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PREFACE 
IN LATE 1991, A REAPPRAISAL OF THE OFFICIAL STATISTICS ON POVERTY 
SHOWED THAT the decline in poverty incidence reported between 195 
and 1988 had been too optimistic. Until then, the government had 
customarily reported an encouraging 8 percent decline in poverty inci- 
dence, from 56 to 48 percent. However, a more refined treatment of the 
data by government agencies themselves later showed that, during the 
period, poverty incidence had fallen by, at most, only 3 percentage 
points, from 58 to 55 percent. Not surprisingly, poverty incidence had 
declined so little even in the years of recovery. 
Events since 1988 were hardly encouraging. Growth slackened 
continuously until the country finally slid into a recession in the last 
quarter of 1990. This recession extended over most of 1992. There was 
a good ground to suppose, therefore, that the poverty situation had not 
improved and may, in fact, have deteriorated. Results available recently 
from the 1991 Family Income and Expenditures Survey, although 
computed on a different basis, show that the number of poor families 
actually increased and poverty incidence worsened between 1988 and 
1991. The government, however, appeared unprepared to undertake any 
signifiacnt initiatives to reverse the trend. At the time, the government's 
economic managers were engrossed in the complex fiscal and financial 
problems related to meeting its targets under a stabilization program. 
Even worse, the steps taken to address the deficit -- such as large cutbacks 
on infrastructure spending and heavy indirect taxes -- seemed to aggra- 
vate the problem by stifling growth further and compromising the 
chances for future development. 
It was in this climate of missed objectives and policy drift that Dr. 
Ponciano S. Intal, Jr. of PIDS approached the group of scholars whose 
work appears in this volume to discuss and write for a project called 
"The Crisis of Poverty." The aims were clear: first, public attention 
needed to be refocused on the most important development goals and 
issues. The overriding question was whether and how poverty could be 
alleviated significantly and in a sustained manner. 
Second, it was the aim to suggest more practicable ways to approach 
these goals, being mindful of the inevitable difficulties in policymaking 
confronted by officials. Rather than merely set directions, the point was 
to present policy tradeoffs soberly and help decisionmakers come to a 
choice. At the same time, it was not lost on the group that the new set 
of national officials to be elected in 1992 might be receptive to a fresh 
and nonpartisan look at the country's problems. 
The message was that measures to redress poverty could not be 
regarded merely as a "special" or sectoral concern. For, without denying 
the need for programs to address some special problems faced by poor 
groups, it is still the direction of mainstream development and 
macroeconomic policies that shall ultimately determine whether pov- 
erty alleviation efforts succeed or fail. The danger on the one hand is the 
shortsightedness of those who make macroeconomic adjustments with- 
out regard for long-term consequences on the poor and on development. 
On the other hand are the poor, or those who work closely with them, 
who feel justified in their skepticism or hostility towards painful but 
necessary economic reforms. But this, too, is a kind of myopia and 
between one and the other fertile ground for useless debate and conflict. 
Where there are no longer any neat and pat answers, however, and 
virtually all solutions require much of everyone, it is hoped that the 
articles included here can contribute towards shaping a working consen- 
sus, if not on ultimate visions, then at least on the urgent tasks at hand. 




THE PAPERS PRESENTED HERE HAVE BENEFITED GREATLY 
from meetings and discussions with numerous persons. Especially 
helpful was a workshop on "Development Issues in the 1990s" sponsored 
by the Philippine Institute for Development Studies in Tagaytay City on 
12-13 June 1992, which was attended by a large number of leading 
scholars and experts in their fields. These included the following: 
Dr. Arsenio Balisacan (UPSE); Dr. Carlos Bautista (Ateneo de 
Manila); Dr. Ernesto Bautista (NEDA); Dr. Ramon Clarete (UPSE); Dr. 
Marian de los Angeles (PIDS); Dr. Benjamin Diokno (UPSE); Dr. 
Herminia Francisco (UPLB); Ms. Milwida Guevara (Department of 
Finance); Dr. Mario B. Lamberte (PIDS); Ms. Jennifer P.T. Liguton 
(PIDS); Dr. Joseph Lim (UPSE); Dr. Gilberto Llanto (ACPC); Dr. 
Rosario Manasan (PIDS); Dr. Erlinda Medalla (PIDS); Dr. Nimfa 
Mendoza (UPSE); Dr. Celia Reyes (PIDS); Dr. Gwendolyn Tecson 
(UPSE); Ms. Ofelia Templo (NEDA); and Dr. Bruce Tolentino (Depart- 
ment of Agriculture). 
Even as they have generously contributed their time, however, 
these persons are not responsible for any of the opinions the authors 
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AND THE FISCAL CRISIS 
Emmanuel S. de Dtoa 
Introduction 
POVERTY IN THE PHILIPPINES TODAY HAS ASSUMED THE DIMENSIONS OF A 
crisis. As of the last official count in 1988, there were 5.8 million 
families in the country living below the poverty line; this is 55 percent 
of the total population. The most recent recession and the power crisis 
have swelled the ranks of the poor owing to large-scale unemployment 
and underemployment. 
Poverty in the country is most stark when viewed against the 
experience of other countries. The Philippines now stands in Southeast 
Asia as the only country where the number of poor families actually 
increased in the 1980s relative to the 1970s, and where the incidence 
of poverty remains virtually unchanged (Fig. 1-1). In all other countries 
of Southeast Asia, Indonesia included, the proportion of the population 
suffering from poverty was reduced by half in a decade, and the absolute 
number of poor families decreased. The incidence of poverty in those 
countries was steadily reduced by at least 1 percent annually over a 
decade (Table 1-1). 
On the other hand, the incidence of poverty in our country fell by 
only 6.4 percentage points between 1971 and 1988, while the number 
5 
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Table 1-1 
Changes in Pomty4ncidence, for Selected Countries 
Years Covered Poverty Incidence 
Annual First Last 
Reduction Year Year 
N N N 
Indonesia 1970-87 2.34 58 17 
Malaysia 1973-87 1.66 37 15 
Thailand 1962-86 1.40 59 26 
India 1972-83 1.04 54 43 
Philippines 1961-88 0.73 75 55 
1971-88 0.38 62 55 
aMeadcount index 
Sources: World Development Report 1990; National Statistics Office for the Philippines. 
of poor families increased by 1.9 million. On the average, the annual 
reduction in poverty incidence was only slightly more than one-third of 
1 percent. 
This record is alarmingly inferior even to that of India, where, despite 
a much larger population, the absolute increase in the number of poor 
has been less over a comparable period, and the reduction in poverty 
incidence much faster. The proportion of the population in the Philip- 
pines unable to meet the most basic needs of human existence is now 
one of the highest in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Even international comparisons have become superfluous in recent 
years since the deterioration in the quality of life for the many has 
become undeniable by merely comparing past with present conditions. 
Based on the most aggregate economic indicators, the country has lost 
ground. Sluggish economic growth and, lately, actual contraction - 
rendered more difficult by natural disasters, bureaucratic ineptitude, and 
repeated political threats - have resulted in record rates of unemploy- 
ment and underemployment and eroded the real incomes of those 
employed. Open joblessness is on the rise once more and is close to 


























6 Emmanuel S. de Dioe 
while underemployment is in excess of 20 percent (see Fig. 1-2). It 
becomes virtually certain, notwithstanding the absence of official 
confirmation, that even the small gains on poverty achieved since the 
mid-1980s are in the process of being nullified in the 1990s. 
The collapse of the economy after a brief spurt of growth in 1987- 
1989 casts doubt on whether and how it is possible to make any headway 
against poverty. Two elements in the present situation should cause 
serious concern. 
First, the past growth had been too slow and erratic to effect a 
significant reduction in poverty. In the end, growth could not even be 
sustained and, since the last quarter of 1990, the economy has been 
contracting. The average income of Filipinos today is not higher than 
what it was in 1977 (Fig. 1-3). Unless basic issues are resolved and 
current trends are reversed, there is a real danger that the economy may 
enter a long period of stagnating incomes and growing joblessness. 
A second source of concern should be that the government's options 
in its efforts to alleviate poverty have never appeared more restricted 
than at present. Caught in a fiscal bind, the government appears inca- 
pable of either ameliorating the problem through the provision of basic 
social services, or stimulating private initiatives that would create eco- 
nomic opportunities for the majority. 
If, indeed, there is a war against poverty, then recent events suggest 
that it is in real danger of being lost and, unless something is done, 
perhaps it will be lost for good. 
In Sections 2 and 3, which immediately follow, we review what is 
already generally known and undisputed about the nature and causes of 
current poverty in the Philippines, as well as other long-term issues 
which exacerbate it. In Section 4, we argue that the fiscal problem, 
combined with the contractionary bias of current efforts to solve it, has 
become the most important obstacle to the resumption of growth in the 
short-run and to the redress of poverty. 
Finally, Section 5 advances a set of recommendations aimed at 
solving the fiscal problem in a manner that allows the government 
sufficient leeway to continue restructuring the economy and resume the 
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Reasons for Poverty 
Poverty initially appears so complex that its solution seems tanta- 
mount to resolving the entire development issue itself. It may, therefore, 
be validly asked whether poverty is not really beyond the capacity of any 
single administration to address, and whether its relief is a futile 
agendum. 
It is important not to mystify the problem, or inaction may result. 
The exact meaning of poverty - absolute versus relative, material 
versus cultural or spiritual' - may be elusive and the subject of inter- 
minable debates. In this country, however, absolute material depriva- 
tion is a dominant reality that further discussion is almost superfluous 
in defining the immediate problem. 
In the most basic terms (Chart 1-1), material poverty must be viewed 
as the outcome of a person's greater or lesser command over output, i.e., 
one's entitlements'. Entitlements arise from two sources: people earn 
private incomes from productive assets they own,' or, regardless of 
income, they may be politically entitled to certain goods and services, 
such as basic education and primary health care. Absolute poverty 
results mainly because the amount and quality of assets a person owns, 
his or her endowments, are low to begin with, or are inadequately 
supplemented by publicly provided goods and services. 
1. The problems generally have to do with the content of "well-being." Some 
distinction may be made, for example, as between command over commodities 
(opulence), satisfaction (desire-fulfillment), or the scope of objective capabilities 
(functionings). These are all valid distinctions, but it can be argued that at palpably 
low levels of existence, the overlap among these is likely to be large. 
2. This terminology is taken from Sen (1984). A household's command over goods 
and services x is limited by its budget according to: (p + Ox = wk - z + s. The left- 
hand side represents total expenditures on goods, where p stands for prices of the 
goods, t the indirect taxes on goods. The right-hand side represents purchasing power; 
k stands for the resources the household owns, w the prices paid for those resources. 
In other words, wk represents its market income. z represents direct taxes. Subsidies 
to goods and services to which a household is politically entitled (e.g., primary health, 
basic education) are represented by s. Clearly, therefore, the government can expand 
or contract the household's entitlements x by: (1) promoting growth so that k 
increases; (2) changing the existing distribution of k; (3) changing subsidies s and 
taxes t and z. 
3. In a market-economy, this depends on prices received for those resources. 
10 
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This fact is well-illustrated in the "hierarchy" of worsening poverty 
in the rural areas. The incidence of poverty increases in the following 
order: orchard growers; rice farmers; fishermen, corn and coconut farm- 
ers. Poverty is highest among the landless farm workers, as can be easily 
seen at the lowest rung of the poverty ladder. 
Confronting poverty, therefore, means enlarging people's entitlements 
in a long-term, sustained manner. This implies either promoting growth 
in their incomes; or redistributing wealth in their favor; or raising the 
level and quality of social services provided them. Of course, these issues 
are neatly separable only in theory. Achieving growth itself may have 
wide-ranging effects on the distribution of resources; or, in some 
contexts, growth itself may not be sustained without a thoroughgoing 
redistribution of wealth and incomes. A certain minimum provision of 
public goods (such as infrastructure) is necessary if growth is to occur. 
Finally, the directions of taxes and public spending are themselves 
Table 1-2 







(000) (000) (%) 
1961 4,426 3,320 75.02 
1965 5,127 3,439 67.08 
1971 6,348 3,912 61.63 
1985 9,847 5,874 59.65 









Sources: National Statistics Office for 1988; Balisacan (1992) Table 1-2, for 1961-1985. 
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powerful instruments to redistribute incomes. Societies, in addressing 
poverty, may choose between varying emphasis on growth, redistribution, 
and the provision of social goods. What is important, however, is 
whether in practice the means chosen are adequate to the problem and, 
no less important, whether they correspond to the social and political 
context in which change is to occur. 
Failure of Growth and the Lack of Employment Opportunities 
In the Philippines, the principal reason poverty has remained high 
was the economy's simple failure to grow rapidly enough, sustain that 
growth, and generate employment a Rapid and sustained economic 
growth results in higher earnings from assets the poor already own; to 
the extent that they are able to save out of these improved incomes, they 
also begin to accumulate a higher level of assets (e.g., work implements, 
animals, land, financial assets). 
Through growth, changes in the poor's material conditions may 
occur without a direct intervention in the distribution of property. For 
this reason, many social reformers in the past have always suspected that 
simple growthmanship is merely a means to avoid resolving the difficult 
social questions of distribution. Nonetheless, both theory and history 
show that the effects on poverty of simply sustaining per capita income 
growth of 6 to 7 percent annually over a decade or so cannot be 
underestimated. It is no accident that most countries which have made 
the most rapid progress in alleviating absolute poverty are also those 
which have managed to sustain rapid growth in average incomes. 
This is not to say that an improvement in the lives of the poor is 
inconceivable except through rapid growth. Through judicious use of 
public resources to provide social services, some countries (e.g., Costa 
Rica or Sri Lanka), have also made headway against poverty short of 
emulating the path of NIC-hood. Nor is this a claim that a society's 
goals can be reduced to those that are achievable through material 
opulence. But again, experience shows that the long-run provision of 
social services will strain public finances unless average incomes - and 
with this the tax base - expand at a respectable rate. Besides, none of 
these qualifications is relevant to the Philippines, because it is not true 
4. This has been compounded by rapid population growth, an issue treated further 
below. 
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that in this country, growth was slower because the poor benefited. 
Rather, growth had been poor, even as the poor have grown. 
The failure of economic growth is also the most important explana- 
tion for joblessness, whether this is manifested as open unemployment 
or underemployment. This is nowhere more evident than in the share 
of industry in total employment. Industry has failed to generate enough 
jobs to absorb a labor force that has grown at almost 4 percent annually 
over the last decade.' Table 1-3 below makes this vivid: the share of 
industrial employment, particularly of manufacturing, is even lower 
today (9.7 percent) than it was in 1960 (12.1 percent). The decline in 
the share of agriculture in employment has been significant; but since 
the industrial share has stagnated, it is services, a large part of which is 
in the so-called "informal sector," which served as the receptacle for 
labor shed by agriculture but which industry failed to absorb. The lack 
of employment opportunities condemns the majority of the labor force 
to jobs with low productivity and poor pay. 
This analysis is vindicated by a stylized fact on poverty:6 two thirds 
of all poor families live in rural areas. The rural character of poverty calls 
for solutions that address the problem in situ. This means removing the 
discrimination against the main activity in the rural areas, namely, 
agriculture. It would be wrong to conclude, however, that a purely 
Table 1-3 
Sectoral Employment Shares 
(%) 
Sector 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
Agriculture 61.2 56.7 53.7 53.5 51.4 49.0 45.2 
Industry 12.6 11.3 12.6 12.1 11.6 10.7 10.7 
Manufacturing 12.1 10.9 11.9 11.4 10.6 9.7 9.7 
Services 26.2 31.5 32.1 34.1 36.5 40.2 44.0 
Source: Philippine Statistical Yearbook. 
5. The labor force increased from 18.2 million in 1981 to 25.2 million in 1991, or 
3.8 percent annually. This is much faster than the population growth rate of 2.5 
percent. 
6. See Balisacan (1992). The poor make up at least 60 percent of the population in 
most regions of the country, except for Central Luzon, Cagayan Valley, and Central 
and Western Mindanao. 
14 Emmanuel S. de Dioe 
agricultural strategy would suffice. Landlessness, overpopulation, and 
low incomes in the countrysides are just as much a direct result of the 
failure to provide better paying jobs in nonagriculture. The same failure 
of industry to provide jobs in the urban areas, which creates a large mass 
of migrant unemployment in the cities, also keeps down wages on the 
farms.' 
The reasons for the failure of recent growth are clear. There was a 
failure, in the long-term, to restructure the economy to make it exter- 
nally more competitive and allow broader participation by the people. 
The economy's propensity to lurch from one foreign exchange crisis to 
the next, in a cycle of boom and bust, is by now familiar. Since the 
1960s the pattern has remained the same: from a recession, each revival 
of the economy involves a massive surge of imports - for petroleum, 
capital goods, and intermediate inputs - making large demands on 
available foreign exchange. Investment, employment, and imports ex- 
pand. But these demands, together with the pressure to service foreign 
debt, are scarcely filled by the earnings from exports8 and inflows of 
foreign investments. The balance of payments goes into deficit. New 
lending stops, and the "stabilization" phase sets in. The government 
cuts down on spending and imposes new taxes; monetary authorities 
tighten money supply. Economic activity, employment, and imports 
fall. Then foreign exchange reserves build up - until the next crisis. 
The country is in such a situation today. Unless the parameters of 
competitiveness are radically changed, the next bout of growth, if it 
happens at all, is certain to be short-lived. 
The character of growth is as important as its magnitude, and the 
former is ultimately related to the kind of development strategy pursued. 
Growth reduces poverty all the more if it widely uses those resources 
owned by the poor, or if it promotes the output from which the poor 
earn their livelihood. However, past growth strategies artificially de- 
pressed the price of the factor which the poor owned, namely their 
labor, and the output of the sector where they are found, namely, 
agriculture. In this sense, what made past growth inequitable also made 
it unsustainable. Privileged sectors, largely industries catering to the 
7. In a simple case, the low wage in the provinces will just be equal to the value of 
a chance at getting a higher-paying job in cities by migrating. 
8. Including remittances by overseas workers, which are exports of services. 
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home market, were protected with high tariffs and quotas, supported by 
fiscal incentives, and given access to cheap foreign exchange. This 
encouraged inefficiency and import dependence, discouraged innova- 
tion, and condoned monopoly power. Above all, the pattern of protec- 
tion penalized the poor, since it discriminated against agriculture, the 
use of labor, the rural areas, and small- and medium-scale industries. As 
a result, it failed to generate expanding opportunities for either employ- 
ment or entrepreneurship. 
To break out of this pattern, the country must restructure its economy 
away from its decades-long dependence on protection and towards 
greater competitiveness, both at home and in the export markets. This 
entails the stimulation of competition through freer markets for final 
goods and inputs, funds, and foreign exchange, among others. Some 
crucial steps in this direction have already been taken: tariff reforms 
have begun, the rules on foreign exchange were recently liberalized, the 
entry of direct foreign investment was relaxed, and government inter- 
vention in many sectors of the economy was reduced. If this restructur- 
ing is not to be half-baked but part of an overall strategy, however, much 
more needs to be done. 
Over the next few years, addressing poverty will mean primarily 
focusing on growth and on the generation of new employment. There 
should be no question that economic growth, if sufficiently rapid and 
sustained, will make a significant contribution to relieving poverty. But 
whether it does so rapidly or not depends on whether the benefits from 
growth are equitably distributed. In the Philippines, this has not been 
the case. Poverty in this country is high because growth has not been 
sustained and because whatever benefits it has generated have been 
unevenly distributed. 
At- the moment, the question that still hangs in the balance is 
whether even simple growth can be revived. The average real incomes 
of Filipinos today are still below what they were a decade ago. Further- 
more, in 1990 the economy faltered badly and finally plunged into 
recession in 1991. GNP growth in the past two years has averaged no 
more than 1.3 percent. This means that the average incomes of Filipinos 
have in fact fallen. 
Unless current trends and policies are reversed, the prospects of 
growth for this year and the next do not go beyond keeping pace with 
population growth, hence stagnating per capita incomes. The ongoing 
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contraction and stagnation of the economy can only mean a steep 
deterioration in the living conditions of the bottom 40 percent through 
layoffs, failure of investment, and higher prices and shortages of basic 
goods and services. Each generation of leaders will have its role to play 
in the resolution of the poverty crisis. The overriding concern of the 
present administration must be to lay the foundations for reviving and 
sustaining a vigorous growth of 6 to 7 percent in average incomes until 
the end of the decade. 
The Inequality of Incomes 
The second most obvious reason for poverty is the highly inequitable 
distribution of incomes, which itself only reflects as well as preserves the 
concentration of wealth. Table 1-4 documents this inequality. A 10 
percent elite in society receives fully 36 percent of total income. The 
richest fifth of the population enjoys more than half of all income. On 
the other hand, the poorest 40 percent receive only 14 percent of total 
income. As may be expected, owing to the tendency of the affluent to 
draw wealth from the countrysides and gravitate toward the cities, the 
degree of inequality is somewhat higher in the urban than in the rural 
areas, creating stark social contrasts. 
No less alarming than the magnitude of inequity is its apparent 
stability. The pattern of inequity has hardly changed in a decade and, 
as if to underscore the point, the income distribution in 1988 was 
virtually the same as that in 1985. 
The effect of unequal income distribution on poverty is readily seen 
through a comparison between Indonesia and the Philippines. Indone- 
sia, with a lower per capita income of $440 than the Philippines' $630 
in 1988, had a lower poverty incidence of only 39 percent (see Table 1- 
5). This reflects a more equal income distribution in Indonesia com- 
pared to that in the Philippines. The richest fifth of the population in 
Indonesia, for example, earned incomes about five times (4.7) that of 
the poorest 20 percent. Compare this with that of the Philippines, 
where the ratio between the eamings of the richest fifth and that of the 
poorest fifth is almost nine times (8-7). On the other hand, Malaysia has 
a more unequal distribution of income than the Philippines; however, 
poverty incidence in Malaysia is much lower since its per capita income 
is nearly thrice that of the Philippines. 
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Some may infer from this that countries have a choice between, on 
the one hand, lower but more equally distributed incomes and, on the 
other hand, higher but more skewed incomes; between equity and 
efficiency. This, however, may be a misleading oversimplification of the 
relation between growth in incomes and redistribution. 
First we note that if the distribution of incomes and wealth were more 
even to begin with, then obviously a given growth in average incomes 
would carry more households across the poverty threshold, as compared 
to a situation of greater inequity .9 For a given rate of growth, countries 
Table 1-4 
Income Inequality: Income Shares by Docile, 1988 
Decile* 
National Rural 
Income Share (%) 
Urban 
First 2.0 2.6 2.0 
Second 3.2 4.0 3.3 
Third 4.1 4.9 4.2 
Fourth 5.0 5.9 5.2 
Fifth 6.0 6.9 6.3 
Sixth 7.3 8.1 7.6 
Seventh 9.0 9.6 9.3 
Eighth 11.6 11.9 11.6 
Ninth 16.0 15.6 15.7 
Tenth 35.8 30.6 34.6 
Total 
Memorandum: 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
Share of Poorest 40% 14.3 17.4 14.7 
Share of Richest 20 % 51.8 46.2 50.3 
*Deciles are arranged from poorest to richest. 
Source: Family Income and Expenditure Surveys, 1988. 
9. Suppose the population consisted of 10 people earning a total income of P100, and 
assume the poverty line was P3. If one person earned P90, while the other nine took 
Pi each, then 90 percent of the population would be poor. Incomes would then have 
to treble, i.e., rise to P300, to pull everyone out of poverty, given the income 
distribution. Suppose instead that income was divided so that five people received 
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Table 1-5 
Poverty Incidence and Per Capita Incomes 
for Selected Countries 
Per Capita Poverty 
Income' Incidence' 
(US$) N 
South Korea 3600 16 
Malaysia 1940 17 
Thailand 1000 30 
Philippines 630 55 
Indonesia 440 39 
a/Figures for 1988 
h/1980-88 
Source: United Nations Development Programme, 1992. 
with more equitable wealth and income distributions can eliminate 
absolute poverty more rapidly. Second, in historical context, we have 
seen that the characteristics of past growth itself reinforced inequity 
rather than reduced it. In these two senses, growth and equity may be 
regarded as complementary. 
On the other hand, this must be tempered by a recognition that, at 
this juncture, it is doubtful whether the magnitude of redistribution that 
can be agreed on through a political consensus will suffice to make any 
greater headway against poverty. The clearest way to see this is simply 
to examine the progress and adequacy of agrarian reform, arguably the 
most established and accepted agendum in Philippine development. 
The efforts of successive regimes, the various popular struggles and 
insurrections through centuries, have made the land-to-the-tiller prin- 
ciple as the dominant property issue to be resolved in Philippine society. 
Agrarian reform would no doubt result in significant improvements 
in the absorption of labor, as well as better incomes for the rural 
population. Nonetheless, it is still possible that the poorest segments of 
P18 each, and the other five received P2 each. Then half of the population would still 
be poor, though less intensely so. The point, however, is that to pull even these out 
of poverty (i.e., raise their incomes to P3 each), aggregate income would need to grow 
to only P150, or by half its original level. 
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Table 1-6 
Crude Population Growth Rates for Selected Countries 
N 
1965-1980 1980-1989 
Philippines 2.8 2.5 
Indonesia 2.4 2.1 
South Korea 2.0 1.2 
Sri Lanka 1.8 1.5 
Thailand 2.9 1.9 
Source: World Development Report, 1991. 
the rural populace, such as the landless workers, may remain largely 
redundant even if the government's commitment to small-peasant 
cultivation were to become more whole-hearted and sincere. With rapid 
population growth through the decades, the land frontier has been 
reached and, as seen above, the current reality is one where agriculture's 
share in employment has in fact been declining. In short, while the 
land-to-the-tiller principle must continue to be asserted, it should also 
be recognized that it may help some but not all sections of the poor. 
Forms of wealth-holding have also become more varied than just 
landholding (e.g., industrial capital, financial assets, or political mecha- 
nisms), so that it is possible that the major inequalities in income may 
no longer to be redressed principally through transfers of land. Put 
another way, it may now be asked - though this was self-evident in the 
middle of this century - to what extent the major inequities in 
Philippine society may still remain even after the land redistribution has 
been accomplished. Corollary to this is the fact that, in the course of 
land fragmentation and acquisition, the set of losers from agrarian 
reform is no longer as clearly identified with the elite as it was before; 
elements of the middle classes may also be affected by a below-fifty- 
hectare land retention limit. 
From a radical viewpoint, what all this implies is that a more thor- 
oughgoing asset reform is required, extending beyond arable land to 
include other forms of property. It is certainly no accident that most 
major asset redistributions have occurred only as a consequence of great 
social upheavals, such as wars and revolutions. But the implicit political 
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judgement contained in this is plain enough and should be discussed 
openly: in the current socio-historical context - and short of the 
leadership's willingness to lead a real social revolution - it should be 
seriously asked whether the social costs of transacting further and more 
radical direct wealth redistributions beyond agrarian reform will yield 
much more as a means of alleviating poverty in the short- to medium- 
term. To this must be added the sober realization that, short of a 
confiscatory policy, current fiscal constraints on the government do not 
permit a major land redistribution. 
There should be no mistake: this is by no means a plea to abandon 
the push for agrarian reform, a social demand which the masses have 
long struggled long for. Rather, it is recognition that agrarian reform is 
unlikely to be completed soon enough to affect the poverty situation in 
the medium term, and that even if fully implemented, it would not be 
enough. Beyond this, reliance must be placed on more conventional - 
admittedly also more prosaic and gradual - means of changing the 
income distribution in favor of the poor. Prominent among these is the 
system of taxes and direct public spending, which up to now has been 
grossly underestimated and underutilized. 
High Population Growth 
High population growth has direct effects on poor families. Where 
unemployment is high, a larger population aggravates poverty simply 
because income per person becomes lower as population expands. This 
has more severe effects on the poor since their families are also larger. 
This implies that the share of incomes received by poor families is even 
more thinly distributed among them. 
The slow progress in reducing population growth in recent years is 
surprising in itself, it puts the country grossly out of line with many of 
its neighbors, both poorer and richer. The magnitude of the problem is 
already evident in a comparison of the crude growth rates of population 
across countries (Table 1-4). The Philippines continues to have one of 
the highest population growth rates in the subregion, namely 2.5 per- 
cent annually over the last decade. This is barely an improvement over 
the 2.8 percent per annum registered in the period 1965-1980. By 
comparison, over the same period, Thailand managed to reduce popu- 
lation growth from almost 3 percent to less than 2 percent, and South 
Korea from 2 percent to 1.2 percent annually. The significance of this 
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cannot be underestimated. Even if, for instance, the economy had not 
performed any better, but Philippine population had hypothetically 
grown at the rate of 1.5 percent (Sri Lanka's in 1980.1989), per capita 
incomes today would be fully 12 percent higher than what they are 
now.lo 
The differences are much more evident when one views not only 
crude population growth but also birth and fertility rates (Table 1-5). 
The Philippines' crude birth rate is still in the high 30s per thousand, 
while other countries have managed to lower theirs to the 20s or even 
less. Filipino women are still projected to bear four children over their 
lifetime, while other countries have reduced fertility to less than three. 
Only 44 percent of Filipino couples practice any form of contraception, 
compared to 70 percent in South Korea, 66 percent in Thailand, and 
62 percent in Sri Lanka. 
The lack of substantial improvement in population issues is puzzling 
since, unlike other priority concerns, there have always been sufficient 
foreign and domestic resources to fund population activities. In this 
country, the population problem has worsened primarily because it has 
been turned, on the one hand, into a narrowly dogmatic issue by some 
circles and, on the other hand, into a question of political survival by 
pragmatic politicians who will not risk a religious controversy. As a 
result, politics has abdicated on one of the most crucial development 
issues of our time. The inevitable conclusion is that the basic failing has 
simply been one of political conviction and will. The next few years will 
decide whether a change finally occurs. 
Declining Productivity 
The significance for poverty of increasing productivity is direct and 
needs little discussion. For a given distribution of ownership of produc- 
tive assets, incomes will be higher the higher the productivity. Produc- 
tivity itself is the magnitude of output obtained for a specified amount 
of one or a set of inputs; it is synonymous with the efficiency with which 
those inputs are used. For labor, in particular, the link between produc- 
10. This is easily seen from simple algebra. The ratio of the hypothetical to actual 
per capita incomes after t years is given by h = (y°(l+g)°/(l+rs)`]/{y°(l+g)`/(l+rB)`I _ 
[(I+re)/(l+r,)]','where re is the counterfactually lower rate of growth of population 
than the actual rate rA, the growth rate of income is g, and y° is the common base, 
year income. 
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tivity and market incomes is close, since the price or rental paid to a 
factor by the market reflects, by and large, its productivity. 
But for some time now, the country has been caught in a serious 
productivity decline. Although statistics are piecemeal, there is an 
unmistakable trend that both industry and agriculture have lost signifi- 
cant ground relative to those of other countries. 
Various industry studies (e.g., Hooley 1985; World Bank 1987; Aus- 
tria 1992) have repeatedly pointed out that total factor productivity (or 
the efficiency in the use of all types of productive inputs) has been 
declining for most of the 1960s and 1970s, which were periods of 
relatively high growth. Austria (1992) estimates that total factor pro- 
ductivity has been mostly declining for the 1960s, 1970s, and most of 
the 1980s.11 There were improvements in 1986-1987, but given the 
economic weakening since 1990, the situation could not have improved 
and might even have worsened in recent years. 
At the enterprise level, productivity is largely in the hands of owners and 
managers who must choose the scale and techniques of production, as well 
as devise the relevant pay and incentive schemes for workers. Workers' 
responses in terms of effort depend on how well they are motivated by these 
efforts as well as on their level of ability. Viewed in this manner, there would 
seem to be little room for public policy, since it may be presumed that both 
workers and managers rationally choose their actions in the light of prevail- 
ing demand and technological conditions. 
But from a broader viewpoint, the most important reason for the poor 
showing in industrial productivity has been the diversion of resources away 
from the more productive to the less productive sectors, in accordance with 
the flawed strategies discussed earlier. In industry, the grant of effective 
protection to capital-intensive, import-substituting sectors cheapened their 
inputs, encouraging their uneconomic use; in particular, the use of labor has 
not been sufficiently encouraged. The concurrent protection of output has, 
in the meantime, removed the threat of competition from imports, encour- 
aged collusion among domestic manufacturers, and rendered innovation 
virtually superfluous. In due course, a phalanx of inefficient and 
uncompetititve protected industries was built up.22 
11. Hooley estimates that total factor productivity (TFP) fell annually by 0.7 percent 
in 1956-1970 and by 2.23 in 1971-1980. Similarly, Austria computes an annual 
decline of 0.6 percent in TFP over the period 1950-1987. 
12. This statement holds true even if, more recently; the crises in power and 
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Table 1-7 
Demographic Trends for Selected Countries 
N 
23 
Crude Birth Fertility Contraceptive 
Rate° Rate" Rate, 
1965 1988 1965 1988 1987 
Philippines 42 30 6.8 3.9 44 
Indonesia 43 27 5.5 3.3 45 
Thailand 41 22 6.3 2.5 66 
South Korea 36 16 4.9 1.8 70 
Sri Lanka 33 21 4.9 2.5 62 
a/Number of live births per thousand population in a year. 
b/Number of children bom to a woman over her childbearing years in accordance with 
prevailing age-specific fertility rates. 
c/Percentage of married couples practicing any form of contraception. 
Source: World Development Report, 1991. 
Even in the agricultural sector, evidence shows that the growth in crop 
productivity has slowed down considerably in the last decade, so that 
agriculture grew at only 2.1 percent annually, or more slowly than popula- 
tion has grown. (Table 1-8). This poor performance contrasts with those of 
neighboring countries where agricultural performance improved in com- 
parison with that of the previous decade. This arises largely because the land 
frontier has been reached, investments in irrigation have lagged behind, 
and further technological innovations that could raise yields per hectare in 
various crops have not been forthcoming. 
The latter, in turn, was due to the underinvestment in agricultural 
research, a task that lies principally with the public sector. There has been 
a continuing decline in the real value of government spending on research 
in agriculture. In particular, real expenditures on agricultural research in 
1990 were estimated to be only 60 percent of their levels of a decade ago.13 
infrastructure added a burden to industrial firms, though these were not of their own 
doing. 
13. In contrast, the bulk of increases in real spending has been in the areas of agrarian 
reform and price support. (These data are by A. Baulita and C. David, as cited in 
Balisacan, Clarete and Cortez 1992.) 
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Table 1-8 
Average Annual Growth C/o) of Real 
Agricultural Gross Value-Added for Selected Countries 
1980-1990 1970-1980 
Philippines 2.1 4.8 
Bangladesh 2.9 1.8 
India 3.4 .1.1 
Indonesia 5.3 1.3 
Malaysia 3.8 3.8 
Thailand 2.5 4.9 
Source: David, Ponce, and Intel (1992), Table 6-1. 
Added to the inadequate attention to agricultural research was the 
depressing effect on agricultural prices of the subsidies to urban food 
consumers, particularly for rice and corn. Government intervention in 
the food grains market sought to reconcile low prices for the consumer 
with higher prices for the producer, and food sufficiency for the country. 
In practice, however, this has not worked. Despite short-term interven- 
tions and consumer complaints about inadequate protection, prices to 
producers have remained low on the average. Because of government's 
efforts to "stabilize" rice and corn prices through imports, for example, 
the protection afforded to farmers has actually been less than if the 
relevant tariff of 50 percent had simply been applied.'a 
These low prices over time represent a powerful disincentive to 
production which, through time, has eroded the very goal of self- 
sufficiency (not to mention export competitiveness) which the country 
sought to achieve. 
The trend toward declining real wages should, therefore, come as no 
surprise. Declining productivity in both industry and agriculture, com- 
bined with growing unemployment, put a huge downward pressure on 
wages which well-meant palliatives such as sporadic political accommo- 
dation of minimum wage demands can never hope to remedy. 
The proper responses to the problem of declining productivity are 
similar between industry and agriculture. In both, distortions of prices 
14. Between 1985 and 1989, for example, rice farmers were actually penalized by a 
negative nominal protection rate of -13 percent (David, Ponce, Intal (1992) Tables 6- 
1 to 6.3). 
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have either discouraged production or have drawn resources into the 
more unproductive sectors. In both, too, technological improvements 
have been few and far between. For agriculture, this is because of a 
decline in public spending on research and development, as well as on 
irrigation and infrastructure. The need here is for greater and more 
focused public spending in these areas. In the case of industry, however, 
no amount of research and development at public institutes can substi- 
tute for the firms' own efforts at upgrading techniques. But this depends 
mainly on whether private firms find a need to exert technological effort 
as an imperative for survival.15 Hence, what is required is a reform of the 
industrial strategy to expose domestic firms to competition and to the 
need to innovate. 
Inadequate Provision of Social Services 
Social services are claims on resources provided to the poor by the 
government. These services are unrelated to the assets the poor own or to 
the incomes they earn. In this manner, people's entitlements become 
greater than'what their market incomes alone would warrant. The provision 
of essential social services - especially basic education, primary health care, 
and sanitation - contributes directly to people's productivity and to their 
capacity to help themselves. The potential productivity of the poor, and 
hence, their future incomes, are raised. "Investing" in human beings to 
improve their productivity is one of the few important ways society can 
work toward its goals of growth and equity. 
Compared to other poor countries, the country would at first glance 
not appear badly placed in terms of aggregate expenditures and indica- 
tors on education and health. For example, the country has one of the 
highest rates for basic literacy in the region (some 93 percent). Basic 
literacy means being able to read and write a simple message in any 
language. But closer scrutiny reveals deep problems. It has been esti- 
mated by the program "Education for All" that in 1989 more than one- 
fourth of the population were functional illiterates, the illiteracy rang- 
ing from being "totally unable to use the written word" to "failure to 
15. A vivid illustration of this was the textile modernization program, which aimed 
to upgrade the hitherto inward-oriented textile sector so that it could integrate into 
the dynamic garments export sector. Despite the availability of large amounts of loans 
from the World Bank, there were few takers, simply because technological upgrading 
was not a requisite in order to survive in the protected domestic market. 
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master of set of sophisticated skills." It has also been estimated that in 
the last decade, 1980-1989, the number of simple illiterates increased 
from 5.8 million to 6.25 million, or by 450,000. 
None of this is surprising. Over time, there has been severe pressure 
on budgets for social services. A large part of the problem relates to the 
fiscal crisis. 16 Owing to budgetary constraints, the public budget for 
education has barely covered what is necessary to keep up with the 
growing number of students, not to speak of sustaining or improving the 
quality of instuction. As a result, although the share of education in the 
obligations budget has remained steady, the real value of public spend- 
ing on education has fallen, and there has been a steady decline in the 
quality of public basic education. The same is true for health, housing, 
and sanitation. 
On the other hand - and this is the second point - there exist 
major imbalances of allocations even within budgets. In health, for 
example, the share of primary or preventive health care to total public 
health expenditures may be as low as 25 percent. Tertiary public health 
care (e.g., hospitals) takes up 75 percent. This is a patent misallocation, 
since hospital care is obviously a lower priority among the poor and may 
actually be covered through an expansion of group schemes for medical 
insurance, such as an enhanced Medicare system. 
In all, there is great room for improving the provision of social 
services within the next few years, both through an expansion of 
budgetary allocations to catch up and improve on per capita require- 
ments, and a stress on priority areas, such as basic education and 
preventive health care, even at the expense of nonpriority ones such as 
tertiary education and hospitals. 
The provision of social services focused closely on the poor is an 
important redistributive tool in society. This is especially clear when the 
services so provided are financed through progressive taxation of in- 
comes and wealth (although this is not the case at present). Then it is 
most clear that the affluent subsidize the less well-off. But even if they 
are financed by public borrowing (especially through monetization), 
these expenditures may be progressive, to the extent that inflation cuts 
down the real value of the government's indebtedness to the rich, in 
effect taxing the latter to benefit the poor. 
16. This is discussed further in the following pages. 
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Three Parallel Issues 
In addition to reasons for absolute poverty described above, there are 
parallel issues which must be resolved because of their own merit and 
also because they heavily influence the likelihood of success of the 
measures chosen to address poverty directly. The following discussion 
makes no pretense at exhaustiveness, but includes the most important 
areas involved. 
Changing Prices and Allocation 
A basic point in the preceding argument was the need for a fundamental 
restructuring of the Philippine economy toward greater efficiency and 
competitiveness, if it is to provide employment sufficient to make an impact 
on poverty. However, it should be anticipated and frankly explained that 
real restructuring will deeply affect the present crop of industries as a result 
of shifting strategy and of the structural reforms this will entail. Conse- 
quently, vulnerable groups of the population may be hurt, at the least in the 
short- to medium-term. Unless properly managed, therefore, poverty may 
actually increase during the period of restructuring, and popular resistance 
to the program may build up. 
Examples of particularly controversial changes will be exchange rate 
depreciation and tariff reforms, which are necessary to promote export- 
competitiveness and to protect the current account, or the deregulation 
of politically sensitive goods, such as petroleum or rice. Exchange rate 
depreciation will raise the prices of most goods and services across the 
board over a certain period. This will cut into the incomes of fixed- 
income earners, such as wage-workers and government employees. 
For some of these changes, it may be argued that the source of 
difficulties lies not with the adjustment or restructuring measures them- 
selves, but with the original situation of unsustainable distortion, which 
has typically gone too far and makes wrenching price changes inevita- 
ble. The painful adjustments arising from tariff reform, for example, are 
simply the outcome of long periods of continuing to protect the "wrong" 
industries which have, by and large, failed to become competitive and 
have stagnated. That a tariff reform now inevitably hurts such indus- 
tries, cuts into profits, and makes some employment in them redundant 
may in principle be attributed to the original situation of overprotec- 
tion. Of course, such hindsight, though valid, would do little to com- 
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pensate the workers actually displaced. However, a hypothetical com- 
parison cannot be avoided with a situation in which the protective 
system had instead been more moderate and even-handed, adjusted to 
keep the country competitive. In the latter case, much fewer invest- 
ments and employment in the "wrong" industries will have taken place, 
and the large costs of adjustment will not have occurred. The same may 
be said of devaluations postponed until the crisis cannot be denied. 
Another difficulty with previous measures that hurt the poor was the 
fact that they occurred in a context of incomplete or partial reforms, at 
best.17 For example, while the export sector benefited from past devalu- 
ations, numerous producers for the domestic market were typically 
caught in a price-squeeze. Rice farmers, for example, saw the prices of 
inputs (fertilizer and other imported farm chemicals) rise, while rice 
prices could not keep up since these were under price controls for the 
benefit of urban consumers. This illustrates the problem of "second- 
best," taking on one problem without tackling the rest. Reforms rein- 
force one another, and devaluation would clearly favor the rural poor 
more if the price controls on agricultural products were also to be 
removed. As for poor consumers, a food subsidy program based on 
stamps would cushion the effect of large price changes without resorting 
to price controls. 
Similarly, much of the pain associated with past experiences with 
devaluation stems not from devaluation itself but from the measures 
accompanying it. For example, some counterfactual investigations show 
that past devaluations need not have been as wrenching for the poor if 
monetary and fiscal policies had not been as tight. (See Box 1 for a 
discussion.) In this sense, an autonomously determined adjustment may 
be more sensitive to the trade-offs involved and, in this manner, impose 
smaller short-term costs on the poor, compared to adjustments which 
adhere to externally determined norms. 
The undeniable costs which some sectors of the poor must bear 
during a period of economic restructuring cannot be used as an argu- 
ment against such a restructuring. For, ultimately, the present system is 
demonstrably a failure and its preservation is what has kept the poor 
poor. Instead, what is called for is a careful design of policies which will 
hurt the poor the least, or if the burden must be borne, will distribute 
17. In the chapter on recommendations, the proper timing and method of accom- 
plishing a depreciation is discussed. 
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these in the fairest manner. The need for political participation by the 
sectors who may be potentially affected, e.g., urban working class and 
other fixed income-earners, in the plan and design of reforms should not 
be underestimated. The difference between misery and sacrifice is not 
the magnitude of pain, but a belief in its purpose. 
Infrastructure, Markets, and the Poor 
Even as much of mainstream economic theory lauds the virtues of 
markets, or deplores the consequences when markets fail, there is very 
little in it which says exactly how markets are created where none 
existed before. If markets do not exist, then it must be that transactions 
costs - i.e., the costs of using a market - are too high. Now there are 
many types of transactions costs, but it can be argued that the one clear 
market-creating function of government is to provide infrastructure to 
lower the costs of using markets. Transaction costs may be measured as 
the difference between the prices as perceived by sellers and as perceived 
by buyers. Missing or inadequate infrastructure drives a wedge between 
the two, lowering the price received by the producer and raising that 
confronting the consumer, dissipating even the profits of middlemen in 
pure expenditure of resources in transport and handling (see Box 2). In 
the limit, producers relapse into self-sufficiency, not because it is tech- 
nologically impossible to produce more, but because it is not economi- 
cally worthwhile to do so. 
The significance of infrastructure, energy, and other utilities on the 
lives of the poor has tended to be neglected in discussions regarding 
poverty. Instead, the tendency has been to think that infrastructure 
typically benefits those who are already well-off. The reasoning behind 
this is manifold, but includes the notion that infrastructure is useful 
only for those who have surpluses to sell, thought to be an excess over 
direct subsistence requirements. From this view, of course, the poor - 
who are defined as subsistence agents - are excluded hypothetically 
from the potential beneficiaries of infrastructure. As a result, programs 
for the poor are thought to be restricted to those which have some 
characteristics especially tailored to them (e.g., subsidized credit pro- 
grams). This approach may certainly be warranted to some extent. 
Unfortunately, it merely reinforces the paternalistic notion that the 
poor are different somehow, thus mystifying their condition and con- 
tributing to their marginalization. On the contrary, what should be 
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Box 1 
GROWTH, INFLATION, AND THE EXCHANGE RATE 
Owing to past experience with the phenomenon, many constituencies 
have been formed which oppose devaluation. Most people have come 
to regard impending changes in the currency's value as a threat to real 
incomes as well as to employment. This widespread resistance has not 
been lost on political leaders, either. 
It should be understood, however, that the past adverse 
consequences of large devaluations (in 1962, 1970, 1983, and 1984) 
have occurred largely because of (a) its timing, and (b) the monetary 
and fiscal policies which accompanied it. Large devaluations have 
typically been undertaken only under duress, after a bout of 
unsustainable economic expansion had exhausted international 
reserves. As a result, there is a close association between the 
devaluation itself and economic contraction, which at that point 
becomes unavoidable. Moreover, devaluation has been accompanied by 
tight monetary and fiscal policies. The effect of the latter has been a 
contraction of credit, higher interest rates, and an accompanying rise in 
cost-push inflation. 
Generally the exchange rate should be adjusted in order to 
compensate for higher domestic prices relative to world prices, changes 
in the terms of trade, and changes in the balance of trade. 
A recent study (Lim 1992) sought to find out what the effects would 
have been 4 the exchange rate had displayed the following hypothetical 
pattern in the previous years: 
realized is that the entire effort should in fact be to pull the marginalized 
sectors into the mainstream and that, in many cases, no more special 
tools are required to boost the lot of the poor than simply to reorient the 
provision of standard economic and social services in order to give the 
poor access to markets. 
In reality, infrastructure affects the lives of the poor through several 
channels. First, and most obviously, to the extent that labor is utilized for 
infrastructure in situ, especially in road building using labor-intensive tech- 
niques, direct employment is provided. There has generally been positive 
experience with the various "emergency employment" or "countryside 
employment" schemes of different administrations, although it should be 
admitted that most of these were of a transitional, pump-priming nature. 
Second, the absence of infrastructure is an important hindrance to 
investment and employment expansion. It is certainly no coincidence 
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1987 1988 1989 1990 
Hypothetical 21.11 21.11 25.76 32.75 
Actual 20.32 20.45 22.32 24.87 
Difference(%) 3.9 3.2 15.4 31.7 
The result is that economic growth would have been higher by as 
much as 2 percent in 1989 and 5 percent in 1990 if the exchange rate 
had been adjusted. The fundamental reason this happens is that there 
is a kick given to exports, mostly industrial, at the same time that 
imports are stemmed by the higher peso prices. As a result, the trade 
balance improves, and international reserves accumulate. 
Depreciation undoubtedly has effects on inflation. However, even this 
effect can be regarded as moderate. Even if the exchange rate had 
been P32.75 to the dollar by 1990 (more than 30 percent higher than 
the actual level), inflation would have been higher only by 8 percentage 
points. 
The crucial reason for these different results is that under a more 
autonomous adjustment strategy, it is possible to do things differently 
than under an IMF program, which dictates a contraction in money 
supply. If, instead, money supply is allowed to expand as foreign 
reserves increase, interest rates do not rise, credit does not contract 
for private businesses, and, therefore costs do not rise by as much. 
The point is that the inflation accompanying past devaluations was not 
at all necessary. Some of it could be avoided if other macroeconomic 
policies had been different. Things could have been done better. 
that the least poor among rural households include rice farmers and 
orchard growers who have access to infrastructure. To the extent that 
private investment in poor areas is hindered, employment fails to be 
generated and the lot of the poor deteriorates. 
Less noticed, however, is the fact that infrastructure enhances pro- 
ductivity among the poor. Rural roads make it easier for the poor to gain 
access to markets for final goods and services and to sources of produc- 
tion inputs. Irrigation projects raise farm productivity and incomes. 
Electricity and communication facilities are crucial if off-farm employ- 
ment in the rural areas is to be generated. The final offshoot of this is 
that infrastructure lowers the costs of production and exchange, to the 
benefit of consumers, many of whom are in turn also poor. 
Unfortunately, it is precisely in investment in infrastructure where 
the backlog has been particularly severe. Even before the fiscal crisis in 
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Box 2 
TRANSPORT AND TRANSACTIONS COSTS 
By mode, road transport accounts for the majority of total freight 
movements (60 percent), while interisland and coastal shipping account 
for 40 percent. For regions utilizing mainly road transport, procurement 
is limited to those covered by better roads and relatively peaceful 
towns; otherwise, circuitous routes are resorted to, hence, increasing 
travel time and transport costs. 
"Thus to the extent road conditions affect the choice of routes, 
transport cost (and hence price spreads) become variable. Moreo- 
ver, road conditions also bear heavily on vehicle operating cost 
(VOC). The National Transport Planning Project (NTTP 1987) cites 
that VOC is at least 25 and 50 percent higher, respectively, on bad 
and very bad roads, than on good ones. By the same token, travel 
time for cargo vehicles increases by at least 60 and 110 percent, 
respectively, on bad and very bad roads. Because of this, hauling 
rates within regions are also reportedly higher when applied to 
recent years, there has already been a severe decline in real infrastruc- 
ture spending. In Fig. 1-4, the trends in real government expenditures 
for various forms of infrastructure are shown for the period 1980-1990. 
Total infrastructure spending in 1990 was only some 60 percent of levels 
in 1981. This can only have been heightened with the onset of the 
budget crunch beginning last year. The biggest losers have been power 
and electrification, especially in the rural areas, and communications, 
which is dominated by a private monopoly."' Infrastructure typically 
bears the brunt of cuts in spending during periods of "austerity" since, 
as distinct from current expenditures such as compensation for public- 
sector employees, there is no urgent political pressure to prevent such 
cuts from being made. The myopia of such action should be emphasized. 
Although the constituency served by infrastructure lies in the future, its 
neglect can have crippling effects which cannot be easily remedied. The 
large across-the-board losses from the continuing power outages should 
be sufficient proof of this. 
18. This monopoly has since been recently reinforced by legal restraints on compe- 
tition, particularly the Supreme Court's decision to prevent interconnection and the 
operation of an alternative gateway, and the successful bid to deny a franchise to a 
credible competitor. 
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gravel-surfaced as against cemented or asphafted roads. For 
example, short distance rates along gravel-surfaced roads (Region 
VI) can be as high as P16/ton/km compared to P1.73 on cement or 
asphalt roads. Post-harvest losses also tend to be higher on routes 
marked by poor roads. As seen in the table below, even for rela- 
tively short distances, the loss can be as high as 1 percent of total 
cargo.- 
Rice Post-Harvest Losses During Transportation 
(% of total crop) 
Vehicle Distance Road % 
Route Used (km) Surface Loss 
Tuguegarao-Manila 10-wheeler 484 cement/asphaft 0.005 
Kabalan-Davao City 6-wheeler 140 cement/asphaft 0.005 
Tacurong-G. Santos 10-wheeler 95 gravel/earth 1.000 
Sources: Alburo (1992); Table from Cabanilia (1991) as used in Album (1992) 
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The energy crisis has been worsening since 1989 with no quick relief in 
sight. No amount of cramming (now also called "fast-tracking") can hope 
to make up for years of scrimping and neglect. This merely proves the old 
adage that you can pull on a string, but you can't push on it. Unless placed 
in perspective, the current mood of desperation threatens to sacrifice much 
of what is structurally sound for what is politically expedient and gives the 
impression of action. In this mold are toe moves to exempt energy projects 
under "fast-track" and BOT (build-operate-transfer) schemes from the 
environmental impact assessment of the Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources (DENR), as well as the hasty revisions of judgement 
regarding the operation of the Bataan nuclear plant. Even the duty-free 
private importation of generators - arguably the best cramming measure 
under the circumstances - is a step backward in the long-run, to the extent 
that it artificially cheapens what is actually a costly and more environmen- 
tally damaging source of energy. 
The basic lesson is the need for longer-term planning, which should 
have placed priority on building new plants, developing energy sources, 
maintenance, distribution efficiency, and the rehabilitation of existing 
plants. A more forward-looking view of the current energy shortage 
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well. If the government's concern for the environment is at all taken 
seriously, for example, there should be an equal stress on ways to reduce 
the energy-intensity per peso of value-added, such as, energy conserva- 
tion measures, more energy-efficient building design, etc. It is evident 
that not all of this is encompassed in the simple expedient of creating 
an "energy czar" or energy department. 
Finally, the direction of infrastructure is crucially linked to whether 
it helps poorer sectors and areas in catching up, or whether it merely 
serves to heighten inequalities. If more infrastructure spending is to 
contribute to poverty alleviation, enough of it should be concentrated 
in the poorer areas. Unfortunately, this has not been so. The amount of 
infrastructure expenditures devoted to Luzon and to Metro Manila in 
particular is disproportional to their share of population; even when 
cutbacks are made, cuts in the national capital region are least. The 
relative affluence and political articulateness of some sectors of the 
metropolitan populations doubtlessly have a greater weight in decision- 
making. However, even as it is tempting for government to respond to 
urban blight and congestion by throwing more money into metropoli- 
tan infrastructure (e.g., flyovers) it should be realized that this type of 
spending is not that which will most address poverty, which is to be 
found instead in the more depressed rural areas. In the end, to continue 
the urban infrastructure bias would only be self-defeating, to the extent 
that it encourages further migration from the poor areas and worsens 
congestion. 
The Poor and the Protection of the Environment 
The environmental crisis the country now faces is severe and must be 
taken on its own terms. But it is important to note how environmental 
degradation is all at once an aggravation of poverty and, to some extent, 
also partly caused by poverty itself. 
To a great degree, the environmental crisis is an infliction on the 
poor. Historically, the large-scale denudation of forests and the deple- 
tion and destruction of fishing areas, for example, were perpetrated for 
decades by interests far removed from those of the adjacent communi- 
ties. It was these local communities, many of them poor, which would 
be condemned many years after to suffer the resulting losses of lives, 
livelihood, and biodiversity. 
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On the other hand, it cannot be denied that to some extent, poverty 
itself causes an understandable myopia which make poor people contrib- 
ute to environmental degradation. Kaingin farmers, whose practices 
hinder second-growth forests, the urban poor's contribution to problems 
of waste and congestion, and small-scale mining are examples that come 
to mind. Meanwhile, a failure to address the environmental problems 
has severe effects on the quality of life among poor people (e.g., destruc- 
tive floods; poor income prospects owing to energy lack; poor health and 
sanitary conditions). The dilemma is to what extent environmental 
concerns ought to be considered, in the context where short-term 
survival and the need to earn current income is the priority. 
There is now a general consensus, in principle at least, that the trend 
of degradation, both in terms of "green" (forestry and aquatic resources) 
and "brown" (pollution) issues, must be reversed. Much of the remain- 
ing disputes are really over the nature of the measures to achieve these. 
As a familiar example, the controversy over whether a log ban should 
be "total" or "partial" really pertains to the ease of implementing or of 
monitoring such a ban. Proponents of a total ban on commercial logging 
point out that the uniformity of a total ban - quite apart from its 
symbolic effects - makes it easier to implement. This argument is 
weakened, however, by the fact that even then only "commercial" 
logging is to be banned (a concession to poor wood-gatherers). The 
technology now afforded by chain-saws also makes it easier to engage 
even smaller outfits to continue to supply sawmills with logs illicitly. 
Hence, at the same time that a total log ban would drive up the price 
of lumber, making illicit logging even more attractive, it also becomes 
more difficult to monitor compliance since legal lumber is physically 
indistinguishable from the illegal one.19 This merely illustrates the point 
that the important questions are now unlikely to be settled by mere 
posturing or manifestations of good intent, but only by an objective 
appraisal of the bureaucracy's resources and implementing capacity 
relative to other alternatives. In the coming years, therefore, greater 
attention should be paid to studying various alternative forms of reduc- 
ing environmental damage. 
19. Presumably, all legal lumber would have to be imported under a total commercial 
ban. It is, of course, possible to design more elaborate monitoring mechanisms under 
such a scheme, e.g., permitting imports only of non-indigenous species, but this would 
not escape the problem of bureaucratic discretion endemic to all quantitative regulations. 
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Until now, the government's approach to environmental protection 
has been mostly regulation, sanctioned by criminal penalties. This has 
two disadvantages, however: First, its effectiveness relies heavily on the 
capacity and willingness of the bureaucracy to monitor, both of which 
are in short supply. Second, regulations which are effective and easy to 
implement are also blunt instruments, with few distinctions being made 
between the rich and the poor violators, or between high- and low- 
value producers. Yet in fact, such equity or value-added considerations 
cannot be ignored in practice. For example, even the total logging ban 
must distinguish between "commercial" and "noncommercial" logging. 
Once such distinctions are made, however, the simplicity and ease of 
implementation are lost, since discretion again comes into play. 
There are two insights, not novel but heretofore neglected, which are 
helpful in designing new mechanisms for environmental protection. 
The first is that assigning well-defined and stable rights of property and 
usufruct may lead to responsible management of resources. Examples of 
these would be proper forest management by local or ethnic communi- 
ties, or, from a different viewpoint, even large-scale corporate tree 
plantations, as are to be found in other countries. In these instances, if 
the horizon is sufficiently long to allow the user to reap what he sows,20 
there will be an incentive for private agents to achieve sustainable 
yields. An important reason environmental resources have been de- 
graded is that no clear property rights have been defined over who may 
use them; hence, unlike private property, there is no incentive for 
anyone to conserve or sustain them.21 In theory, of course, the state is 
the steward, but it is a poor one in practice owing to limited resources 
and the bureaucracy's susceptibility to corruption. Thus, the assignment 
of long-term rights to users avoids making too heavy demands on the 
bureaucracy; instead, it becomes the interest of users of natural resources 
to police themselves. When the assigned stewards or users are them- 
selves poor communities (e.g., communal rights over forests of poor 
farmers or fisherfolk), the preservation of the environment also serves 
the additional purpose of alleviating poverty. 
20. There is a suspicion, for example, that the short periods encompassed by logging 
concessions, among others, discourages responsible forest management since there is 
no certainty that the future benefits from current replanting efforts will be enjoyed 
by the same concessionaire. 
21. This is known in the literature as the "tragedy of the commons." 
38 Emmanuel S. de Dive 
The second useful insight is that proper taxes and subsidies (also 
known as "market-based" mechanisms) that approximate resource pricing 
and environmental costing can encourage individuals to adopt more 
socially responsible behavior. A major problem with simple penalties 
and prohibitions is that it is difficult to make them responsive to the 
individual status and needs of people without their rapidly becoming 
complex. Simply prohibiting polluting activities which the poor engage 
in as part of a coping mechanism (see Box 3 for the example of pollution 
from small-scale mining) is difficult to do, again since it taxes 
government's ability to monitor and conflicts with the goal of social 
justice. 
By contrast, taxes and subsidies may be so chosen or combined with 
regulation to reflect the gravity of the environmental damage and the 
economic status of those affected. The recent move to substantially 
increase stumpage fees on logging (RA 7161, 1991) is an example. The 
reason such fees were relatively low is that in the past they were viewed 
primarily as a revenue source. The viewpoint proposed here is that such 
taxes and fees should be regarded primarily as regulatory mechanisms, 
with revenues earned being incidental. The difference is crucial. If the 
purpose of a tax or a fee is to minimize environmental damage rather 
than earn revenue, then it ought to be set at a very high level, to the 
point of discouraging the activity (thereby earning less taxes). 
Another example of the potential use of taxes for the environment 
is mine-waste and -tailing fees, which are currently paid by large mining 
corporations to compensate for damages caused to private farmlands and 
fisheries. Again these fees are largely negligible at their current levels" 
(see Sanchez and Balagot 1992). The reason is that even at their current 
rates they suffice - indeed, fund surpluses are even registered - to 
fulfill their narrow legal function, which is compensation for damage to 
private property-holders. That such fees approximate full compensation 
of privately borne costs is in fact doubtful since they are currently based 
on assessed property values that tend to understate production and 
market values. What is not also contemplated is that the fees may 
actually be lower relative to the damage to public or common resources 
22. For eight mining companies mentioned by Sanchez and Balagot (1992), the fees 
amounted to no more than 0.3 percent of operating costs, although mining companies 
on their own also spend on environmental protection (0.5 percent) and on tailings 
ponds and dams. 
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(e.g., public land and infrastructure, aquatic and inland water resources) 
or the need to maintain tailings impoundments once mines are aban- 
doned by the mining firms. 
These two examples show that existing laws dealing with fees and 
taxes must be reoriented away from the traditional goals of mere revenue 
generation and legal compensation for private damages (torts) and 
toward the goals of efficiency and conservation. 
A final point is the different approach required in dealing with environ- 
mental degradation caused by the poor. In general, of course, to the extent 
poverty itself causes people to abuse the environment, the relief of poverty 
through other means indirectly helps the environment. It has also been 
mentioned previously that one way of addressing the problem, where 
applicable, is to endow the poor with rights over resources, to serve as an 
incentive for them to conserve these. In the case of market-based mecha- 
nisms, however, taxation according to the "polluter-pays" principle is obvi- 
ously unimplementable, since the poor are insolvent to begin with. What 
is indicated instead is a combination of regulation and subsidies given to 
encourage the poor to adopt environmentally friendlier practices. 
The emerging thrust to do so through programs like social forestry 
and community-based reforestation, which are indicative of "win-win" 
strategies, should be sustained and expanded in coverage. Similar such 
strategies which simultaneously address the poverty and environmental 
deterioration problems should be pursued in other situations. 
Poverty, Public Debt, and the Fiscal Bind 
The preceding sections outlined the possibility of reducing poverty 
principally through the achievement of rapid and sustained growth in 
employment and incomes. This growth is to be achieved by placing the 
economy on a competitive footing. Growth is to be supplemented by 
the provision of indispensable social services (basic education, health 
care, and investments in human capital) and infrastructure and utilities 
which are biased toward making an impact on the poor. In this impor- 
tant sense, this approach differs from the naive view that growth will 
simply "trickle down" from the top. Nonetheless, there is a recognition 
that, given the present political configuration, direct asset redistribution 
beyond agrarian reform is not likely to proceed rapidly; therefore, the 
main redistributive measure would have to be progressive taxation of 
incomes. 
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Box 3 
SMALL MINERS AND POLLUTION 
"Mercury pollution from small-scale gold mining is perhaps the most 
environmentally lethal problem associated with the mining industry. 
Small-scale gold miners make use of mercury to combine with gold to 
produce the amalgam, and the tailings and effluents containing mercury 
from amalgamation during panning and milling activities have been 
dumped in areas adjacent to rivers, endangering natural, water systems, 
"...Small-scale miners in 'gold-rush' areas use blowtorches to 
separate mercury from the gold or silver amalgam, This technique of - 
gold recovery exposes those involved in the activity to mercury vapor, 
a serious health hazard, and leads to soil and water contamination, 
which is likely to cause environmental problems in the years to come. 
Existing regulations prohibit the use of blow-torching to recover gold; its 
continued use suggests the ineffectiveness of enforcement. 
"... Monitoring of water bodies in affected areas reveal high 
concentrations of mercury of up to 62parts per million (ppm) in 
Administrations, past and present, to a greater or lesser extent, have 
put in place reforms to finally turn the comer on development. The 
most noteworthy of these include the programs on import-liberalization 
and tariff reform, the liberalization of nationality rules governing the 
entry of foreign investments, the trend to privatization, and the law 
allowing private-sector participation in public infrastructure. Most 
recently, in the most innovative move yet, the present administration 
removed all restrictions in foreign exchange transactions; in particular, 
exporters may now opt to retain all their dollar earnings. These are 
certain to yield positive results for growth and poverty alleviation in the 
long pull. 
It is important to revive the economy in a manner consistent with 
carrying through the basic economic reforms. These reforms provide the 
strong signal to domestic and foreign investors that the new government 
is committed to restructuring the economy. 
What, then, constrains the prospect of such a program of growth on 
a sound basis and, eventually, of the reduction of poverty? Ironically, 
not one of the grand themes of development, but something much more 
mundane: a fiscal problem. The single issue that most complicates the 
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sediments and 0.0204 ppm in water, way above the 0,002 ppm 
standard set by the World Health Organization. Ambient air quality in 
areas in Davao, where 'gold-rush' mining proliferates, reportedly 
exceeds the permissible levels of mercury set by the WHO. Mercury 
pollution of the air and water poses a severe health hazard to man. 
"...Because small-scale miners are mostly poor who venture into 
small-scale mining for economic survival, an approach of using 
subsidies with regulation may be more appropriate to the alternative of 
imposing charges and regulation.'' 
"Encouraging the setting up of processing plants that accept tailings 
from small-scale miners and which include in, their process the recovery 
of mercury has been recommended as a means of mitigating the - 
pollution arising from small-scale mining. Tax incentives or interest rate 
subsidies to investors are concrete ways this objective may be 
achieved." 
So=e_ Sanchez and Balagot {1992 
chances for reviving and sustaining growth at this time is the public- 
sector deficit. Under the current short-term preoccupation with fiscal 
restraint and monetary ceilings, the government is losing much of its 
fiscal leeway to address the problem of poverty decisively. The viability 
of some of many reforms themselves are threatened as a result. 
A chain of external events and past policies related to the debt crisis 
has culminated in one fact: the debt burden is now largely reflected in 
a seemingly unsupportable fiscal deficit caused largely by interest pay- 
ments on domestic borrowings (Medalla 1992). Interest payments by 
the national government between 1987 and 1991 ran from 5 to almost 
7 percent of GNP and caused most of the observed deficit. Yet, in Table 
1-9, it will be seen that in 1989 and 1990, although the apparent public- 
sector deficit seemed to have been increasing, there actually would have 
been a surplus if interest payments were taken out. 
With large chunks of the budget being pre-empted by debt service, 
the financial authorities - at the prodding of multilateral creditors - 
chose the course of fiscal austerity and monetary restriction, at times 
carrying it out to the extreme. The measures chosen in 1991 were to cut 
back on expenditures, especially infrastructure, and to impose large 
indirect taxes such as the 9 percent levy and the taxes on petroleum 
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products. As a result, in 1991, the deficit was reduced to 2.5 percent of 
GNP, which was tantamount to running a surplus of 4.1 percent of 
GNP on items not related to debt service. The severe contraction in 
investment and employment in 1991 and 1992 was the logical result. 
The historical link between the country's present fiscal difficulties 
and the foreign debt crisis cannot be denied. An important reason for 
the dramatic rise of domestic debt between 1986 and today was certainly 
the lack of access to adequate foreign financing or, alternatively, debt 
relief. Instead, there were large outflows of resources from the country 
to its foreign creditors between 1986 and 1989. There was certainly no 
shortage of public effort or of good reasons in the past to persuade the 
government to pursue an alternative debt strategy to stem that outflow. 
Nevertheless, the government persisted in its "nonconfrontational" 
stance on foreign debt. 
Pursued long enough, however, any policy, even a wrong one, may 
become logical through sheer inertia," such as the strategy of accommo- 
dating foreign debt for six years. Controversial as it was, the conven- 
tional "nonconfrontational" approach to resolving the foreign debt 
issue has resulted in the following: First, the debts of many private and 
publicly controlled corporations (such as the bad assets of the Philip- 
pine National Bank and the Development Bank of the Philippines) 
were transformed into debt of the national government. Second, the 
debt to foreign commercial banks was gradually reduced, while corre- 
spondingly the debt to foreign governments and multilateral institu- 
tions increased. Finally, the policy of continuing to repay and even 
retire some foreign debt, while maintaining some minimum level of 
spending, was accomplished through domestic borrowing. As a result, 
the national debt is now primarily public, with a good deal of the 
payments being owed to residents, while the foreign debt is owed mainly 
to official sources. 
One thing the previous financing strategy bought was time. By 
borrowing heavily domestically, the previous administration was able to 
hold off making difficult political and economic decisions. It was able 
to continue servicing the foreign debt, as well as refrain from cutting 
government spending as drastically as it should have if the full burden 
of foreign debt payments had to be borne immediately. However this 
23. A more picturesque metaphor would be "painting oneself into a corner," which 
is in the same class as "closing the barn door after the horse has left." 
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Table 1-9 
Public Sector Surpluses (Deficits) 
(% of GNP) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Total Public Sector feficit° (2.2) (3.6) (4.1) (5.4) (2.5) 
NG Interest Payments (5.2) (5.5) (5.7) (6.6) (6.6) 
Primary Public Sector Su'rplus' 3.0 1.9 1.6 1.2 4.1 
a/Includes the national government, the ventral Bank, major corporations, local 
government units, government financial institutions, and the Oil Price Stabilization Fund. 
b/Equals total public sector deficit less NG interest payments. 
Source: Medalla (1992), Table 2-3. 
option ceases to exist when the burden of servicing domestic debt itself 
becomes large and unsustainable. As can be seen above, however, that 
point has now been reached. Domestic debt service itself is now the 
main pre-emptor of public resources. 
Even as the challenge of poverty has never loomed larger, therefore, 
the government has never appeared more powerless to solve it. Owing 
to the perceived preeminence of fiscal difficulties, the government has 
very few degrees of freedom in dealing with poverty effectively. 
Access to goods and services may be provided either through markets, 
as people themselves earn incomes, or through political entitlements 
provided directly by government, such as the provision of health care, 
education, etc. The present situation is both complex and critical, 
however, since the government cannot cope with even the modest 
demands of a growing population; the sectoral share of the budget 
allocated for social expenditures, for example, is always seriously threat- 
ened with erosion owing to the requirements of debt service and fiscal 
austerity. 
Though social services may be inadequate, one may argue that it is 
largely through the functioning of markets and people's access to them 
that one hopes to see relief of poverty. If the government fails in some 
areas, then indeed the market might take over, and earned incomes may 
grow enough for people to pull themselves out of the morass of misery. 
The current program presupposes that the deficiencies of public invest- 
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ment in the provision of employment and revival of growth can be made 
good by private, including foreign, investments. In this respect, much 
optimism has been reposed in the efficacy of the abovementioned 
structural reforms which the country has undertaken. 
Even here, however, the fiscal deficit casts its shadow. For there is a 
certain minimum of public expenditures needed in order to "create" 
markets and make them work.24 One example is the absence of roads to 
transport the production of poorer farmers and give them access to 
cheaper inputs. The thousands of potential and actual jobs that have 
been lost because of the failure to invest publicly in energy is also 
sobering. Yet these are precisely the ones being sacrificed under the 
current policy of adhering to tight fiscal and monetary targets. The 
inability to provide counterpart financing - lest targets be violated - 
is an important hindrance to the implementation of the infrastructure 
program. 
In the immediate future, therefore, it is fair to say that no apparent relief 
of poverty can be found either through direct public provision or through 
markets and private initiative. In either case, the crucial question turns 
around whether the State can regain its fiscal freedom and lay the founda- 
tions for resolving poverty through growth and redistribution. 
The dilemma confronting policy-makers is as follows: an expansion 
of the deficit through borrowing cannot be financed indefinitely, since 
it is thought that that would lead sooner or later to renewed inflation." 
On the other hand, a continuation of "stabilization" and a suspension 
of action invites current discontent and long-term stagnation. This 
impasse has meant that the rationale behind many structural reforms 
themselves is in danger of being crowded out by the exigencies of fiscal 
bean-counting. 
Not only would a continuation of such a course lead to a sacrifice of 
immediate growth objectives, there is a real possibility even structural 
24. Textbooks on theory typically begin with the assumption that markets exist. It 
is probably more important from a development viewpoint, however, to investigate 
how markets arise or are created. The strong presumption is that governments 
probably have a large role to play in the reduction of transactions costs. 
25. Sooner, if the deficit is immediately monetized; later, if financed through 
Treasury bills, since larger and larger amounts of these must be tolled over and 
ultimately retired. 
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reforms themselves may be endangered or reversed. For cxample, with- 
out the quid pro quo of providing the basics such as energy and infra- 
structure, local business is likely to harden its resistance to a continua- 
tion of trade liberalization and tariff reforms, as well as to the commit- 
ment to the vision of the Asean Free Trade Area (AFTA). The strong 
peso regime resulting from the current recession raises valid questions 
whether domestic businesses are adequately protected against imports, 
and whether the government is serious about export promotion (all 
exhortations to export notwithstanding). The fiscal circumstances have 
ko built up a bureaucratic constituency for a postponement or vitiation 
of structural reforms. Such for example is the Central Bank's interest in 
maintaining an overvalued peso in order to limit its foreign-exchange 
losses. 
The experience with the recent liberalization of exchange rate rules26 is 
the most striking illustration of how the fiscal crisis has stood in the way of 
a more fundamental restructuring. While the exporting sector and the 
public in general have been led to expect that exchange rate liberalization 
would result in a depreciation of the peso and a recovery of export- 
competitiveness, it has actually led to a further appreciation, worsening the 
distortion. This should really be no surprise, however. Exporters' howls 
notwithstanding, there is nothing artificial about the current exchange rate. 
The central bankers are right in saying that the rate is that which would 
prevail without intervention. But the reasons for this should be clear. 
Extremely tight money targets and fiscal cutbacks have been directly respon- 
sible for stifling economic activity. As a result, domestic investment and 
employment, imports, and the demand for foreign currency are at their 
lowest." The peso is strong because the economy is weak; and twenty-four 
pesos to a dollar is precisely the rate to be expected from an economy in 
recession. What is pathetic is that, from this desperate situation, some would 
argue for a return of Central Bank intervention, this time from the side of 
supplementing dollar demand, clearly a step backward. In truth, what is 
needed is simply an appreciable relaxation of fiscal and monetary targets. 
26. In itself an important and laudable move. 
27. Another factor contributing to the strong peso has been the larger-than-usual 
international reserve owing to, among others, the rescheduling of debt service payments 
for 1992 and the strong inflows from overseas contract workers. These should not 
hinder, but rather facilitate, a more liberal growth-oriented program of spending. 
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In brief, the fiscal problem-or, more exactly, the official preoccupa- 
tion with it-has metamorphosed into one of the largest obstacles to a 
resumption of growth in the short run and to its being sustained in the 
long run. In this sense, it is bound up significantly with addressing the 
problem of poverty. Unless decisive action is taken soon, the timing - 
if not the very wisdom - of many structural reforms may come into 
question, and both economy and society could be engulfed by a process 
of irreversible immiserization. 
Direction and Reform of Policies 
The problem of poverty has always seemed large and complex. It will 
seem novel, if not strange, therefore, that the bulk of actions suggested 
here to deal with it appear to address the problem indirectly at best. 
There are three underlying reasons for this nontraditional approach. 
First, as shown in the previous sections, the principal and quickest 
means for alleviating poverty in its present form is a broadly-based and 
sustained revival of economic growth leading to rising incomes for the 
majority. Second, this growth in incomes is to be accomplished mainly 
through the action of market forces. Third, however, there is an indis- 
pensable minimum of government provision and intervention required 
to create and stimulate the operation of markets (e.g., energy, infrastruc- 
ture), especially in more depressed areas, upgrading the most basic social 
services for the poor and providing safety nets to the most vulnerable 
groups. 
In the first two years, generate employment rapidly by adopting 
a growth-oriented spending program. Secure debt relief and 
additional foreign aid to finance massive infrastructure. 
There has recently been an encouraging shift in official language about 
changing the preoccupation of economic policy with "stabilization" to one 
with "growth." Nonetheless, it is important to be clear that, under present 
circumstances, this is significant only if it entails a lifting of the prevailing 
tight fiscal deficit and monetary ceilings. 
In the face of widespread unemployment and underemployment, the 
immediate need is to revive investment and generate more employment 
quickly. This cannot be done unless the government devotes a minimum 
amount of resources to expand and maintain transport and communications 
infrastructure and energy supply. Spending should be pursued more 
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aggressively, with most of it devoted to catching up with delayed energy and 
infrastructure projects, where there has been a huge backlog. This in itself 
should suffice to restart the economy in the short-term. Austerity in these 
areas is misplaced and may be likened to imposing a slimming diet on the 
starving. Indeed, the public deficit is partly an illusory problem, since it is 
largely caused by a large debt-service component. Without this, the national 
government's budget would actually be in surplus; therefore - without 
denying the possibility of improving the efficiency of the use of funds - the 
picture of current profligacy is misplaced. 71 Nonetheless, the issue of how to 
finance such additional spending needs to be soberly addressed. It is argued 
that the only lasting solution is more efficient and equitable tax collection. 
But this leaves the question open as to how the economy should be revived 
in the short-term. 
The conventional fear regarding greater spending is that it will either 
rekindle inflation (when spending is financed by creating money) or 
raise interest rates substantially (when it is raised through borrowing 
domestically). On the other hand, there are those who cite the econo- 
my's low starting point and the magnitude of excess capacity. In such a 
situation, similar to the 1986-1987 episode, inflation is less of a prob- 
lem; government spending rather stimulates production. 
Simulations with the NEDA-PIDS model (Box 4) suggest results that are 
mixed, at worst. That is, in the short run, there would be both higher 
growth and higher inflation. In all events, however, greater government 
spending (in this case on infrastructure) results in higher real GNP than 
otherwise. An increase of P10 billion in the deficit, devoted to infrastruc- 
28. Another way to view it is to compute the "real budget deficit," deflating the value 
of the government's debt service by the price level. The argument for doing so is that - unless inflation is expected to be nil or negative-the government may always 
expect some gain from redeeming old debt with pesos having lower purchasing power 
than at the time the debt was contracted. Using this measure, Krugman et al. 
(1992:35-6) found that the country was in fact running a balanced budget or a surplus 
from 1987-1990 and that "the apparent fiscal problem may be largely an illusion due 
to inflation." 
Real and Nominal Public-Sector Deficits 
M of GNP) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Nominal Deficit 5.0 2.3 3.8 4.3 5.4 
Real Deficit 1.2 -2.6 -1.2 -1.1 -0.4 
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ture, raises GNP growth by 0.28 to 0.54 percentage points. Inflation would 
be moderately higher the more the spending relies on expanding money 
supply. Domestic borrowing to finance the deficit results in a slightly better 
growth response and lower inflation. This merely shows, however, that 
higher budgets cannot and should not be entirely financed either by 
domestic borrowing or money creation. 
From a macroeconomic viewpoint, probably the least disruptive course 
would be for government to secure additional external funding (either 
through additional official assistance or through further substantial debt 
relief) with minimal counterpart funds, to be used to finance the 
unavoidably capital- or import-intensive parts of the infrastructure pro- 
gram, such as energy, telecommunications, and ports and shipping. The 
role of the private or non-government sector in implementing these 
projects would be complementary. BOT and BT schemes financed by 
ODA could allow projects to be undertaken without bloating the 
national government's deficit. To preclude further subsidies to NPC, for 
example, private firms rather than the NPC itself may build new power- 
plant capacity. 
In this manner, the government may judiciously spend more and 
revive the economy without fanning inflation or crowding out invest- 
ments (and raising its own debt service) through higher interest rates. 
In brief, the formula must be: borrow as much foreign funds as is needed 
to finance capital-intensive infrastructure; use money-creation and do- 
mestic borrowing for employment-intensive ones. 
Relax the monetary targets to lower interest rates, to adjust 
the exchange rate, and to support recovery and growth. 
Overhaul the Central Bank and obtain debt relief. 
For the first two years at least, an'appreciably larger public-sector 
deficit can be financed through a combination of foreign borrowing, 
domestic borrowing, and monetization, with a preference for the first. 
There is no compelling reason to hold urgent infrastructure and energy 
projects hostage to the passage of new taxes and revenue measures. 
Looser monetary targets are also essential if the chances of sudden and 
large increases in the interest rates and distorted exchange rates are to 
be avoided as the government pump-primes the economy. 
The current monetary ceilings as set under the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) stabilization program are undoubtedly too low to support sound 
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growth. No better evidence of this can be seen than in the vicious cycle in 
which monetary policy finds itself. In the first place, because of the tight- 
money regime, government deficits push up T-bill rates. Especially since the 
liberalization of the foreign exchange market, this has attracted short-term 
speculative capital from abroad (also called "hot money"); dollars are 
exchanged for pesos, expanding the supply of pesos and raising international 
reserves. All this would be fine, except that the Central Bank feels itself 
absolutely bound to its monetary targets under the IMF program. It then 
proceeds to "mop up excess liquidity,," by issuing more T-bills and CB bills, 
making interest rates higher than they would be otherwise. But this 
encourages even more "hot money" to come in. 
Inflexible IMF ceilings on money supply have robbed the monetary 
authorities of all credibility in their attempts to influence interest rates 
and the exchange rate. IMF test periods have become predictable hunt- 
ing seasons for profiteers and speculators in search of high interest rates. 
Attempts to set the peso's value at competitive levels through dollar 
purchases are ineffective, since it is completely anticipated that such 
purchases, by releasing money into the system, cannot continue lest 
they violate IMF-imposed targets. 
Of what relevance is all this to the poor? Two things are relevant. 
First, through all of this, the peso strengthens even further relative to 
the dollar owing to the hot money inflows and weak economic growth. 
This wreaks havoc on the export industries and employment, as foreign 
buyers begin to find Philippine goods more expensive in their own 
currencies and switch to other country-suppliers. Nor is all well for 
domestically oriented firms; they must now contend with both weak 
demand and threat from cheaper imports.30 In all, employment suffers 
further, the recession deepens, poverty worsens. 
Second, as long as interest rates remain high, the government must 
contend with heavy expenditures simply to service existing debt. If the 
monetization route is largely closed, government must resort to ever 
larger floats of securities to finance its deficits; then it may continue to 
run after its own tail, borrowing increasingly larger amounts to service 
29. By which it apparently means any liquidity beyond the program targets, regardless 
of how circumstances have changed in the meantime. 
30. For example, as a result of the strong peso, foreign packaging materials now 
appear cheaper than their domestic substitutes. 
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Box 4 
THE IMPACT OF INCREASED 
GOVERNMENT SPENDING 
Suppose the government were to increase its spending by P10 
billion. The fears that have been expressed regarding this have been 
that it will result in substantially higher inflation if it is achieved by 
increasing money supply; or that it would raise interest rates and crowd 
out private investments if it is done by borrowing domestically from 
residents. While these effects are certainly conceivable, their exact 
magnitudes depend on the situation. 
Various runs of the NEDA-PIDS macroeconometric model show that 
for every P10 billion increase in the national government deficit, there is 
a gain of 0.28 to 0.54 percentage points in the growth rate of GNP, 
depending on how it is financed. External financing yields the biggest 
positive impact on GNP, provided that the effects of the exchange rate 
appreciation are allowed to pass through to domestic prices. 
Regardless of how the financing is achieved, however, the increase 
in the inflation rate never exceeds 0.62 percentage point. The 
inflationary impact is lowest when financing comes from abroad due to 
lower peso price of imports. 
The effect of a higher deficit on the interest rate is also small. In 
fact, the real interest rate falls when the higher deficit is combined with 
a corresponding increase in money supply. When there is instead a 
resort to domestic borrowing, the P10 billion increase in spending 
increasingly larger debts. Again this is bound to crowd out more produc- 
tive spending on infrastructure and social services. 
It is, therefore, vital to seek an immediate revision of the monetary and 
fiscal programs, currently enforced by agreements with multilateral credi- 
tors, to reflect the changed conditions. This effort can succeed only if it 
proceeds from the country's highest political and diplomatic channels to the 
creditor-governments and highest decisionmaking bodies at the 1MF. 
Apart from adopting more relax monetary targets, there are other 
measures that can be adopted to ease interest rates. The completion of 
financial reforms, as discussed below, will help lower interest rates 
substantially. Monetary restrictions such as the high reserve require- 
ments and the gross receipts tax on banks should be relaxed. Liberalized 
entry of foreign banks, smaller denominations and alternative market- 
ing networks for Treasury bills in order to attract small savers should also 
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translates into an increase of only 0.17 percentage points in the nominal 
interest rate and 0.11 percentage points in the real interest rate. 
As it turns out, the actual deficit resulting from increased spending is 
much smaller, since higher incomes also raise revenue collections. 
Option 1. Increase spending by P10 billion, financed by increasing the 
money supply by the same amount. 
N 
GNP growth +0.49 
Inflation rate +0.62 
Interest rate +0.22 
Option 2. Increase spending by P10 billion by borrowing the entire 
amount domestically. 
N 
GNP growth +0.49 
Inflation rate +0.06 
Interest rate +0.17 
Option 3. Increase spending by P10 billion by borrowing abroad. 
N 
GNP growth +0.54 
Inflation rate -1.12 
Interest rate -0.49 
Source: Based on Reyes (1992 
provide healthier competition-to the existing crop of commercial banks 
and lower the costs of government borrowing. 
Finally, external financing and a credible debt-reduction package will 
further ease the pressure on interest rates and thereby help reduce the 
government's debt-service burden. This will also serve to finance an 
essential part of increased infrastructure spending. 
The results of past strategy in dealing with the debt to foreign 
commercial banks are fait accompli; with the smaller size of that debt, 
the leverage left in dealing with it aggressively has likewise diminished. 
Yet there is still the pending matter of obtaining relief on foreign debt 
to official sources. This should be pursued at the highest political levels. 
Alternatively, the resource transfers may be improved through higher 
new inflows and more liberal terms. In the interests of transparency and 
justice, the private entities whose domestic and foreign liabilities were 
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generously assumed by the government and the Central Bank should 
also finally be disclosed and investigated, with possible recoupment of 
their other assets if irregularities can be proved. 
The Central Bank's deficits must be immediately transferred to the 
national government under a separate account. In exchange, the Central 
Bank must be replaced by a Central Monetary Authority (CMA) independ- 
ent of the executive with full-time monetary board members.31 The purpose 
of this is to enable the CMA to conduct its operations more objectively as 
a normal central bank would, and in particular remove its bias against 
exchange rate changes. A special foreign loan, possibly from the World 
Bank, should be obtained to finance the reforms involved under the transfer 
and reduce the burden of the national government. 
Higher monetary ceilings, as well as the economy's incipient growth from 
added spending, should permit a credible depreciation of the currency, 
allowing the country to regain competitiveness.32 The crucial role of prompt 
exchange rate adjustment in this strategy cannot be overemphasized; with- 
out it, the higher expenditures to revive economic activity would simply 
find their way out of the country as extra imports, rapidly depleting inter- 
national reserves. The result would be a reversion to the familiar boom-bust 
pattern. The rise in prices occasioned by devaluation also enhances revenue 
collections.33 The full returns to such an approach may be reaped in the 
structural kick to exports and gains in employment a year or two after. 
Deregulate and depoliticize entry and pricing in the power 
sector to achieve efficiency and lower prices. 
Petroleum pricing. A swift deregulation of the power sector is necessary in 
order to remove once and for all the purely political considerations that 
31. "Full-time" membership in the monetary board implies that members must be 
professionals with tenure. There is no compelling reason they should come from the 
banking sector. Needless to say, there should be safeguards that they divest them- 
selves of all other (especially corporate) interests to avoid insider trading. 
32. An important reason the monetary authorities cannot credibly devalue the peso 
now, even if they so desire, is the existence of monetary ceilings. The Central Bank's 
action of buying dollars in an incipient devaluation can hardly be taken seriously so 
long as market participants know the former is constrained by IMF ceilings limiting 
the release of large amounts of pesos in the system. 
33. E.g., tariff collections in peso terms may increase. 
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enter into energy pricing. The prices of petroleum products should be 
deregulated as soon as possible and the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) 
abolished. The best time to do this is now, when world prices for petroleum 
are soft and deregulation results in stable or even lower prices. The scheme 
of things under the new regime of deregulation should be carefully ex- 
plained to the public, so that expectations are levelled off.34 Through an act 
of Congress, revenues hitherto collected from the OPSF may then be used 
to fund needed infrastructure. The role of the Philippine National Oil 
Company (PNOC) as price competitor and countervailing power to the 
large private oil companies should be played to the hilt to protect the public 
against possible oligopolistic excesses. 
The deregulation of petroleum prices should, of necessity, also lead to the 
deregulation of fares for at least some categories of public transport, espe- 
cially at the higher end where commuters are willing to pay higher fares for 
better quality (e.g., air-conditioned buses, upscale passenger shipping). At 
the same time, cheap mass transport with regulated rates should continue 
to be afforded, possibly through a system of cross-subsidies, to those who 
choose to use it. The point of all-round deregulation is to encourage the 
private sector to create markets for a broader range of services and, through 
competition, ensure that the public is served. 
Power generation. The moves to allow the private sector freer access 
to their own power sources through duty-free imports of generators, as 
well as the "fast-tracking" of gas turbines, are acceptable as stop-gap 
measures in a situation hopelessly compounded by past errors. On the 
other hand, it should be recognized that from a technical and a strategic 
viewpoint, both financial and environmental costs of many of these 
projects are huge, and even now, the investment efforts that must be 
promoted should focus on cheaper energy sources (e.g., hydroelectric 
and geothermal). Rehabilitation and maintenance of power plants must 
be accelerated. 
Beyond the current energy crisis, the aim of more fundamental 
reforms in the sector should be how to ensure dependable and cheaper 
power to households and industry without causing a continuous drain 
on the national government's resources. Foremost among these reforms 
34. In particular, it should be made clear that increases in world prices shall 
henceforth be fully reflected in domestic prices. 
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is a complete redefinition of the role of the National Power Corporation 
(NPC). Present energy prices are economically distorted, and contem- 
plated rate increases are unjustified, since they pass on to the public the 
costs of past mistakes and corruption within NPC. Instead, the national 
government should once and for all assume part of NPC's past losses to 
remove the distortions in pricing and reduce the burden shouldered by 
household and industry users. In exchange for the government's assump- 
tion of its losses, the NPC's generating plants must be privatized. NPC's 
role should then be refocused at simply maintaining the power grid. The 
aim should be to achieve greater efficiency in power transmission to 
minimize losses and to lower prices to both industry and households. 
Focus domestically financed infrastructure on projects to link 
rural areas with markets. 
The share of real capital expenditures on infrastructure must be 
increased, with an improvement in the shares of the regions besides 
Metro Manila. A suitable target is to recover the real 1983 levels of 
public investments within two years. This means the growth of real 
infrastructure spending must be greater than the projected over-all 
growth of the economy. These targets are over and above those needed 
to resolve the acute and recurring difficulties of resettlement and reha- 
bilitation of the population displaced by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. 
Apart from energy projects, new spending must not neglect road and 
other transport infrastructure, as well as small-scale irrigation. This, 
aside from lowering prices, makes the greatest impact on employment by 
encouraging investment. To the extent possible, the projects imple- 
mented must use labor-intensive techniques. 
The main purpose of infrastructure spending should be to link pro- 
duction units to markets, and markets with one another. (This is in 
contrast to infrastructure which seeks merely to reduce commuting time 
within urban areas). It is ultimately this type of infrastructure that 
creates the most markets and enhances their efficiency. Key ports must 
be expanded over a three year period, particularly in Northern, South- 
ern and Western Mindanao, and in Eastern and Western Visayas. It is 
highly recommended that a five-year public investment program be 
specified, concentrating on linking rural areas to urban centers, on 
inter-provincial road networks, farm-to-market roads, interconnection 
power facilities, and telecommunication interfaces. 
Poverty, Growth and the Ai cal Crtete 55 
It is urgent to define a clear system for identifying infrastructure 
priorities and implementing projects, especially with the impending 
changes occasioned by the Local Government Code. Responsibility and 
competence for defining intra-interregional and trans-provincial link- 
ages should be vested in the regional development councils (RDCs). 
Implementation should, of course, remain with the line agencies. In 
drawing up plans for specific areas, it would be desirable to coordinate 
projects with line agencies based on the desired direction for regional 
development and the degree of expected industrial growth. For example, 
DTI may the lead agency for Calabarzon, DA for Southern Mindanao, 
DTI for Central Visayas, etc. Plans for these regions should then be 
consistent and mutually supportive. 
However, other than for these levels, the facilities and personnel of 
infrastructure agencies must be transferred to local governments. Infra- 
structure identification, design, ranking, and implementation should 
rest with local officials at the appropriate level: the municipality for 
barangay projects, the province for municipal ones. To support this 
decentralization, the government needs to start immediately the inten- 
sive programs on training and technical assistance. 
Despite strong arguments for consolidating all infrastructure resources, 
political realities may require setting aside funds for other infrastructure 
(e.g., for barangay halls, municipal buildings, multipurpose areas, etc.). 
Nonetheless, clear objective criteria should be drawn up to determine 
priorities. The situation should be avoided where resources are me- 
chanically spread out too thinly, with the result that no projects are 
completed 35 
Equally effective in pursuing regional equity in the distribution of 
resources are actions meant to reduce the apparently insatiable infra- 
structure needs in Metro Manila. This may be done through a greater 
decentralization of personnel and functions in the regions for many 
government departments, or through deliberate dispersion of amenities 
hitherto monopolized by the metropolis (e.g., a programmed morato- 
rium on the expansion of private universities in Metro Manila, and 
eventual dispersal to the provinces). 
35. Where, e.g., budgets are to be cut by 10 percent, it is better to complete 90 
percent of projects than to leave each project only 90 percent completed. 
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Let the exchange rate fully and immediately reflect the higher 
demand for foreign currency as the economy recovers and as 
structural reforms are implemented. Institute safety nets to 
protect the vulnerable groups. 
The liberalization of the exchange rate regime in the first days of the 
present administration is in itself a bold step forward and lays the 
foundation for future progress. Until and unless monetary and fiscal 
targets are revised, however, it will still fail to provide the acid test of 
the present administration's will to change the economy's orientation 
once and for all. On the contrary, the present episode shows the danger 
of piecemeal reforms. Exchange rate liberalization without monetary 
and fiscal relaxation has effected a change completely opposite to that 
desired: overvaluation. This has resulted in the loss of export markets, 
the collapse of export firms, and a deprotection of domestic industry, all 
of which contributed to growing unemployment and poverty. 
The direction of change in the exchange rate must be immediately 
reversed if the country's competitiveness is to be restored. Given the fact 
of foreign exchange liberalization, this can be achieved only with the 
revival of growth advocated above, upon which one should observe the 
peso begin to depreciate.36 If and when this latter strategy is adopted, 
however, further measures are required. The rise in prices resulting from 
a depreciating peso will clearly cut into real wages and salaries, bringing 
pressure for across-the-board increases in nominal wages and adjust- 
ments in the user-charges for certain utilities (especially power). On the 
other hand, full wage- and price-adjustment would nullify the effects of 
devaluation itself. 
Concrete programs must, therefore, be readied beforehand to com- 
pensate the most vulnerable sectors. These should include expansion of 
the scope of social services, as well as devoting part of the increases in 
expenditures to an upgrade of salaries in the public sector. Straight 
subsidies for food provided exclusively for the poor in both rural and 
urban areas should be seriously considered." It should be frankly admit- 
36. If foreign exchange liberalization had not preceded pump-priming, a one-time 
devaluation would have been possible. 
37. Balisacan (1992b) shows that increases in food prices contribute more to poverty 
(both urban and rural) than increases in the prices of utilities, water, transport, etc. 
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ted, however, that none of these will fully offset the loss in incomes 
occasioned if a depreciation is to have any lasting effects. The worst 
possible scenario would be if the effects of a nominal devaluation were 
to be completely offset by full adjustments in prices and wages. Then a 
political price would have been paid without economic gains, and it 
would be arguable whether the move should have been undertaken in 
the first place. 
Reinforce the structural reforms already in place; accelerate 
these when possible. 
What is sound and already in place should be kept and strengthened. 
There is already widespread agreement that the momentum of structural 
reforms already achieved should be maintained. While many of these 
may not be perfect with respect to their phasing and some particular 
provisions, much of the costs have already been paid, and it would be 
costlier to backtrack on them. 
The new government should reaffirm its commitment to the direc- 
tions of important past measures. These reforms promote competition 
and greater efficiency within and among industries. Among the most 
important have been the following: 
Trade reforms. The current thrust of government in the trade policy 
area is one of pursuing greater trade liberalization and a near-uniform 
tariff of 15 percent. Toward this end, quantitative restrictions - mainly 
in the form of import bans or prohibitions and import-licensing require- 
ments - on a substantial number of items have been removed, and 
Executive Order 470, which narrows the tariff range, has been promul- 
gated. These trade reforms should be accelerated in full preparation for 
participation in the proposed Asean Free Trade Area (AFTA). There 
should be no wavering from the aim of a uniform 15 percent tariff across 
all sectors (see Jurado 1992). In the end, any remaining quantitative 
restrictions should be limited to those relating to security, health, and 
sanitation. 
The present administration has recently passed further trade reforms 
reinforcing this policy thrust. Executive Order 8 raises tariffs on a number 
of items, while a Central Bank Circular simultaneously removes these same 
The poverty headcount increases by 3.6 percentage points owing to a 20 percent 
increase in food prices. By contrast, only an increase of 0.2 percentage points results 
from a 20 percent increase in utilities prices. It should be noted, however, that these 
capture only direct effects. 
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items from the list of regulated imports. These measures are an encouraging 
move to change the form of protection away from quantitative restrictions 
and toward tariffs (quaintly called "tariffication"). Nonetheless, it should be 
realized that these are mere first steps. As long as the new tariffs are just as 
h igh as the quantitative protection,38 no gains in efficiency may be expected 
(although government earns additional revenue). Nor is the ultimate suc- 
cess of such moves certain. Even now, however, some sectors continue to 
lobby for the withdrawal of these reforms. Again, the value of standing firm 
on this issue cannot be overemphasised. 
Liberalization of foreign investments. The framework has been set with 
the passage of the Foreign Investments Act of 1992. What remains to 
be done is to interpret and administer it liberally. The administration 
should reduce List B and eliminate List C altogether. It is only logical 
to pass other pending measures in the same direction. These include the 
lengthening of the term of land leases by foreign investors and allowing 
minority foreign ownership in landowning corporations (the so-called 
"horizontal application" of the Condominium Law), especially for in- 
dustrial estates. In so doing, however, supplementary rules should be 
issued which forestall excessive land speculations that result in land 
conversions running counter to agrarian reform. 
Raise industrial productivity. Further reforms are called for if the trend of 
declining productivity is to be reversed. More liberal trade and investment 
policies expose firms to competition and encourage them to become effi- 
cient. Access to better markets and to inputs at world prices and quality will 
be achieved through a more liberal trade policy and through investments in 
infrastructure. In addition, however, more positive action should be taken 
to help especially small and medium enterprises keep abreast of trends in 
technology in their respective industries. There is a great need for institu- 
tions to assist small and medium enterprises in improving product quality, 
design, and packaging, and in linking them with larger firms, either as 
ancillary suppliers to the latter or as bulk-customers. For example, a center 
to provide information and testing services could improve the quality of 
packaging for small firms and improve competitiveness. 
38. Indeed, in some cases, there are moves to make these tariffs much higher than 
the quota protection. 
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Financial reforms. The trend toward deregulation and freer entry in 
industry, utilities, and banking should be continued and possibly accel- 
erated. This has received a large boost with the administration's move 
to liberalize foreign exchange transactions. 
Reforms in the banking sector are also long overdue. A two-pronged 
thrust is called for: on the one hand, greater competition in the sector 
must be enforced; on the other, policies which impose avoidable cost 
penalties to banks must be removed. The common aim is to effect lower 
lending rates for both private firms and the government and to encour- 
age savings by raising deposit rates. 
There is strong evidence (Box 5) that concentration has permitted 
banks to charge increasing spreads. To remedy this, foreign banks should 
be allowed to enter the banking industry. Simultaneously, the gross 
receipts tax and the agri-agra and other loan quotas should be abolished 
and the development of capital markets encouraged. Without breaking 
bank concentration, lower intermediation costs would simply result in 
higher profits with little benefits to either borrowers or savers. 
The purpose of these measures is no less than to change the compo- 
sition of the country's industries and firms with those that can with- 
stand international competition in price and quality, imitate, innovate, 
and, in this manner, generate rapidly expanding employment. This is 
the only sound basis for making steady gains against poverty. 
The impact of some of these reforms in the short run will be mixed: 
adjustment costs from dislocation, on the one hand, and positive and 
immediate benefits for some highly responsive and flexible sectors of the 
economy, on the other. Immediate costs could possibly outweigh short-run 
gains, and sustained and dynamic gains from trade reforms may not come 
until the medium to long term. As a result, the momentum for such reforms 
may be difficult to maintain. At the same time, policy reversals would be 
deleterious, especially after adjustment costs will have already been paid. 
It is tempting to suppose that since most of these long-term measures 
are in place anyway, much of the work has already been done. This is 
too pat a view. What is often neglected is that the apparent consensus 
for many of these measures may be threatened, since many of the other 
prerequisites for them to work are not in place. In particular, there is 
continuing resistance by incumbents to new competition (with good 
reason) owing to the absence of a "level playing field": the familiar 
litany includes the miserable state of power supply, poor transport and 
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communications facilities, and high interest rates; for exporters, there is 
the additional penalty from an overvalued peso. Unless these comple- 
mentary factors are addressed, ranks may break on several structural 
reforms; or, worse, the effects of the reforms themselves may be nullified. 
The catch, however, is that the elimination of these hindrances to a full 
restructuring hinges, again, on a resolution of the fiscal problem. Hence, 
what at first glance appears to be conjunctural turns out to be the key issue. 
Improve resource mobilization in the private and public sectors. 
The public investment-led pump-priming of the economy should last 
no more than two years, lest inflationary problems arise, or control over 
the process be lost. Beyond that, what is important is to mobilize 
resources to finance growth so it may be sustained. Given the limited 
amount of foreign capital, mostly official assistance, that is likely to 
come in the future, growth and employment generation can continue 
only if larger amounts of domestic resources are mobilized, and their 
allocation improved. There are two sources of these resources: the first 
is private savings, the second is taxes. 
Promote savings among the people. The record of domestic savings has 
consistently deteriorated in recent years, both relative to the country's 
past performance and to those of other countries. In the 1980s, an 
average of 23 percent of GDP was saved; in recent years this has 
declined to only 16 percent. In the meantime, other economies in the 
region with comparable savings figures in the 1970s now save at double 
the country's rate, or more than 30 percent of incomes (Table 1-10). 
Under the current environment of savings repression, the poor suffer 
doubly. It is obvious that the most important effect of the lack of savings 
in the aggregate is that it constrains growth and employment and, 
hence, cuts off earning opportunities for the poor. The fall in average 
incomes and the impoverishment of the majority are themselves out- 
standing reasons for the decline in savings. 
In addition, the little that the poor manage to save out of their 
meager incomes finds no avenues for profitable returns.39 Smaller savers 
39. It is an oversimplification to think that the poor do not save. The Family Income 
and Expenditure Survey (1988: xxvii, Table F) shows, for example, that all deciles 
from the lowest third upward, had positive savings. If approximately 60 percent (or 
up to the sixth decile) of the population are poor, this means that roughly two-thirds 
(four out of six deciles) of the poor save. 
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Table 1-10 
Gross Domesbc Savi 
(% of GDP) 
1971-80 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Philippines 23.4 16.2 16.5 17.5 18.1 18.0 16.1 
Thailand 21.5 20.6 21.6 24.8 29.8 31.2 32.1 
Indonesia 22.6 29.8 27.3 32.9 34.0 37.2 37.4 
Malaysia 30.4 32.7 32.1 37.3 36.3 33.9 34.2 
S. Korea 27.5 27.3 28.6 33.0 34.2 34.6 34.8 
Source: Asian Development Outlook, ADB. 
earn less, and outlets for savings by the non-rich are typically limited 
(e.g., investments in higher education, in own small enterprises, or in 
residential improvements) for want of alternative forms of asset-holding 
which yield higher returns. 
Higher savings may be attained primarily by increasing competition 
in the financial system to attract funds from small savers through more 
attractive offerings and yields. 
Greater competition among domestic and foreign banks should help 
lower the costs of intermediation, narrowing the spreads between de- 
posit rates and borrowing rates. As a result, savers may eam higher yields 
while borrowers may pay lower rates. For this reason, the entry of 
reputable foreign banks and the rules on establishment of branches must 
be liberalized. Greater competition among banks must complement the 
removal of policies which raise the costs to the banking industry, such 
as high reserve requirements and the gross-receipts tax. As discussed in 
Box 5, doing the latter without enforcing competition would simply 
raise bank profits without benefiting savers and borrowers. 
Improve the efficiency of revenue collecdon.While the linkages be- 
tween fiscal, monetary, and foreign exchange policy may appear com- 
plex, ultimately it is not so difficuIt40 to pursue an economic expansion 
based on borrowing or monetary expansion. The crucial issue in sustain- 
ing growth in the medium- to long-term, however, is whether the 
40. To some extent, it could even be politically popular. 
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Box s 
BANK CONCENTRATION AND INTEREST RATES 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Since interest rates were liberalized in 1981, the interest rate on 
loans has generally tended to increase. Some have attributed this to 
the higher costs that banks had to bear in the form of "intermediation 
taxes," in particular, the reserve requirement ratio, the gross receipts 
tax, and the agri-agra requirement. These have certainly played some 
role; but empirical results strongly suggest that increasing bank 
government in the succeeding years can regain sufficient fiscal leeway 
to continue its programs. The incoming administration can afford to cut 
its teeth on just this single issue: can it collect taxes efficiently and 
fairly? 
The significance of this issue should be clear by now. The fiscal bind, 
an offshoot of the debt overhang, has proven to be the single largest 
obstacle to structural reforms, sustained growth, and the direct and 
indirect alleviation of poverty. Even as some expansion can be under- 
taken immediately through higher fiscal and monetary ceilings, this 
cannot be sustained indefinitely lest inflation accelerate unduly. Hence, 
the fiscal gap must ultimately be closed and the public debt reduced 
through higher revenues. 
In recent years, it is true, revenue collections have been raised; indeed, 
the share of tax revenues to GNP increased from some 11 percent to some 
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concentration was a major reason for higher interest rates. 
The bank spread, or margin, is the difference between interest rates 
on loans and those on deposits. The figure above shows that, except 
for 1983 and 1985,E the bank spreads or margins have generally risen. 
What caused this? 
When controls on interest rates were lifted, there was no 
accompanying liberalization of bank entry and branching policy. This 
resulted in greater banking concentration, Between 1980 and 1990, the 
share of the five largest banks in total deposits increased from 30 
percent to 52 percent. The Herfindahl index (a measure of 
concentration) almost doubled from 4.4 percent to 7.4 percent. The 
figure shows that bank spreads have risen as the Herfindahl index rose, 
suggesting that increasing bank concentration has led to larger spreads 
for banks. A regression analysis** shows that the variation of the 
concentration index explains 65 percent of the total variation of bank 
spreads for the period. 
Source: Lam berte (1992). 
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*The dip in 1983 was due to preterminations by depositors wishing to shift to T-bills; the 1985 average 
was lower owing to PNB losses. 
"The estimated equation is S - -12.76 + 604.9H 
(-1.44) (4.18) 
where the S and H stand for spread and Herfindahl index, respectively, and the figures in parentheses 
are t-values. The adjusted R2 Is 0.65, the D.W. statistic is 1.57. 
15 percent between 1986 and 1991. Nonetheless, this is still much lower 
than the 20 percent typical for other countries at a similar level of devel- 
opment. Furthermore, up to now, improved revenue performance has 
largely been attained by imposing new taxes of an indirect sort, simply in 
order to meet an arbitrarily set fiscal ceiling. A recent prime example was 
the 9 percent import levy. As a consequence, the net incidence of the entire 
tax system diverges even further from the original goals of efficiency and 
redistribution. Worse, when the tax is controversial, the improved perform- 
ance is itself uncertain and transitory. 
On the whole, the country has been very inefficient at collecting 
direct taxes (corporate and personal income taxes, taxes on interest and 
dividends) and has relied heavily on indirect taxes. Direct taxes were 
less than one-third (30 percent) of total tax revenues in 1990, while 
indirect taxes made up 70 percent. 
64 Emmanuel S. de &m 
There is a general consensus by now that there is nothing seriously 
wrong with the structure of direct taxation. What is lacking is simply 
the implementation of existing tax laws. There is no doubt that losses 
due to pure and simple evasion of income taxes are extremely large.41 
Large-scale evasion is also true in the case of corporate income tax." 
The magnitudes of these losses are of such an order that, if they could 
be recouped, the entire dilemma posed by the deficit problem would by 
and large fade into insignificance. Hence, the message is simple and 
clear: simply and plainly implement the law and punish those who 
violate it. The new administration may stand or fall depending on 
whether it achieves the goal of efficiently and fairly raising tax revenues 
to 20 percent of GNP by the end of its term in 1998. 
As enforcement of direct and indirect taxes improves enough to 
secure the government's finances, further adjustments to the tax struc- 
ture may be considered to make the tax system more efficient and 
equitable. Among others, the coverage of the value-added tax must be 
broadened; tax deductions for businesses and for nonfixed income 
earners ought to be limited; current final taxes withheld on interest and 
other "passive" incomes should be included in a truly global income tax; 
appropriate user-charges must be imposed for nonbasic government 
services (e.g., tertiary education and health care) and for access to and 
use of natural resources. 
Another major revenue source which has been grossly underutilized 
and is continuously declining in performance is the real property tax 
(RPT). From a purely economic viewpoint, the tax on property is 
probably closest to the ideal tax, 43 one that is both efficient and equi- 
table. Being a pure tax on wealth, it distorts no prices or behavior. Yet 
the contribution of RPT to total government taxes has declined from 4 
percent in 1978-1983 to only 2 percent in 1990, and from .005 to .0025 
percent of GNP (Tan 1992). The main reason for the RPT's poor yield 
41. For 1985, estimates were between P5.4 billion (Manasan 1990) and P16 billion 
to P37 billion (Krugman et al. 1992). 
42. Again, for 1985, the estimates of tax evasion are between P2.9 billion (Manasan 
1990) and P13 billion (Krugman et al. 1992). 
43. The ideal redistributive tax is a lump-sum tax differentiated according to the 
circumstances of individuals. 
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is the simple failure to apply revised property valuation in a timely and 
uniform manner. Again the matter is one of implementation; the 
national government should be involved in standardizing institutions 
and the procedures to be followed by local government units (LGUs). 
The RPT has not come in for much scrutiny since it is administered 
by the local governments. However, the recent enactment of the local 
autonomy code means many functions hitherto performed by national 
agencies will be passed on to LGUs. There is a real danger that the level 
and quality of social and economic services received by the people will 
suffer if there are no additional sources of local government revenue. 
The sophisticated justification for tolerating the regressive tax system 
is that the revenue so collected will be used in any case to finance 
expenditure items benefiting the poor. The belief is that a progressive 
expenditure pattern corrects regressive taxation so that the net fiscal 
incidence of fiscal policy favors the poor. Some sense of reality is in 
needed here: this belief is not borne out by the actual access to these 
expenditure items by various income classes. High- and middle-income 
classes have also been principal beneficiaries of public goods and serv- 
ices. Nothing short of a comprehensive review and possibly overhaul of 
policies, laws and regulations and tax institutions is necessary. 
It should be clear by now how this drive toward stricter tax compli- 
ance must mesh with the earlier monetary and fiscal components of the 
program. Simply imposing stricter tax enforcement is bound to meet 
resistance, especially from the harassed middle- and lower-income classes, 
unless it is bound up with palpable improvements in the provision of the 
most basic social services, such as energy, water, infrastructure mainte- 
nance, and administrative services. It is also for this reason that the 
current strategy of squeezing expenditures while raising new taxes has 
been an utter political social failure and must be abandoned. 
Set and adhere to clear and realistic targets for agrarian reform. 
The present situation of uncertainty regarding the implementation of 
the law on agrarian reform has discouraged investments in agriculture. 
While affirming social justice and redistribution, the letter of the law is 
itself ambiguous regarding the preferred form of property in agricultural 
areas 44 Support for small-peasant production is affirmed at the same 
44. This point is made by Adriano (1991), among others. 
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time that loopholes allow large corporate landholdings and the conver- 
sion of agricultural lands into industrial uses. This hesitation in the law 
and in the fact of agrarian reform has led to poor investment prospects 
in agriculture, setbacks in the interests of poor farmers, and increased 
potential conflict in the countrysides. 
Before any substantial improvements in agriculture can be expected, 
clear ground rules must first be laid, and the uncertainties regarding 
property rights resolved. To this end it is proposed the government 
undertake the following measures in regard to agrarian reform: 
O The government must affirm its commitment to quickly com- 
plete the agrarian reform in rice and corn lands. This is the 
most realistic target it can set in the light of its budgetary 
constraints. As for lands devoted to other crops, the priority 
should be the rapid transfer of publicly owned alienable and 
disposable lands. At the same time, as advocated above, land 
taxes should be raised substantially and utilized to encourage 
the voluntary transfer of idle private lands. 
O To resolve uncertainty and avert potential conflicts over the 
scope of agrarian reform, a detailed land-use policy for the 
whole country must be promulgated as soon as possible. The 
national policy on land-use should delineate areas suited to 
agricultural and industrial development based on objective 
criteria. In particular, prime agricultural lands should be 
protected from real estate speculation and from being converted 
to industrial estates at the expense of their tillers. In formulating 
a national land-use policy, far-reaching and exhaustive 
consultations between the national government, farmers' 
organizations, landowners, and local governments must be held. 
In the past, both transparency and effectiveness of land trans- 
fer have been hampered by a blurring of the mandates among 
various agencies. The activities of the Department of Agrarian 
Reform (DAR) should be strictly confined to land transfer. Sup- 
port and extension services provided by the DAR should be 
transferred to the Department of Agriculture (DA), where they 
belong, and bolstered by coordination. At the same time, funds 
specifically alloted to finance land acquisition transfers should not 
be diverted to other purposes, no matter how noble. There is no 
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doubt, that cooperatives or ancillary livelihood programs may 
have much to do with the success of agrarian reform; but if these 
are worthwhile, other sources of funds should be found to finance 
them without eating into the budget for land transfers. To do 
otherwise would only put into question the government's deter- 
mination to implement the essence of agrarian reform, which is 
the transfer of ownership and control. 
Q Finally, the process of land acquisition and distribution should 
be simplified further and the formulas for land valuation and 
compensation clarified. Task forces should be formed to make 
recommendations on aquatic reform, urban reform, and rural 
nonfarm education. 
Increase agricultural productivity through agricultural deregulation, 
investment in research and development (R&D), and irrigation. 
A fundamental reorientation of government's role in agriculture is 
required.45 Up to now, the state has assumed a paternalistic attitude 
toward the agricultural sector and the consuming public, thinking it 
possible to stave off difficult choices through a complex system of 
subsidies and controls on quantity and prices that was all at once 
supposed to support the producer and protect the consumer. As has been 
shown above, however, this approach has pleased none and failed in 
both its purposes. In addition, the fiscal crisis of the state has undercut 
that strategy's financial foundations. 
The required change in agriculture must bear away from a preoccu- 
pation with the complicated accomodation of interests and move to- 
ward a simple goal: raising productivity. This can be accomplished, first, 
by giving agricultural producers the fullest chance to respond to the best 
market prices for output and inputs; second, by direct support to produc- 
tion through spending on research and irrigation. 
The deregulation of crop agriculture must be completed to give 
agricultural producers fair prices for their products and, in this manner, 
stimulate production. The most significant move is to end the mo- 
nopoly by the National Food Authority (NFA) on international trade 
in rice and corn and its direct intervention in the domestic market. 
45. See David, Ponce, and Intal (1992), on which most of this discussion is based. 
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NFA's budget would be better spent on the generation of agricultural 
technology, extension, and irrigation. The NFA's functions can and 
should be replaced by simpler, more transparent rules to protect and 
promote agricultural production. Rice and com producers may be suffi- 
ciently protected through the expedient of applying variable tariffs on 
imports and allowing private imports of grain. Even as this raises the 
prices for producers, consumers are assured that the prices they must pay 
are never too far from those of comparable imports. (It is also a minor 
benefit of this scheme that the government, for once, ends up earning 
revenue rather than losing it.) The kick to production this simple 
measure gives would do more for self-sufficiency than the many decades 
of paternalist policy ever could. 
The development of the farm sector cannot be viewed in isolation 
from other industries which serve as markets for its output, the most 
important of which is food processing. Policies which aid the latter 16 
will also benefit agriculture, indirectly perhaps, but no less potently. 
Hence, one must resist the temptation to raise tariffs excessively on 
agricultural imports. Tariffs on yellow corn much higher than the 
current 50 percent, for example, would unduly penalize poultry and 
livestock and, ultimately, the consumer. 
Any serious reform effort must also remove the many restrictions on 
agricultural production and trade which prevent farmers from earning a 
higher return, or from procuring inputs more cheaply. Among the most 
important of these are: the limits on the hectarage planted to bananas; 
the import bans on garlic, onions, potatoes, cabbage, coffee, and seeds; 
restrictions on sugar imports; restrictions on importing cattle feeder 
stock; export bans on buntal and ramie planting materials; the slaughter 
ban on carabaos; and export restrictions on (non-endangered) animals 
and animal products. 
On the side of supply, the major effort must be to improve public 
support services which enhance productivity. Foremost among these is 
the increase in, and more effective allocation of outlays on agricultural 
research. At the moment, there are only weak linkages between research 
and extension; research does not concentrate on the most important 
crops; expenditures and personnel tend to concentrate on extension. 
46. For example, the provision of cheaper or better quality packaging materials for 
food processors may help expand their markets and, indirectly, the market for 
agricultural output. 
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A large part of the reason this has happened is that agriculture research 
has fallen between chairs. There has been a proliferation of agencies with 
mandates to provide various agricultural support services (among them 
research) with little coordination among them. For example, apart from the 
DA, the Philippine Council for Aquacultural Resources Research and 
Development (PCARRD) and the Philippine Council for Agriculture and 
Marine Resources Development (PCAMRD), which are under the Depart- 
ment of Science and Technology (DST), also have mandates to do agricul- 
ture-related research, as do the the state colleges and universities (SCUs) 
under the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). The 
DAR also allocates 90 percent of its funds and personnel to providing 
support services." Finally, the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) is 
under the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). Even 
within the DA, research for specific crops is balkanized among various 
"attached" agencies such as the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) and 
the Sugar Regulatory Authority (SRA). 
The changes involved, therefore, are less of large additional appropria- 
tions than a fundamental restructuring of institutions. What is proposed 
here is to make the DA mainly or solely responsible for agricultural tech- 
nology generation, technology transfer, and irrigation. This means placing 
under the DA the relevant functions and corresponding resources of the 
agencies currently undertaking these. On the other hand, extension and the 
management of irrigation systems should devolve upon the provincial 
governments, as envisioned by the Local Government Code. Through 
these realignments, it should be possible to devote more resources to 
research and obtain better productivity results without causing a budgetary 
strain - a classic case of "less is more." 
Promote equitable access to natural resources 
and their efficient use. 
The environmental crisis has justly attracted grave concern from 
virtually all sectors of society. But it is precisely where an issue already 
commands broad agreement in principle that finer work is required to 
identify tradeoffs and opportunities foregone, as well as devise practical 
mechanisms to resolve these. Otherwise, policies may not proceed 
beyond being mere symbolic gestures. 
47. This situation is itself improper; it was argued earlier on that DAR should 
concentrate principally on land transfer and allocate its funds accordingly. 
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There are no easy answers to environmental degradation, especially 
where society as a whole is not moving away from opulence and excess 
but out of poverty. The program outlined here underscores the need for 
growth and greater employment as the principal means of uplifting the 
poor. Yet it should be clear that measures needed to revive growth 
themselves are bound to impose further demands on an already endan- 
gered environment.48 Nonetheless, it is obvious that growth is still 
required; hence, the point must be to reduce the dependence of that 
growth on those activities which tend to degrade the environment, such 
as mining, logging, and upland agriculture. 
This means, first of all, improving the bureaucracy's capacity to 
implement existing environmental laws and regulations. For example, 
remaining forest lands must be designated for various uses in response to 
various goals. Much of this will go hand-in-hand with the formulation 
of a national land-use plan. Areas should be designated for specific 
purposes, such as agro-forestry, tree plantations, biodiversity, protection, 
and even selective logging. Laws must be transparent and implementable, 
rather than merely symbolic. On these grounds, the proposal for a 
complete logging ban, though well-motivated, must be dropped. Mecha- 
nisms to protect fishing grounds of coastal, small-scale fisheries must be 
strengthened. Critical areas must be rehabilitated then preserved. For 
this purpose, sufficient funds are required to build up the capabilities of 
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and 
the police (e.g., in monitoring denudation or pollution, putting out 
forest fires, etc.). The government should set an example by strictly 
adhering to the system of making environmental impact assessments 
(EIAs) for proposed development projects, rather than regarding this (as 
it is doing in the present energy crisis) as an empty gesture to be ignored 
when convenient. 
A second set of measures is to impose more comprehensive, and 
generally higher, taxes for the use of natural resources and environmen- 
tal services. Up to now, the use of taxation in the natural-resource sector 
has mainly been for indifferent revenue purposes. But natural-resource 
taxes for revenue purposes may conflict with conservation, to the extent 
that higher revenues may be obtained from lower tax rates and higher 
48. For example, to the extent currency-depreciation raises the cost of imported logs, it makes 
domestic logging more profitable, even if this is illegalized. Lower interest rates, which are 
desirable in any event, also have the effect of lowering the discount rate for many projects. 
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rates of exploitation. On the other hand, if the aim is to reduce 
degradation, it would be better to raise taxes and reduce exploitation-19 
Forestry charges and mining-waste and -tailing fees can and must be 
raised substantially and immediately. 
Finally, for poorer communities in seriously degraded areas such as 
the uplands, programs must be designed to allow them to make a 
livelihood from rehabilitating the environment. Social forestry pro- 
grams are the prime example. Where the poor are themselves engaged 
in environmentally harmful activities as a form of livelihood, prohibi- 
tions must be combined with carefully chosen subsidies to make them 
use the right technologies. Finally, legal innovations in affirming the 
property rights of (especially ethnic) communities adjoining resource- 
rich areas vis-a-vis would-be exploiters would by itself do much to 
enforce the right social price for resources and hence preserve them. 
Reduce population growth; improve the provision 
of basic education and primary health care. 
No anti-poverty strategy can omit the task of reducing the growth 
rate of population. From comparable historical experience of other 
developing countries it should be possible to attain a crude growth rate 
of less than 2 percent, or a fertility rate of less than 3 by the end of the 
decade. The only way this can be done is to strengthen the population 
program. The poor, especially, should be given greater access to family 
planning services; an aggressive educational campaign for family plan- 
ning must be waged. 
A basic reorientation of public spending is needed in order to focus 
them on the enhancement of productivity among poor people and in 
poor areas. The re-emphasis on productive infrastructrure has already 
been discussed. The other large area to be re-emphasized is social 
services, especially education, health, and sanitation. Again the focus 
must be on those services which are of immediate benefit and relevance 
to the poor and away from what is token and sytpbolic. This means 
nothing more than full concentration on improving the coverage and 
quality of basic education, rather than tertiary education; preventive 
rather than curative health care. 
49. In the extreme, if the desire is to stop exploitation, a prohibitively high tax rate 
may be set. This, of course, would not earn revenue at all, but then revenue will not 
have been the purpose. 
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Recent suggestions for an additional compulsory year in public grade 
school is well-motivated in light of the decline in functional literacy 
and the crucial role of basic education for future employment and 
acquisition of skills. However, more than the years of schooling, it is the 
quality of school inputs which needs to be improved; and this can be 
achieved more effectively by investing in teacher training, increasing 
and upgrading public school facilities, and building roads to give com- 
munities access to schools, among others. 
Consistent with this new thrust toward basic education, full costs 
should henceforth be charged for publicly provided college and other 
tertiary education, accompanied by scholarships and subsidies for aca- 
demically qualified poor students. Any excess resources released from 
this may then be used to improve primary and secondary education. 
In the same manner, the recent proposal not to expand the allocations 
for hospitals but to concentrate on disease prevention is a bold move 
that should be welcomed; its rationale must be explained to the public. 
Full costs must be charged for tertiary health care, coupled with increased 
allocations for preventive and primary health care. Providing for the 
need for hospital care among indigents should instead devolve upon a 
vastly expanded Medicare system offering differently priced packages of 
benefits, depending on whether coverage is broader or narrower. This 
will permit a greater cross-subsidization and a wider provision of standard 
benefits for the poor (e.g., including child delivery) and the inclusion 
of workers belonging to the informal sector. 
None of what has been said so far about increasing budgets, whether 
for infrastructure or for social services, means to overlook the potential 
for waste and corruption when more resources become available. There 
is a need for sharper public vigilance, effective bureaucratic reforms and 
determined prosecution to address these problems. On the other hand, 
the mere possibility or even the existence to a certain extent of corrup- 
tion is no valid excuse for procrastination or inaction. This is not to say 
one must completely agree with the present distribution of resources. 
But there can be no question regarding the large amounts of public 
resources required if employment is to be revived, and if any headway 
against poverty is to be made. 
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Conclusion 
The country has weathered a long political and economic interreg- 
num, during which, for better or ill, important political and social issues 
were resolved. Crucial questions which have occupied the nation for 
decades have now been decided. Among these were the choice between 
dictatorship and formal democracy, military coups versus constitutional 
transitions, the degree of reckoning with beneficiaries of past regimes, 
the presence of foreign military troops and facilities, and the choice 
between centralization and local autonomy. In the sphere of the 
economy, the country's relations with its foreign creditors, its reliance 
on markets and the private sector, and its openness to world-markets for 
goods and to international investment are issues that have been re- 
solved. Policies and other measures taken to implement these social 
decisions are now accepted, if not in principle, then at least in fact, by 
broad social sectors. 
This process has also been pushed to some extent by the fact that 
throughout the world - partly owing to the events in Central and 
Eastern Europe - the debate on development has become increasingly 
de-ideologized, though this is not to say that the purely technical 
questions have become easier to answer. To be sure, the sum of these 
decisions and their outcomes will not fit neatly into favored political 
categories, radical or conservative; few will be completely satisfactory to 
all. For the moment, however, their costs have been paid, and most of 
society regards them as having been settled. 
If there is any optimism to be observed, therefore, it is certainly not 
because the problems of development have become less difficult or 
daunting. This optimism stems rather from the guarded hope among 
many that the nation and people might now use this opportunity to 
make the pragmatic political settlements needed, so that all may con- 
centrate on the serious business of building society and regaining the 
decades of lost human development. 
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ON DEBT MANAGEMENT 
AND MACROECONOMIC POLICIES 
Felipe FYI. Meaalla 
Introduction 
THERE ARE SEVERAL WAYS OF LOOKING AT THE DEBT PROBLEM. ONE WAY IS TO 
view it as a foreign exchange, net resource transfer, and balance of 
payments (BOP) problem. From 1986 to 1991, for instance, about 18 
percent of all receipts in the current account of the BOP went to interest 
payments on the external debt. The drain on the BOP would have been 
larger if not for the debt rescheduling agreements. In spite of the 
rescheduling, however, a large transfer of resources out of the country 
has been experienced because net availments of foreign credit were 
consistently smaller than the interest payments on the existing external 
debt during the entire term of the Aquino administration. 
The debt problem can also be seen as a fiscal problem. With the 
rescheduling of a substantial portion of the country's external debts, the 
immediate burden of servicing the foreign debt has been reduced to 
paying only the interest which is about 5 percent of the gross national 
product (GNP). But since a large part of the external debt is public, 
interest payments on the public external debt account for a substantial 
part of government revenue. As in the case of net resource transfer, the 
rescheduling of principal payments partially addresses the effects of the 
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external debt on the public sector's fiscal problems. Given the weak- 
nesses and inequitable features of the tax system, however, the fiscal 
aspects may complicate macroeconomic policymaking even more than 
the BOP implications of the debt service. 
In 1988, interest payments on public external debt represented 3.9 
percent of GNP which is slightly higher than Malaysia's 3.7 percent and 
Indonesia's 3.4 percent. In relation to the revenue of the central gov- 
ernment, however, the interest payments on our external public debt 
were quite large: 27.1 percent of the revenue of the national govern- 
ment in the same year. In contrast, the corresponding ratios for Malaysia 
and Indonesia were only 14.8 percent and 17.8 percent, respectively. 
Thus, even if all of our foreign loans had been invested in activities with 
high rates of return, the debt would have continued to cause political 
and social problems as long as the tax system remained inequitable and 
distortive and a large proportion of output growth escaped the tax net. 
Consider, for instance, how taxpayers in Cebu would react if they were 
solely responsible for servicing debt of financed projects that would 
benefit Metro Manila alone. Arguably, taxpayers in Cebu would be 
angrier if the projects had very high rates of return than if the projects 
were total failures. 
In other words, the distribution of the burden of servicing the debt 
is at least as important as its magnitude. If one abstracts from fiscal 
constraints, it is difficult to see why an interest bill of 3 to 4 percent of 
GNP on the external public debt could have such far-reaching conse- 
quences. However, since money creation or internal public borrowing 
must be used to finance external debt service not covered by taxes, and 
administrative and legislative considerations have forced the govern- 
ment to resort to inequitable or distortive revenue measures in order to 
raise the ratio of revenue to GNP from less than 10 to 14 percent, it 
should be clear why the 3 to 4 percent of GNP that goes to interest 
payments on the public debt could be pivotal. Indeed, it is not surprising 
that the tightness of the May 11 elections compelled President Aquino, 
in an apparent policy turnaround and at risk of losing her Secretary of 
Finance, to abolish the import levy on Labor Day and roll back gasoline 
and energy prices in the process giving up revenues that may add up to 
more than 1 percent of GNP. 
A third way of looking at the national debt is to compare its growth 
with economic growth. Public debt is much easier to manage if the 
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growth rates of exports and GNP are much higher than the rate of 
interest on the debt. Moreover, if the tax system is elastic and govern- 
ment expenditures do not grow faster than GNP, the fiscal burden 
becomes lighter over time since the public sector has shown the capacity 
to keep its total spending, excluding interest payments, below its rev- 
enue. On the other hand, a small primary surplus (i.e., revenue exceed- 
ing expenditures excluding interest payments) will not be enough to 
prevent the public debt problem from getting out of hand if the interest 
rate is much higher than the growth rate of output. 
The debt burden will of course be lighter if external creditors are 
willing to reduce either the face value or the interest rate on the debt. 
Realistically, however, Filipino taxpayers will continue to shoulder a 
significant part of the debt burden. As will be discussed in this paper, 
the prospects for reducing the debt burden depend not only on the relief 
that creditors are willing to give the Philippine government, but on 
fiscal and exchange rate policies as well. Moreover, fiscal success will 
likely result in better exchange rate policies which could, in turn, result 
in faster growth and therefore a lower debt-to-GNP ratio in the long 
run. 
This paper is divided into two main parts. The first part deals with 
external debt management. The second part focuses on the interaction 
between macro-policies and the external debt. The debt strategy imple- 
mented by the Aquino government increased the share of the public 
sector in total external debt, substituted official external debt for com- 
mercial external debt, and, owing to negative resource transfers, in- 
creased internal public debt to pay interest on the external public debt. 
These changes in the composition of the debt reduce the country's 
leverage in bargaining with commercial creditors and make the country 
more dependent on decisions of official creditors (on which Philippine 
influence may be less strong). On the other hand, the large public sector 
share in the external debt increases the fiscal risks from a devaluation 
and a policy of maintaining competitive exchange rates. Unfortunately, 
non-competitive exchange rates increase the probability of rapid eco- 
nomic growth triggering another BOP crisis. 
Debt Management 
The first section of this part of the paper discusses changes in the 
structure of the debt under the Aquino government. The second section 
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is concerned with the proposed commercial package, and the third 
section, the country's basic options in reducing the size of the negative 
net resource transfer from the economy. 
Debt Management Since EDSA 
The Aquino government inherited a foreign debt totalling over $26 
billion and bequeathes more than $29 billion to its successor. Even if 
the increase in the foreign debt had not been due to changes in the 
exchange rate between the US dollar and other foreign currencies, a 10 
percent increase over a six-year period negates some critics' allegations 
about the Aquino government's profligacy. In fact, if changes in the 
exchange rates between the US dollar and other currencies are factored 
in, the level of external debt is almost the same before and after the 
Aquino term (Table 2-1). Since both exports and GNP have grown 
since EDSA, the external debt service ratio and the external debt to 
GNP ratio are much lower now than during the Aquino government's 
incumbency. (The ratio of the external debt to GNP was reduced from 
82 percent at the end of 1985 to 66 percent in July 1991.) It should of 
course be pointed out that the debt ratios and the social cost of manag- 
ing the external debt would have been lower even if the external debt 
had increased by 20 percent instead of 10 percent, but annual export 
Table 2-1 
Changes in the External Debt, 
End of 1985 to End of July 1991 
(US$ million) 
Level as of end of 1985 $26,252 
Plus: 
Net availments 4,152 
Foreign exchange fluctuations 2,566 
Capitalized Paris Club interest 737 
Less: 
Debt Reduction (3,803) 
Assignment of credits to FCDUs (321) 
Adjustments (804) 
Level as of end of July 1991 28,779 
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines. 
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growth had been 3 to 4 percent higher and GNP growth was 2 to 3 
percent higher. Given the climate of uncertainty created by coup 
attempts, and judging from the travails of tariff and tax reforms, it could 
also be argued that greater success in reducing net resource transfers 
would have simply financed increases in the consumption of non- 
essential imports and greater investments in the protected industrial 
sector (e.g., car assembly) and would have increased the proclivity to 
postpone privatization, improvement in tax collection efforts, and other 
economic reforms. Worse, a stronger peso would have likely been a 
short- or medium-run result if the country's economic managers had 
succeeded in reducing net resource transfers, but for some reason or 
another, they chose to defend the peso with proceeds from reduced 
outflows. 
At any rate, counterfactual inference is probably not a very useful 
exercise. Still, there may be some utility from looking at the implica- 
tions of the changes in the structure of the external debt. 
One change in the structure of the external debt that represents an 
unambiguous improvement, one which debt negotiators regard as proof 
of the effectiveness of a "non-confrontational" negotiating stance, is the 
reduction in the share of short-term debt from 33 percent at the end of 
1985 to 17 percent in July 1991. Admittedly, critics are quick to 
downplay this change in the composition of the debt by pointing out 
that the creditors do not have much of a choice but to stretch out 
repayment periods - as it is, the country is already experiencing 
difficulty in paying interest alone. 
Other changes in the structure of the external debt are double-edged. 
The net availments of $4,152 million in Table 2-1 were from official 
(multilateral and bilateral) sources. The net availments plus the capi. 
talization of $737 million of Paris Club interest increased the share of 
official creditors from 28 percent of total external debt as of the end of 
1985 to 52 percent as of the end of July 1991. Commercial creditors, on 
the other hand, extended only $605 million of new money since the 
EDSA revolution. Since the debt reduction schemes involved mostly 
commercial debt, the share of commercial creditors was reduced from 
58.1 to 38.6 percent. 
Government officials have stressed the advantage of relying on offi- 
cial loans rather than on commercial loans: the former has more 
concessional terms. Other observers, however, have also claimed that 
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official loans have "more strings attached" (e.g., the loans could be tied 
to purchase of commodities which are not necessarily from the lowest 
cost or highest quality supplier). In addition, the smaller exposure of 
commercial creditors would tend to reduce our leverage in dealing with 
the commercial creditors. 
Another significant change in the structure of the external debt is the 
rise in the share of the public sector (national government, Central 
Bank, and government corporations) in the total external debt. The 
total public component increased from 72.9 percent at the end of 1985 
to 81 percent as of mid-1991 despite the decline of the Central Bank's 
share from 22.6 to 19.2 percent. The public sector's share increased 
because the net availments were almost solely assumed by the public 
sector. The government also assumed some guaranteed private debts. 
Because the total external debt did not change, there has been a 
substantial negative net resource transfer from the country, accounted 
for largely by the difference between interest payments to commercial 
creditors and new loans from commercial creditors. From 1986 to 1991, 
there was a net resource transfer of resources from the Philippines 
amounting to minus $7.7 billion dollars. Of the $7.7 billion net out- 
flow, $6.6 billion were accounted for by net transfers to commercial 
creditors. The net transfer to the commercial creditors, meanwhile, was 
due to one thing: the country paid a lot more in interest to commercial 
creditors than what it was able to borrow from them. 
Since the public sector accounted for a large part of the external debt, 
and public revenues were not sufficient to cover both interest payments 
and capital and operating expenditures, the net resource transfers to 
creditors resulted in very rapid growth of internal public debt. The 
domestic debt of the national government increased from about P190 
billion in 1986 to P342 billion in 1991. 
The link between negative net resource transfers and the growth of 
internal public debt is not immediately apparent from figures on the 
national government's interest payments on its foreign debts. The 
national government's total interest payments on its external debt from 
1986 to 1991 were only P84 billion, which are much lower than the 
P152 billion increase in its domestic debt. However, the national 
government's interest payments on its external debt only partially ac- 
count for the buildup of its domestic debt arising from the negative net 
resource transfer. In the first place, the national government's cash 
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infusions into government corporations were made primarily to help the 
latter pay interest on their external debts. In addition, the Central Bank 
purchased a lot of foreign exchange to finance interest payments, debt, 
equity swaps, and debt buybacks. Such transactions would have caused 
unacceptable increases in money supply if the Treasury had not bor- 
rowed more money domestically than was needed to cover the national 
government's deficits. 
To summarize, there were three main types of transformations of debt 
or debt-related expenditures: 
O Some commercial external debt was transformed into official 
external debt; 
0 Some private external debt was transformed into public exter- 
nal debt; and 
O Part of the interest payments on the external public debt was 
transformed into domestic public debt. 
Without doubt, these three types of transformations would shape (some say 
constrain) the next administration's management of the external debt. 
The Commercial Bank Package 
In a speech before a group of businessmen in November 1991, CB 
Governor Jose Cuisia called the financial package that was expected to 
result from negotiations with commercial banks "a meaningful debt 
relief... allowing the authorities to leave the debt issue behind and focus 
more attention.on strengthening economic performance." In the same 
speech, he said, "The package is expected to provide a significant cash 
flow relief of approximately $2.3 billion over the next six years." The 
package was also described as "an improvement over similar commercial 
bank debt reduction and financing deals that have been implemented 
so far by other heavily-indebted countries." 
Much has happened since November 1991 that could change the gov- 
ernor's assessment of the commercial debt package. However, abstracting 
from Argentina's recent agreement with the banks, recent changes in the 
Philippine package should make the Central Bank governor even more 
enthusiastic about the revised debt package. After all, the revised package 
retains many features of the original package, although interest rates on the 
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Interest Rate Reduction Bonds and the Principal Collateralized Interest 
Reduction (PCIR) Bonds were reduced slightly. 
Recent information on the contents of the newly negotiated Argentine 
package clearly shows that our debt negotiators did not get a good deal in 
1991. A comparison, for example, of the PCIR bonds in the Philippine and 
Argentine packages reveals that Argentina is scheduled to pay lower interest 
rates over a longer repayment period: their 4.0 percent versus our 4.25 
percent in year 1; 4.25 percent versus 5.25 percent in year 2; 5.0 percent 
versus 5.7 5 percent in year 3; 5.25 percent versus 6.25 percent in year 4; 5.75 
percent versus 6.25 percent in year 5; and their 6.0 percent for years 6 to 30 
versus our 6.5 percent in years 6 to 25. 
We do not need the Argentine package, however, to realize the 
unrealism of the claim that the Philippine package will provide the 
country $2.3 billion of cash-flow relief. It is very clear from the CB 
governor's statements that the estimated $2.3 billion debt-relief ex- 
pected from the package is based on the dubious assumption that the 
Philippines would have to start amortizing the principal unless the 
country accepted the package at hand. It is untenable to assume that the 
country will start paying principal amortization unless the proposed 
package is accepted. After all, more heavily-indebted countries were 
routinely able to reschedule their commercial debts at LIBOR plus, and 
also able to get new money even before the so-called Brady initiative. 
One way of evaluating the commercial debt package is to compare it 
with the admittedly burdensome pre-Brady arrangement of postponing 
principal payments but paying interest equal to LIBOR plus spread. 
Buying debt back at a discount, for example, can be seen as a form of 
"unrescheduling" which reduces debt but increases initial cash outflows. 
If LIBOR plus spread is 7 percent, say, $100 of debt buyback at 50 
percent discount actually increases cash outflow by $43 in the first year 
(the $50 dollars used for the buyback less the avoided interest payment 
of $7). 
The net present value of the savings from buying back debt at a 50 
percent discount can only be estimated because we do not know the 
opportunity cost of capital to the Philippine government. However, 
since the Philippine government has been borrowing domestically at 
more than 15 percent, the present value of future savings from debt 
buybacks is probably small or even negative, depending on changes in 
the exchange rate. If, for example, the cost of borrowing domestically is 
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15 percent and the government borrows $50 worth of pesos domestically 
to retire $100 of foreign debt, the cost of servicing the increase in 
internal public debt is $50 x 15 percent which may be greater than $100 
times LIBOR plus spread. 
Another way of measuring the effects of a debt buyback is to evaluate 
the effects of the buyback together with other features of the package. 
Banks that grant new money can convert $4 of existing debts at par into 
bonds which charge LIBOR plus for every $1 of new money. Suppose 
the Philippines gets $100 of new money, and the new money is used to 
buy back $200 worth of debt. After the two transactions, the Philip- 
pines will owe $100 of new money and $400 of conversion bonds, or a 
total of $500. The $500 worth of new debt has taken the place of $600 
worth of old debt ($400 of old debt converted to bonds plus $200 
covered by the buyback). 
Assuming that the spread over LIBOR is the same before and after 
the package, annual interest payments on the debts which are covered 
by the two transactions would be reduced by 16.67 percent (LIBOR plus 
spread times $500 compared to LIBOR plus spread times $600). Thus 
the new money and the conversion bonds together result in some debt 
reduction, but the reduction is significantly lower than say a conversion 
arrangement that substitutes bonds which pay LIBOR plus spread for 
existing debt at a 35 percent discount (which Mexico got). 
Conversion of debt to bonds at par value with pre-determined inter- 
est rates (which are expected to be lower than LIBOR plus spread) can 
also be compared with the old arrangement of simply rescheduling debt 
at LIBOR plus spread. Since we can only guess what future LIBOR will 
be, we will merely estimate the expected value of the debt relief that 
such bonds offer. The average interest rate on the PCIR in the Philip- 
pine package over the next five years is 5.55 percent ([4.25 + 5.25 + 
5.75 + 6.25 + 6.25]/5). Thus, if average LIBOR plus spread over the 
next five years is say 7 percent, the PCIR bonds represent an average 
reduction of 20.7 percent. (A similar analysis can be applied to the 
Interest Reduction [IR) bonds.) 
Since the current LIBOR stands at 4.5 percent, however, average 
LIBOR plus during the next five years is probably going to be lower than 
7 percent. The effective debt reduction could therefore be closer to 15 
percent than to 20 percent. Moreover, since the Philippines must offer 
25-year zero coupon bonds as collateral, the net benefit from the PCIR 
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bonds would be lower. If the yield on 25-year zeroes is, say, 8 percent, 
the Philippines must initially spend $14.6 to buy U.S. treasury zeroes as 
collateral for every $100 of PCIR bonds ($100x1.08'25). Assuming that 
the opportunity cost of funds to the Philippine government after adjust- 
ing for exchange rate changes is, for instance, 12 percent, the present 
value to the Philippine government of $100 to be received 25 years from 
now is only $5.8 ($100x1.12'25). Thus, the present value of the oppor- 
tunity loss from buying 25-year zeroes with a face value of $100 could 
be as high as $8.7. On the other hand, at a discount rate of 12 percent, 
the present value of interest savings on $100 of existing debt from a one- 
percentage point reduction in the interest rate over the next 25 years is 
$7.8. In other words, a large part of the gains from the interest reduction 
from PCIR bonds could be eaten up by opportunity losses from what the 
Philippine economy could get from domestically investing the money 
that would be used to buy the collateral. To put more plainly, it would 
not be a good idea for the Philippine government to buy US treasury 
zeroes if the package had not required that US treasury zeroes be used 
as collateral. 
In sum, the benefits from the commercial debt package are not as 
large as claimed by our debt negotiators. From this it does not follow, 
however, that the next government should junk the package at hand 
and contend with a lengthy standoff. While continuing the buybacks, 
the outgoing administration did not accept the proposed package and 
passed the decision on to its successor. After the buybacks, the amount 
of commercial debt subject to negotiation will be reduced from about $5 
billion to less than $4 billion. By the time the new government is in 
place, the country would have very little bargaining power, since the 
buildup of reserves that could be gained by going into arrears on less 
than $4 billion of commercial debt is minuscule relative to total debt 
service and overall macroeconomic targets. (It is clearly a bad idea to go 
on arrears with official and private external debt and trade credits.) 
Indeed, much of the leverage was lost several years ago when the 
government decided to rely more heavily on official sources and reduced 
the share of commercial debt in total external debt from 58.1 percent 
at the end of 1985 to 38.6 percent in mid-1991, effectively transforming 
commercial debt to official debt. 
It is therefore hard to evade this conclusion: the Aquino administra- 
tion squandered numerous opportunities the EDSA revolution created 
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for a solution to the debt problem. It would be another mistake - and 
possibly bigger - if the country fails to capitalize on the potential 
increase in business confidence that may arise from what has already 
been achieved in the country's dealings with its creditors (e.g., the 
reduction of debt-service and the debt-GNP ratios and the share of 
short-term debt, etc.). 
To quote the CB Governor, "We are leaving the commercial debt 
issue behind." We are certainly not leaving it in the manner best for the 
country, but it is quite likely that we are not in a position to reverse the 
actions that have already been taken. The time and energy of the next 
government's finance and economics team would be better spent if it is 
focused on the management of official flows and the pursuit and suste- 
nance of economic reforms. 
Reducing Net Resource Outflow 
Since more than half of the country's external debt is from official 
sources (22% multilateral and 30% bilateral), the reduction of net 
resource outflow must focus on official debt. The most straightforward 
way of.reducing net resource outflow is to ask official creditors for "debt 
forgiveness." Poland was able to get a substantial write-off of its official 
external debt, although it does not necessarily follow that the Philip- 
pines can obtain a similar agreement. According to newspaper reports, 
Japan objected strongly at the outset to writing down Polish debts but 
eventually, albeit reluctantly, it gave in to pressure from other official 
creditors like the United States. 
Fortunately for Poland but not for the Philippines, Japan accounts for 
a relatively small percentage of Polish debt compared to ours (nearly $6 
billion, or two-thirds of total bilateral debt). It is also quite unlikely that 
the United States will do for the Philippines what it did for Poland. 
Thus, although we should try all avenues for straightforward debt 
reduction (e.g., on a creditor-by-creditor basis), our strategy should be 
flexible enough to leave room for other ways of reducing net outflow of 
resources. 
The outgoing administration has had some success in capitalizing 
interest on Paris Club debt and the new administration should therefore 
ask for interest capitalization from official creditors. Official creditors 
will, however, not always allow interest capitalization. Multilateral 
sources- are probably even less likely to grant interest capitalization. 
90 F Ip,, M, Md.11. 
Therefore, reduction of net resource outflow would have to be achieved 
through means other than securing new loans (both project and pro- 
gram type). The most obvious candidate for project loans would be 
energy generation, where regardless of the availability of foreign funds, 
investment must catch up rapidly. The rehabilitation of the Central 
Bank, on the other hand, would fit easily in a program loan involving 
exchange rate reform. 
This paper does not aim to give a detailed strategy for reducing net 
resource outflow. But it is obvious that the strategy would contain many 
elements. Also noticeable is the presence of economies of scale in 
dealing with official lenders. Official lenders may be able to gain more 
influence in determining Philippine priorities if they could pit one 
department of the government against another. To reduce transactions 
cost and interdepartmental dissonance, it may be advisable to focus on 
which "big ticket" items are likely to generate consensus within and 
outside government (energy, Central Bank rehabilitation, transporta- 
tion, etc.). 
Debt and Economic Stabilization 
This part of the paper reviews the stabilization measures set in place 
in 1990-1991. One of the conclusions drawn is that although 
stabilization inflicted a lot of pain, lack of decisiveness and delayed 
action could have resulted in even greater costs to society. Nevertheless, 
it could be argued that the social costs of stabilization could have been 
much lower if policy makers were more willing to give exchange rate 
adjustment a bigger role in the stabilization package. 
The next section looks at the stabilization measures that were actu- 
ally undertaken, what they accomplished and failed to accomplish. The 
paper then examines alternative stabilization measures that could have 
been undertaken and their advantages and disadvantages compared to 
the measures actually implemented. Since the alternative measures have 
the benefit of hindsight, it could be argued that the mere existence of 
better alternatives should not diminish the value of what the stabilization 
program has accomplished. The final section of this part of the paper 
looks at: 
0 the various reasons policy makers were very reluctant (and are 
probably still reluctant) to rely more on exchange rate adjust- 
ment; and 
1 
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0 The set of economic reforms that must be put in place which 
would make policy makers more willing to give exchange rate 
adjustments a greater role in the stabilization program. 
Hopefully, economic reforms will make the gains from stabilization 
more permanent and will increase the probability that the economy 
would reap significant benefits after having paid the inevitable cost of 
the stabilization program. 
Stabilization: 1990-1991 
By the second half of 1990, the economy was clearly on the verge of 
another foreign exchange crisis and another period of macroeconomic 
instability. The current account deficit ballooned from $954 million or 
1.3 percent of GDP in 1987 to $2.6 billion or 5.6 percent of GDP in 
1990. The trade deficit increased from about $1 billion in 1987 to 
almost $4 billion in 1990. Moreover, international reserves (excluding 
gold) was at a dangerously low level of $924 million at the end of 1990. 
The economy also showed signs of higher vulnerability to inflation- 
ary pressures. The inflation rate increased from less than 4 percent in 
1987 to almost 13 percent in 1990. But probably more alarming than 
the rise in the inflation rate was the fact that it took progressively less 
monetary growth to trigger inflation. In 1987, depending on how 
money supply is defined, each percentage point of money supply growth 
was accompanied by about one-fifth to one-third of a percentage point 
of inflation. Inflation was only 3.8 percent despite the growth of Ml, 
M2 and M3 by 20.7, 14.8 and 10.8 percent, respectively. As the 
economy grew, however, inflation showed signs of catching up with 
money supply growth. In 1990, each percentage point of money supply 
growth was accompanied by about one-half to nearly two-thirds of a 
percentage point of inflation: M1, M2 and M3 grew by 20.6, 23.2 and 
22.8 percent, respectively, and the consumer price index increased by 
12.7 percent. Money supply growth was met by less and less growth in 
output and demand for money balance and was accompanied by more 
and more increases in prices. (See Charts 2-1 and 2-2 and Table 2.2.) 
Moreover, due to economic growth and massive net resource outflows 
arising from the external debt, domestic interest rates increased rapidly. 
The interest rate on 91-day treasury bills rose from an average of 11.5 
percent in 1987 to an average of 23.7 percent during the second quarter 
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Table 2-2 
Money Growth, O utput Growth and Inflation (%) 
Growth rate of: Accounting for M1 Growth 
(M1 Growth Rate =100) 
M1 GNP CPI M1 GNP CPI Residual 
1987 20.7 5.9 3.8 100 28.5 18.4 53.1 
1988 19.1 6.6 8.8 100 34.6 46.1 19.3 
1989 18.5 5.7 10.6 100 30.7 57.2 12.1 
1990 20.6 3.0 12.7 100 14.5 61.6 23.9 
1991 16.8 -0.5 17.7 100 -3.0 105.2 -2.3 
Growth Rate of: Accounting for M2 Growth 
(M2 Growth Rate =100) 
M2 GNP CPI M1 GNP CPI Residual 
1987 14.8 5.9 3.8 100 39.8 25.7 7.3 
1988 20.4 6.6 8.8 100 32.4 43.2 20.2 
1989 26.1 5.7 10.6 100 21.9 40.6 35.4 
1990 23.2 3.0 12.7 100 12.9 54.8 30.5 
1991 17.5 -0.5 17.7 100 -2.9 101.0 1.5 
Growth rate of: Accounting for M3 Growth 
(M3 Growth Rate =100) 
M3 GNP CPl M1 GNP CPI Residual 
1987 10.8 5.9 3.8 100 54.8 35.3 10.0 
1988 19.5 6.6 8.8 100 33.8 45.1 21.1 
1989 25.5 5.7 10.6 100 22.3 41.5 36.1 
1990 22.8 3.0 12.7 100 13.2 55.8 31.1 
1991 17.5 -0.5 17.7 100 -2.9 101.3 1.5 
of 1990. The rise in interest rates made the fiscal picture even bleaker. 
The consolidated public sector deficit increased from P15.5 billion or 
2.2 percent of GNP in 1987 to P57.8 billion or 5.4 percent of GNP in 
1990. The increasing public sector deficit meant higher internal public 
debt which, together with rising interest rates, made interest payments 
of the national government the fastest growing item in the consolidated 
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almost doubled between 1987 and 1990, increasing from P36.9 billion 
to P71.1 billion in 1990. 
While the interest bill was rising, the capacity of the government to 
service debt was faltering. If interest payments of the national govern- 
ment are excluded to arrive at the primary surplus of the public sector, 
it becomes clear that the government's capacity to service its debt 
declined significantly: the primary surplus of the public sector fell from 
3.0 percent of GNP in 1987 to only 1.2 percent of GNP in 1990. On 
the other hand, if both the interest expense of the national government 
and the losses of the Central Bank are excluded, the decline in the ratio 
of the primary surplus to GNP would be 1.3 percentage points: from 4.6 
percent in 1987 to 3.3 percent of GNP in 1990 (Table 2.3). 
The public sector's ability to service debt declined in spite of the fact 
that the ratio of tax revenue to GNP increased from 10.4 percent in 
Table 2-3 
Public Sector Deficit 
(in billion pesos) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
(est.) 
National government 16.7 23.2 19.6 37.2 26.6 
Major corporations 3.2 -2 4.4 19.1 15.4 
LGUs and SSS -5.3 -5.4 4.2 -11.6 -8.9 
GFIs -1.3 -1.8- 3.3 -3.1 -2.0 
CB 10.9 16.9 20.8 21.9 21.5 
OPSF 0 0 7.1 7.4 -11.5 
Intersectoral transfers -8.7-1.1 -5.3 -13.1 -9.6 
Total public sector deficit 15.5 29.8 39.1 57.8 31.5 
As % of GNP 2.29'6 3.6% 4.1% 5.4% 2.5% 
NG interest payments 36.9 45.8 54.6 71.1 83.4 
Primary public sector surplus 21.4 16 15.5 13.3 51.9 
As % of GNP 3.0% 1.9% 1.6% 1.2% 4.1% 
Primary sector surplus 32.3 32.9 36.3 35.2 73.4 
excluding CB deficit 
As % of GNP 4.6% 4.0% 3.8% 3.3% 5.8% 
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1987 to 12.7 percent in 1990. This is traceable to the increasing deficit 
of the major government corporations and rising outlays for personal 
services as the number of employees increased and government salaries 
increased with the implementation of the Salary Standardization Law. 
The need to implement stabilization measures - soon and decisively 
before the end of 1990 - became clear. To their credit, the country's 
economic managers were quick to implement measures to stabilize the 
economy. Still, with the benefit of hindsight, it could be said that the 
stabilization measures chosen involved high social costs which were by 
no means irreducible. Thus, while there is no question that failure to 
implement stabilization policies would have resulted in even much 
higher costs to society, it is likely that an alternative mix of policies, one 
more reliant on exchange rate adjustments, lowered the costs to society 
and laid a more solid foundation for more outward-looking and sustain- 
able growth for the economic policy makers of the next administration. 
The government used three types of instruments to stabilize the 
economy: tight money, fiscal restraints, and exchange rate adjustment. 
(The third instrument was aided by controls on foreign exchange 
holdings and transactions, which were eventually relaxed.) At first 
glance, the tightening of money supply and credit was not apparent. M1 
growth was reduced from 20.6 percent in 1990 to 16.8; M2 growth from 
23.2 to 17.5 percent; and M3 growth from 22.8 percent to 17.5 percent 
(Table 2-2). But the economy was reeling from two major supply shocks 
in 1991: high oil prices at the beginning of the year and the eruption 
of Mount Pinatubo, which caused inflation to increase at a time when 
a tight money policy was underway. The end result was a credit squeeze 
which was much tighter than any other previous credit squeeze, with the 
exception of the 1984-1985 squeeze often associated with the issuance 
of high-yielding "Jobo" bills by the Central Bank (named after then CB 
Governor Jose "Jobo" Fernandez). 
Since the monetary targets were not adjusted despite the two major 
shocks, interest rates hit their highest level during the Aquino administra- 
tion (Table 2-4). Moreover, there was high speculative upward pressure on 
interest rates since the peso-dollar reference rate was initially set at a rate 
that was appreciably lower than the black market rate. In a sense, the high 
T-bill rates punished speculators who hoarded foreign exchange, but they 
also probably wiped out any remaining chance that the economy could 
experience positive economic growth in 1991. 
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Table 24 
Dollar Yield of 91-Day T-Bills 
Period Rate of: 
(A) (B) (A + B) Exchange Rate 
Appreciation Interest (P/$) 
(91-Day T-Bills) 
1987.1 -0.6% 9.90/0 9.2% 20.5625 
1987.2 1.5% 11.6% 13.1% 20.4564 
1987.3 -2.1% 11.6% 9.4% 20.6005 
1987.4 -3.1% 13.20/6 10.1% 20.8148 
1988.1 -3.1% 13.0% 9.9% 21.0277 
1988.2 1.1% 14.8% 15,9% 20.9487 
1988.3 -4.3% 14.6% 10.3% 21.2485 
1988.4 -1.5% 16.3% 14.7% 21.3560 
1989.1 0.3% 16.0% 16.2% 21.3380 
1989.2 -4.8% 16.4% 11.6% 21.6800 
1989.3 -4.0% 20.3% 16.3% 21.9691 
1989.4 -5.0% 22.3% 17.3% 22.3352 
1990.1 -5.7% 20.9% 15.2% 22.7594 
1990.2 -4.5% 23.7% 19.2% 23.1026 
1990.3 -29.2% 22.8% -6.5% 25.3519 
1990.4 -31.30/6 26.8% -4.6% 28.0000 
1991.1 0.0% 25.3% 25.30/a 28.0000 
1991.2 .2% 19.5% 21.7% 27.7955 
1991.3 8.8% 19.7% 28.4% 26.9834 
1991.4 4.1% 21.4% 25.5% 26.6183 
Sources of basic data: Government Securities Department, Central Bank; Reference Exchange Rate 
Bulletin, Treasury, Central Bank. 
Some have argued that the "real" rate of interest in 1991 was not very 
high because the inflation rate was about 18 percent. Since the peso was 
in fact appreciating, however, there is hardly any theoretical basis for 
subtracting the inflation rate from T-bill rates to compute short-term 
real interest rates. More relevant perhaps is the sum of the rates of 
interest and peso appreciation which represents the rate of return to an 
investor who converts dollars into pesos to buy T-bills and then con- 
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verts back into dollars the proceeds from the maturing Philippine T- 
bills. By this measure, the average interest rate in 1991 would be about 
four times the US rates. Indeed, the lending rates were so high in 1991 
that some businessmen felt they were working for the banks. In addi- 
tion, although the high interest rates eventually cooled down inflation 
by reducing demand, its initial impact was to contribute to cost-push 
inflation by raising the cost of capital. 
Perhaps the excessively tight monetary policy would have been less 
onerous if the government did not have to heavily borrow domestically. 
But because government is a heavy borrower, the rise in interest rates 
increased the national government's interest bill by P12.3 billion from 
an already large P71.1 billion in 1990 to a gargantuan P83.4 billion in 
1991. 
Despite the large increase in interest payments, the government was 
committed to reducing the public sector deficit. To meet the deficit 
targets, regular capital expenditures and current operating expenditures 
had to be reduced to rates that were even lower than the already 
trimmed down programmed levels. The resulting contraction in regular 
government spending in 1991 was extreme. Were it not for interest 
payments of the national government, the surplus of the public sector 
would have been P51.9 billion or 4.1 percent of GNP, a ratio that was 
higher than even the 3.0 percent ratio of primary surplus to GNP in 
1987, the first year the Aquino government had full control over its 
budget. Similarly, if both interest payments of the national government 
and the losses of the Central Bank were not counted in computing the 
consolidated public sector surplus, the surplus would have reached 
P73.4 billion or 5.8 percent of GNP, a level exceeding the previous high 
of 4.6 percent of GNP in 1987 (Table 2-3). In short, as in the case of 
monetary policies, the 1991 budget was by far the most contractionary 
budget under the Aquino administration. It is most likely that some 
long-term growth potential was sacrificed for the sake of macroeconomic 
stabilization. 
The program worked in terms of reducing macroeconomic and external 
imbalances. The trade and current account deficits started to shrink and 
inflation, more than a year after stabilization began, decelerated. Clearly, 
monetary and fiscal tools did almost all the work while exchange rate 
adjustments were given a very minor role, if any at all. The trade deficit fell 
primarily because imports fell; imports fell because the growth rate of GNP 
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plummeted from plus 3.0 percent in 1990 to minus 0.5 percent in 1991, 
undoubtedly due to tight monetary and fiscal policies. 
An Alternative Stabilization Program 
The minor role assigned to the exchange rate in the stabilization 
program is perhaps its weakest aspect. The trade deficit was reduced not 
by exporting more, nor by economizing on the use of imported com- 
modities, but by reducing output growth (Chart 2-3). Worse, stabilization 
did not change the fact that any subsequent economic recovery is likely 
to result in import growth outstripping both export and output growth. 
Thus, the gains from stabilization are likely to be temporary unless 
policy makers are satisfied with very low (say, less than 3%) economic 
growth after stabilization. 
In many ways, the current account deficit is a more serious problem 
than the public sector deficit. It is therefore puzzling why the exchange 
rate adjustment which affects external balance more directly than mon- 
etary or fiscal instruments, was not given a bigger role. The public sector 
at least consistently showed primary surpluses. Moreover, since a non- 
negligible part of interest payments (at least before the peso started to 
appreciate) is due to inflation, the real deficit is actually smaller than 
the nominal deficit. Thus it is possible that stabilization might have 
been less contractionary if a higher peso-dollar rate had been set in the 
fourth quarter of 1990. 
As earlier mentioned, the appreciable gap between the black market 
rate and the reference rate during the initial stage of stabilization 
probably added a few points to the T-bill rate. N more competitive 
exchange rate would also reduce imports without necessarily reducing 
output through expenditure switching. More importantly, more com- 
petitive exchange rates would make it easier to promote exports after the 
stabilization period. The way it stands, for example, getting the ex- 
change rate up to P30-32 per dollar would present many problems, since 
the current exchange rate is around P26 per dollar. A gradual creep from 
P26 to P30 or P32 would mean higher nominal interest rates. A one- 
shot increase from P26 to, say, P30 or P32, however, would trigger 
another surge in inflation. Since the black market rate was already over 
P30 in December 1990, the reference rate could have been set at P30 
instead of P28 with the same effect on inflation but with a much more 
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Another puzzling aspect of the stabilization program is allowing the 
peso to appreciate to current levels. Since balance of payments stability 
was attained by contracting the economy, it is very likely that balance 
of payments problems will recur as soon as economy picks up again. In 
other words, the current peso-dollar rate is sustainable only if the 
economy continues to stagnate. Unless new growth is financed through 
foreign investments, more growth would mean increasing scarcity of 
foreign exchange. Increasing scarcity of foreign exchange, on the other 
hand, would require either a gradual depreciation or a drastic devalua- 
tion of the peso. As previously discussed, a gradual depreciation of the 
peso would mean higher nominal interest while a drastic devaluation 
results in another price surge, effectively negating the gains that have 
been achieved in controlling inflation during the last 12 to 15 months. 
Maybe some insights can be gained by comparing the exchange rates 
of the Philippines with those of Indonesia and Thailand. The peso had 
depreciated more, both nominally and effectively, than the baht. The 
rupiah, however, has been devalued more sharply, both nominally and 
effectively, than the peso (Table 2-5). 
Thailand's imports have grown much faster than its GNP, but it 
probably does not have to weaken the baht since it has been very 
successful in attracting foreign investments in export-oriented firms, 
and has been able to achieve export growth rates that match the growth 
rate of imports (Chart 2-3).However, to replicate Thailand's experience 
requires not only a favorable global environment but a very open 
economy as well. 
There is little doubt that the Thai economy is much more open than 
ours. This is seen, for example, in the ratio of the share of international 
trade taxes in total indirect taxes to the share of merchandise imports 
in GDP. In 1987, the Philippine ratio was 139 percent, 36 percentage 
points higher than Thailand's 103 percent. Relative to Thailand, the 
Philipines taxes foreign goods a lot more than domestic goods. 
The ratio of tax rates on foreign goods to tax rates on domestic goods 
in Indonesia is about the same as the Philippines'. Indonesia, however, 
has pursued an exchange rate policy that is much more aggressive than 
that of the Philippines, triggering the rapid growth of non-oil exports. 
But because of the large share of oil in Indonesia's exports, the growth 
rate of total exports has not been very high. Notwithstanding its de- 
pendence on oil exports, Indonesia's economy has grown much faster 
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Table 2a 
Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates 
Nominal Exchange Rates 
Indonesia Philippines Thailand 
1985 11.105 18.607 27.159 
1986 12.826 20.386 26.299 
1987 16.439 20.586 25.723 
1988 16.857 21.095 25.294 
1989 17.701 21.737 25.702 
1990 18.4 24.3 25.68 
Real Effective Exchange Rates 
Indonesia Philippines Thailand 
1985 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1986 75.7 81.5 88.1 
1987 57.8 76.6 83.6 
1988 55.5 74.5 79.3 
1989 56.8 77.1 81.8 
1990 57.2 76.9 85.6 
Note: Rupiahs/U.S. Cent, Pesos/U.S.$ and BahVU.S.$ 
Source: Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 1991. 
than our economy: the growth of Indonesia's imports, unlike the growth 
of Philippine imports, had not outpaced the growth of output (Chart 2- 
4). Even in cases where competitive exchange rates do not succeed in 
paving the way for rapid export growth, exchange rate policy can still 
contribute to sustained growth by making consumers and firms use 
foreign goods more efficiently. 
The Exchange Rate: An Underutilized Tool 
In the previous sections, it was argued that exchange rates played a minor 
role in 1990-1991 stabilization, and that a bigger role for exchange rates 
would have reduced reliance on monetary and fiscal tools which might have 
resulted in lower social costs of stabilization. It is therefore interesting to 
know why the Philippines is more reluctant to use exchange rates in 
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The most obvious explanation is the weak position of the Central 
Bank's international reserves as of the end of 1990. Central banks with 
weak reserve positions tend to be more cautious in using exchange rate 
adjustments and use foreign exchange controls instead. (Since the 
controls will cause distortions anyway regardless of the size of the 
exchange rate adjustment, authorities may be more inclined to rely less 
on exchange rate adjustment when there are exchange controls.) It is 
worth noting, for instance, that Indonesia was sitting on huge reserves 
when it sharply devalued the rupiah. 
One can hypothesize that the Philippines would have adopted more 
competitive exchange rates if it had been more successful in reducing 
net resource transfers to creditors since a reduction in net resource 
transfers could have resulted in a more comfortable level of interna- 
tional reserves. It should be pointed out, though, that large reserves 
could also cause complacency toward trade and industrial reforms which 
would result in "more of the same" type of industrialization policies that 
protect industries using huge foreign exchange but are not competitive 
in the world market and are therefore unable to earn sufficient foreign 
exchange to pay for their own imported inputs, not to mention sell 
dollars to the Central Bank to service the external public debt. 
Another possible explanation for the reluctance to adopt competitive 
exchange rates is the fear that the Philippine government - a more 
democratic one than Indonesia's - may have to succumb to pressure to 
adjust legislated minimum wages proportional to the rate of currency 
depreciation. As shown by the experience of some Latin American 
countries, there is very little to be gained from devaluing the currency 
if wages are indexed. In other words, the Philippine policy makers would 
be less reluctant to use the exchange rate as a tool for maintaining 
external balance if wage-setting was based more on collective bargain- 
ing agreements than on minimum wage legislation. 
A third and possibly more important reason for the reluctance of 
Philippine policy makers to adopt a competitive exchange rate policy is 
the fiscal overhang of the foreign debt. As shown in Table 2-3, Central 
Bank losses have exceeded P20 billion per year since 1989. The primary 
explanation for the large and recurring losses of the CB is the fact that 
Central Bank liabilities are in dollars and other foreign currencies but 
its assets are mostly in pesos. Every devaluation, in other words, means 
a bigger Central Bank deficit. 
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It is not merely the Central Bank's financial position that can be 
upset by a devaluation. Since a large proportion of the country's exter- 
nal debt is public, policymakers consider devaluation a risky proposi- 
tion. It is easy to compute the effects of a devaluation on the peso value 
of external debt service but it is difficult to predict accurately what its 
effects would be on government revenue. In a sense, it is not the size of 
the public external debt per se that is most alarming; it is the vulner- 
ability of the public sector's ability to service debt to shocks such as 
changes in the exchange rate. 
As pointed out earlier, the primary surplus of the public sector which 
can be used as an indicator of the public sector's ability to service its 
debts, fell steadily between 1987 and 1990. Furthermore, although our 
public sector's external debt is quite large relative to GNP by interna- 
tional standards, it is the size of the Philippines' ratio of interest 
payments on external public debt to public revenue that stands out in 
an international comparison. 
Compared to other Asian countries (Table 2-6), the Philippines' public 
external debt burden is high relative to the GNP. Yet the public debt service 
ratio of the Philippines is not higher than those of Malaysia and Indonesia. 
The Philippine ratio in 1988 was 3.9 percent, as against Malaysia's 3.7 
percent and Indonesia's 3.4 percent. The picture changes drastically, how- 
ever, if the public external debt service is compared to central government 
revenue instead of GNP. Not only is the Philippines' ratio much higher 
than Indonesia's or Malaysia's, the two other countries in the region with 
high ratio of external public debt service to GNP- it is also the highest. 
In 1988, the ratio of interest payments on external public debt for the 
Philippines was 27.1 percent, while the corresponding ratios for Indonesia 
and Malaysia were 17.8 percent and 14.8 percent, respectively. 
In fact, Table 2-6 understates the vulnerability of the Philippine 
public sector to devaluations and overstates the vulnerability of the 
Indonesian and Malaysian public sectors. The revenues of the govern- 
ments of Indonesia and Malaysia are heavily dependent on oil production 
and exports. As a result, government revenue tends to increase when the 
currency is devalued. In contrast, the revenue of the Philippine govern- 
ment is quite dependent on the taxation of oil Consumption and imports. 
This means there would always be political pressure to reduce the 
effective tax rate on petroleum products every time the peso is devalued. 
Thus it is not surprising for the Philippines to experience difficulty in 
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Table 2-6 
Interest Payments on External Public Debt, 1988 
% of GNP % of Central 
Government 
Revenue 
Bangladesh 0.7 8.4 
China 0.4 n.a. 
India 0.9 6.5 
Indonesia 3.4 17.8 
Malaysia 3.7 14.8 
Nepal 0.6 5.9 
Pakistan 1.2 7.0 
Philippines 3.9 27.1 
Sri Lanka 1.8 9.4 
Thailand 1.6 9.4 
Source: World Bank (1990). 
pursuing a more realistic exchange rate policy than either Indonesia or 
Thailand. The Philippine balance of payments may be more serious and 
may have greater tendency to recur, but Philippine policy makers are 
probably more worried about the fiscal implications of a devaluation. 
This does not mean that a devaluation would have a negative fiscal 
yield in the Philippines. It simply means that the Philippines is in a 
more difficult position than either Indonesia or Malaysia, To the extent, 
for example, that a surprise one-shot devaluation reduces the real value 
of public internal debt and domestic interest rates (if the new exchange 
rate is credible), a devaluation would improve the fiscal position of the 
public sector. Revenue (in pesos) from taxes on international trade 
would also increase with devaluation (albeit less than proportionately), 
since the price-elasticity of demand for imports is likely to be much 
lower than unity. 
On the other hand, because of political factors, the revenue of some 
government corporations with foreign liabilities may not be very elastic 
with respect to a devaluation. The National Power Corporation, for 
instance, would face political resistance if it tries to raise rates to keep 
On Dek Management and Macroeconomic Policiee 107 
up with changes in the exchange rates. Similarly, government employ- 
ees would demand higher wages if the exchange rate is increased sharply. 
In short, policy makers would probably be more willing to devalue the 
peso to address balance of payments problems if the tax system were 
elastic with respect to devaluations. Unfortunately, no guarantee can be 
made that this is indeed the case. The ratio of tax revenue to GNP has 
increased significantly since the first year of the Aquino government, 
but the increases in the tax-GNP ratio are not built-in features of the 
system. (In contrast, the term "automatic stabilizer" is often used in 
western textbooks in economics to describe the tax system.) Instead, a 
large proportion of the increases in tax collections came in patchwork 
at a high political cost (and therefore stands a high chance of being 
reversed) since a significant proportion of the increases was due to new 
taxes (e.g., "sin" taxes, the import levy, and special taxes on oil). 
Finally, it should be pointed out that increasing the elasticity of the 
system is just one of the fiscal reforms that must be put in place to make 
Philippine policy makers more comfortable with the idea of using the 
exchange rate as a major component of the economic adjustment 
program. To reiterate, devaluations worsen the financial position of the 
Central'Bank. So even if the public sector as a whole may initially realize 
some financial gains from a devaluation, there is no guarantee that such 
gains will not be quickly used up to finance politically attractive spend- 
ing which is likely to be of lower economic priority compared to 
addressing the problems of the Central Bank. To illustrate, imagine how 
people would react to a proposal to use increases in the Oil Price 
Stabilization Fund (OPSF) resulting from an appreciation of the peso or 
a decline in crude oil prices to rehabilitate the Central Bank. It may be 
a good economic idea since giving a break to motorists would most likely 
yield a much lower social rate of return than improving the financial 
position of the Central Bank. But given the history of the fund, it is safe 
to assume that only a few legislators would openly support such a 
proposal, especially if the public is not given a detailed accounting of 
how the losses of the Central Bank were accumulated. 
In other words, a political solution must be found so that the Central 
Bank rehabilitation gets first crack at whatever fiscal gains may be 
realized from a devaluation. Multilateral financing may make it easier to 
forge this political solution. 
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Conclusion 
The debt problem is a balance of payments problem, net resource- 
transfer problem, and a fiscal problem all rolled into one. To resolve it, 
the Aquino administration almost succeeded in preventing the growth 
of the external debt but, in the process, only addressed very partially the 
effects of the external debt on the growth of the economy and the fiscal 
problems of the public sector. The ratios of debt service to export and 
the external debt to GNP are much lower now than during the Aquino 
government's incumbency beginning in 1986, not because the growth 
targets were achieved but because net resource outflow was bigger than 
envisioned when the government first drafted its development plans. It 
could therefore be argued that the social cost of managing the external 
debt would have been lower if the external debt had increased faster and 
annual export and output growth had been higher. 
Success in controlling the growth of external debt was achieved by 
increasing the share of the Philippine public sector in the external debt, 
increasing loans from official creditors, and reducing the exposure of 
commercial creditors. Moreover, due to negative resource transfers, the 
government increased its internal debt to pay interest on the external 
public debt. Such changes in the composition of the debt reduce the 
country's leverage in bargaining with commercial creditors, make the 
country more dependent on decisions of official creditors, and increase 
domestic interest rates. The increase in domestic interest rates, in turn, 
accelerates the buildup of internal public debt. 
These changes in the structure of the country's external debt would 
shape and constrain the management of public and external debt by the 
next administration. The decision on the commercial debt package, for 
instance, will be passed on by the outgoing administration to the 
incoming one, but the latter may really have a very weak leverage in 
improving the package. The package, as it stands, does not represent 
substantial debt relief and is in fact inferior to what other countries have 
gotten from the commercial creditors. Given the small exposure (rela- 
tive to other Philippine creditors and to other country-debtors) of the 
commercial banks in the Philippines, it may not be wise for the new 
officials to prolong negotiations on the financial package. The new 
administration must concentrate on increasing direct foreign invest- 
ments, reducing net resource transfers from official creditors, and im- 
proving the efficiency of the economy and the tax system. 
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In particular, the exchange rate regime must be made more competi- 
tive so that the economy does not experience what it has experienced 
repeatedly since the 1950s: the recurrence of balance of payments crisis 
every time the Philippine industrial sector experiences a significant 
expansion. Unfortunately, a more realistic exchange rate policy is likely 
to cause fiscal problems (and is therefore going to yield at best short- 
term benefits) unless the fiscal system is improved (81 percent of the 
external debt is public). 
In the long run, the only lasting way we can leave the debt issue 
behind is to achieve faster economic growth and to make the tax system 
more efficient and equitable. 
Appendix 
Public debt, measured in domestic currency, consists of internal and exter- 
nal debt. 
D=L+eF (1) 
where L is internal public debt, e is the exchange rate and F is external public 
debt in foreign currency. 
From (1), it follows that the increase in public debt is: 
ADI = D, - Du l = ALI + e,AF, + Ae,F, (2) 
Changes in the level of public debt can be decomposed into three parts: 
(a) net domestic borrowing, 
(b) net foreign borrowing, and 
(c) changes due to changes in the exchange rate. 
Since the public sector's primary deficit and interest expense is financed 
through (high-powered) money creation and domestic and foreign borrowing: 
AL, + eAF + AM = 
G,- 
T + + iie"IF0 (3) 
where M is high-powered money, G is public sector expenditures (excluding 
debt service) and T is public sector revenue (including "income" from debt 
reduction/forgiveness), id is the nominal interest rate on public internal debt 
(e.g., T-Bill rate), and if is the nominal interest rate on public external debt 
(e.g., LIBOR plus spread) 
Combining (2) and (3) and dividing by GNP Y, 
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D t. R = Gt Tt mk + (ias + (if + x,) (1-s) - rl 2,L (4) 
Y, Yt,, Y, Y, l+r Y, 
where m is the growth rate of high-powered money, k is the ratio of high- 
powered money to output, s is the share of domestic debt in total public debt, 
x is the rate of change of the exchange rate, and r is the nominal growth rate 
of GNP. 
Alternatively the equation (4) can be written as 
D DO G, 7 mk ' Y Y Y Y 1 +r i-r t ", , , 
(5) 
E ' 1+r 
Y, Y 
which gives the rate of change in the ratio of public debt to GNP. Alterna- 
tively, (5) may be rewritten in continuous form as: 
( G - T - mk) Y + i-r 
Y Y 5- 
(6) 
where the variables have the same meaning as before but are all values at 
particular points in time (e.g., G = G(t), etc) and the rate of interest i is simply 
the weighted sum i,,S + (if + x,) (1-s) of the interest rates on internal and 
external debt, with the latter adjusted for changes in the exchange rate. 
Actually, the rate of change of the ratio of public debt to GNP has been 
consistently negative in the past six years, reaching its lowest point (highest 
in absolute value) in 1991. In 1991, with the high reserve requirements, 
growth in high-powered money and the primary surplus (national government 
and Central Bank interest payments excluded from public sector expendi- 
tures) together contributed more than six percentage points to the reduction 
of the ratio of public debt to GNP. If real GNP growth is not lower than 
population growth, neither the nominal interest rate on T-Bills nor the sum 
of LIBOR plus spread and the rate of change in the peso-dollar exchange rate 
is expected to exceed the nominal growth of GNP (not to mention exceed the 
nominal growth rate of GNP by six percentage points times the reciprocal of 
the public debt-GNP ratio). Thus, the ratio of public debt to GNP would 
continue to fall significantly if the new government is as fiscally conservative 
as the last one. Moreover, since the debt reduction from the buybacks are 
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treated as revenue in equation (4), the ratio of public debt to GNP would fall 
even more in the coming years with the conclusion of debt negotiations with 
commercial creditors. 
One option is to continue with the present macroeconomic policy which 
maintains prudent money supply growth, large primary surpluses and a strong 
peso. It is quite clear, however, that such a macroeconomic policy would result 
in low economic growth (some say at best 3 percent) unless there is a large 
increase in the flow of foreign investments. 
Presumably fiscal and monetary conservatism (and a rapidly falling public 
debt-GNP ratio) if maintained long enough would establish enough credibility 
and send good signals to foreign investors (especially if the number of goods 
covered by 50 percent tariff is reduced to zero and the implementation period of 
tariff reform is reduced from five years to two or three years). Significant tariff 
reforms, however, are likely to cause the peso to depreciate. Moreover, as previous 
studies have pointed out, and especially with recent peso depreciation, it is 
doubtful if the Philippines is competitive with other Asian countries at current 
exchange rates. 
It is also important to note that the past reduction of the ratio of the public 
debt to GNP was, to a large extent, achieved by reducing the size of govern- 
ment expenditures other than debt service relative to GNP. In particular, the 
ratio of capital outlays to current operating expenditures in the national 
budget has been reduced drastically. (The ratio of capital to current expen- 
ditures in the national budget during the term of President Aquino is around 
half of the ratio during the last five years of before the fall I of President 
Marcos.) In other words, it is doubtful if the present quality of infrastructure 
together with current spending policy would send good signals to foreign 
investors. 
Thus, it seems clear that a higher growth path can be attained only with 
a higher level of spending and a real devaluation of the peso. The qualification 
real is very important since as can be seen from equation 4, the public debt 
to GNP ratio may rise if t, m, x and id all rise by the same amount but k falls 
(velocity rises) and the ratio of revenue to GNP falls (e.g., the tax system is 
not elastic with respect to inflation which has happened in the past when the 
ratio of tax collections to GNP fell below 10%). 
As is usually the case, the alternative macroeconomic policy regime sug- 
gested above is not without its risks. Bad public investment projects may be 
chosen, or good projects may be implemented poorly. In addition, a real 
devaluation is going to increase the ratio of public debt to GNP in the short 
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run and reduce it in the long run only if the economy grows faster (in all 
likelihood it will, since with an overvalued peso, growth has a tendency to 
produce large current account deficits). Moreover, similar to the point men- 
tioned earlier about the elasticity of the tax system, public revenue may fall 
relative to GNP after a real devaluation. In the first place, a real devaluation 
will reduce the size of imports relative to GNP. Since a significant portion of 
taxes is collected by the Bureau of Customs, revenue will rise when the peso 
becomes weaker but at a rate lower than the change in the exchange rate. In 
addition, there would be tremendous political temptation not to adjust rates 
of utility companies (which use a lot of foreign exchange for debt service and 
inputs) to levels necessary to absorb the effects of the devaluation. There 
would also be pressure to cut the tax rate on petroleum products to cushion 
the effects of devaluation on motorists, commuters and jeepney drivers. 
A more competitive peso and better social overhead capital are necessary 
for breaking out of the present cycle consisting of- 
relatively high growth, which results in 
Q a foreign exchange crisis, which in turn necessitates 
O very low or negative growth to attain external balance. 
But tax administration must be improved to make it less likely that a devalu- 
ation would become a purely nominal one in the long run as money creation 
is used to make up for the negative fiscal effects of the devaluation. 
There seems very little choice but to take the more risky path. A few more 
years of very low growth rates and rising unemployment would make the 
political pressure to pump prime nearly irresistible. It is better to initiate the 
alternative macroeconomic regime when international reserves are high and 
at the start of a new administration which may have a better chance of 
implementing bureaucratic reforms. 
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POLICY OPTIONS FOR BANKING 
AND FINANCIAL REFORMS 
Ma. Socorro Gochoco 
Introduction 
IN ASSESSING THE RELATIONSHIP OF MONETARY POLICY TO POVERTY, ONE MUST 
bear in mind that monetary policy affects the following prices: 
a The price of goods or the inflation rate; 
Q The price of credit or the interest rate; and 
The price of foreign currency or the exchange rate. 
The inflation rate is the rate at which the price level grows. It 
influences the ability of people to purchase goods and services with a 
given amount of money income. A high inflation rate may not just 
mean less ability to afford more and better quality goods; for the 
majority, it may imply an inability to provide one's self with the basic 
necessities. 
Interest rates affect the availability and affordability of credit to 
finance present and future consumption or investment. High loan rates 
discourage borrowing to finance investment, particularly by small busi- 
nesses. However, high loan rates can attract high-risk borrowers who 
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would otherwise be unable to borrow from formal financial institutions. 
This exemplifies the so-called adverse selection effect. Low savings 
deposit rates, which cannot keep up with inflation, would result in 
negative real deposit rates, thus hurting small savers, particularly those 
with meager savings. A disincentive to save, in the form of financial 
assets, results. Poor deposit mobilization exacerbates the problem of 
credit availability and affordability. The affluent, however, have more 
possibilities in managing their savings. Real assets such as land or 
productive investments compete with financial assets such as time 
deposits and treasury bills. Time deposits and treasury bills have higher 
interest rates compared with savings deposit. The return on these 
instruments also carry no.risk except for inflation; it is also easier to 
generate compared to investments in the real sector which are subject 
to more risks. The poor are essentially deprived of this financial market 
as the minimum placements are quite large. 
As more savings go into lending to the government via the purchase 
of treasury bills, fewer factories are established and less jobs are created 
for the poor. A resulting limited output of goods in the economy may 
contribute to the inflation problem. 
An incorrect exchange rate policy, particularly an overvalued peso, 
taxes exporters and dollar earners and encourages the production of 
import-dependent goods which are capital-intensive. This dampens the 
employment of the country's abundant labor supply. 
The three prices identified above and the policies governing them 
also have a repercussion on the budgetary deficit of the government. A 
high rate of inflation reduces the size of the deficit in real terms. Some 
revenues accrue to the government from inflation as it is the rate at 
which money balances are taxed. Those who hold nominally denomi- 
nated assets will shoulder most of the inflation tax; they are therefore 
apt to resist this form of taxation as a means of earning revenues for the 
government. At some point, a very high inflation tax rate erodes the tax 
base of money holdings so much that the revenue from inflation actually 
decreases as the inflation rate increases. 
High interest rates worsen the budgetary deficit as the cost of competing 
for the scarce supply of credit in the market surges. They also increase the 
debt service burden. Nevertheless, the overvaluation of the peso prevents 
the foreign debt burden from becoming larger than it is in peso terms since 
the government is able to buy dollars at a cheaper rate, as compared to the 
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proceeds of treasury bill sales used to service the foreign debt. Thus, the 
overwhelming need to continue servicing the foreign debt while keeping 
the budgetary deficit within bounds necessitates, among other things, an 
overvalued peso. But while this may be so, the inflation rate must also be 
held down so as to prevent the peso from depreciating, relative to the dollar. 
Conflicting effects would then result from high interest rates since revenues 
from the inflation tax, despite alleviating the budgetary deficit, would 
undermine the ability to keep the peso at an overvalued level; this in turn 
would jeopardize debt servicing. The accompanying "tight" measures to 
hold inflation down and the resources which are extracted from this process 
to service the foreign debt will stall the economy's growth. The alternative 
of borrowing from the public through high-yielding, risk-free treasury bills, 
which only the rich can afford, to finance the deficit (instead of money 
creation and the inflation tax) means that only the rich benefit in the form 
of high interest income taxed at a final rate of 20 percent, way below the 
marginal tax rates of the rich. 
This study discusses the problems and issues of implementing mon- 
etary policy and attempts to: 
O Characterize the overall thrust of monetary policy; 
Q Examine the role of money creation in the deficit financing 
mix; and 
C3 Review the structure and performance of the banking industry 
and their effects on savings mobilization, the level and term 
structure of interest rates, and the availability of long-term credit, 
particularly after financial liberalization was implemented. 
Various solutions to problems in each of these areas, as well as the 
difficulties associated with these solutions are also presented. The con- 
cluding section suggests a course of action for monetary policymakers to 
undertake. 
The Overall Thrust of Monetary Policy 
Fixing the Exchange Rate: Evidence and Effects 
In theory, a fixed exchange rate regime constrains the ability to use 
money creation to generate revenues from the issue of money called 
seignorage. What evidence exists show 
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O that the authorities effectively peg the peso vis-a-vis the dollar; 
and 
O that they did not rely much on seignorage revenue from money 
creation partly as a result of the above. 
In terms of pegging the peso, the nominal peso/dollar rate has been 
below targets set by the authorities in 1986, 1987, 1988, and the months 
of 1990 with available data (Table 3-1). In these periods, the current 
account balance deteriorated, and the gross international reserve levels 
in months of imports of goods and services at the Central Bank (CB) 
declined and fell below the target (Tables 3-2 and 3-3). In theory, the 
domestic currency would tend to depreciate relative to the foreign 
currency, if the external accounts deteriorate and no intervention takes 
place in the foreign exchange market. This is because as long as imports 
of goods and capital exceed exports, the demand for dollars will rise 
compared with the demand for pesos; hence, the value of the peso would 
tend to fall relative to the dollar. But what occurred in the Philippines 
was the contrary. The peso did not depreciate; instead it appreciated in 
real terms against the dollar between 1986 and 1988 as shown in Table 
3-4; it also dropped below targeted nominal levels between 1986 and 
1990. This trend could result if the authorities deliberately intervened 
to prevent the peso from falling in value relative to the dollar. Since the 
CB's international levels were low in these periods, it was not possible 
for it to intervene directly by selling dollars and buying pesos to main- 
tain the value of the peso. The only other option to effect the situation 
was for the authorities to raise domestic interest rates above foreign 
interest rates and create a spread between them, at least as large as the 
expected peso depreciation, in order to persuade asset holders to will- 
ingly hold pesos rather than dollars. Table 3.5 provides some evidence 
that the CB borrowed from the public through a reverse repurchase 
(RP) transaction which contracts liquidity or the money supply via high 
interest rates on these borrowings. This would then strengthen the peso 
or at least prevent it from depreciating further against the dollar. 
A more technical approach this study used pointed out that a fixed 
exchange rate regime was adopted during the 1981-1989 period. Called 
LARCH, this econometric technique measures the variability of the 
exchange rate over time (Gochoco 1991). The LARCH results indi- 
cated that except for the discrete devaluations in 1983 and 1984, the 
Policy Option for Banking and Financial Reforme 119 
Table 3-t 
Nominal P/$ Exchange Rate 
{period averages) 
Actual Exchange Rate (P/$) Annual 
Target 01 02 03 04 Average 
1986 21.00 20.09 20.51 20.46 20.46 19.5136 
1987 20.60 20.51 20.47 20.49 20.799 20.5677 
1988 21.40 20.92 20.97 21.11 21.36 21.0947 
Dec 
1989 21.70° 21.34 21.55 21.91 22.33 21.7370 
Mar Apr May June July 
1990 24.10° 22.75 22.76 22.90 23.10 23.5600 
a/Average for the period 29-31 December 1987. 
b/Adopted during the November 1989 Review. 
c/As of 23 November 1989. 
Source: Central Bank. 
peso/dollar rate remained remarkably stable. In contrast, monetary growth 
was highly erratic in the same period. This is consistent with the fact 
that the authorities had to contract or expand the money supply to 
offset shocks in the financial market in order to keep interest rates high, 
maintaining the exchange rate at the desired level. In economic par- 
lance, money was used as the instrument to target the exchange rate. 
The policy of keeping tight money supply, aside from maintaining 
high domestic interest rates and persuading portfolio holders to prefer 
domestic over foreign assets, seeks to avoid excessive monetary growth 
which is inflationary. This inflationary pressure would undermine the 
exchange rate target. This is because domestic goods would become 
much more expensive relative to foreign goods, inducing the public to 
switch their expenditures toward foreign goods and capital, assuming 
that there are no barriers like import quotas. Demand for foreign goods 
and capital represents a demand for foreign exchange which would then 
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Table 3-2 
Gross International Reserve of the Central Bank In Billion US$ 
(End of period; In months of goods and services) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
01 1.2 2.5 1.8 1.8 Mar 1.751 
[2.1] [1.7] [1.3] 
02 1.6 2.4 1.7 1.6' Apr 1.614 
[1.7] [1.2] [1.1] 
Q3 1.7 2.1 1.6 1.5 May 2.025 
[1.2] [1.5] 
Q4 2.5 2.0 2.1 2.32 June 1.974 
July 1.982 
[2.1] [1.9] 
Target 2.4 2.5 1.8 3.5" 3.17 
[3.0] [2.4] 
a/As of 9 June 1989, 
b/Adopted during the March 1989 Review. 
Source: Central Bank. 
tend to increase its value relative to the peso. Hence, despite a growing 
need to finance the budget deficit, a fixed exchange rate regime would 
constrain the ability of the authorities to generate revenues via seignorage 
and the inflation tax. In fact, the proportion of the deficit financed by 
money creation, measured as the ratio of the difference between changes 
in holdings of government debt held by the CB and changes in holdings 
of required reserves to the overall deficit remained almost always nega- 
tive for the years 1983-1986 (Gochoco 1988, pp 28-30). 
This highly contractionary monetary policy would crowd out high 
interest rates. Gochoco (1990a) examined the effects on nominal inter- 
est rates of various methods of financing the deficit, using monthly data 
from 1981 to 1986. The coefficient on the logarithm of surprises in 
privately held debt, which measures the effect of a surprise substitution 
of debt for taxes to finance the deficit, came out significantly positive. 
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Table 3.3 
Gross International Reserves of the Central Bank 
on thousand !S$) 
[Months worth of Imported Goods & Services] 
End of End of 
Period Period 
1985 1061.16 Apr 1812.59 [1.9] 
May 1780.33 [1.8] 
1986 Jan 951.62 [1.4] Jun 1725.10 [1.8) 
Feb 898.05 [1.4] Jul 1620.25 [1.7] 
Mar 1243.56 [1.9] Aug 1656.47 [1.7] 
Apr 1435.52 [2.2) Sep 1626.87 [1.7] 
May 1594.24 [2.4] Oct 1543.14 (1.6] 
Jun 1601.79 [2.4] Nov 1676.53 [1.7] 
Jul 1704.16 [2.6] Dec 2058.88 [2.1] 
Aug 1670.91 [2.5] 
Sep 1710.35 (2.5] 1989 Jan 1947.47 [1.6] 
Oct 1904.79 [2.8] Feb 1878.22 [1.6] 
Nov 1884.37 [2.8] Mar 1799.25 [1.5) 
Dec 2458.98 [3.6) Apr 1641.75 [1.4] 
May 1726.64 [1.4] 
1987 Jan 2577.66 (3.0] Jun 1564 [1.3] 
Feb 2566.47 [3.0) Jul 1325 [1.1] 
Mar 2484.29 [2.9] Aug 1474 [1.21 
Apr 2508.09 [2.9) Sept 1537 [1.3] 
May 2335.55 (2.7] Oct 1832 (1.5] 
Jun 2359.57 [2.7] Nov 1783 [1.5] 
Jul 2411.58 [2.8] Dec 2324 [1.9] 
Aug 2481.48 [2.9) 
Sep 2111.88 (2.5) 1990 Jan 1721 (1.3] 
Oct 1978.28 [2.3] Feb 1621.28 [1.2] 
Nov 1772.52 [2.1] Mar 1751.03 [1.3] 
Dec 1958.69 [2.3] Apr 1614 [1.2] 
May 2025 (1.5] 
1988 Jan 1803.80 [1.8] Jun 1974 [1.5] 
Feb 1732.79 [1.8] Jul 1982 [1.5] 
Mar 1807.48 [1.9) 
Sources: Treasury and Foreign Exchange Operations and Investments 
Departments, Central Bank of the Philippines. 
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Table 3-4 
Real Effect" Exchange Rate 
(p/$) 
Import Price GDP Price Real Exchange 
Official Exchange Index Deflator Rate 
Rate (1972 = base year) 
1980 7.51 354.56 285.89 9.32 
1981 7.89 394.39 317.29 9.82 
1982 8.54 406.56 344.04 10.09 
1983 11.11 465.08 384.39 13.45 
1984 16.69 651.34 575.41 18.90 
1985 18.60 775.32 678.66 21.25 
1986 20.38 661.85 692.58 19.48 
1987 20.56 716.02 741.58 19.86 
1988 21.10 740.66 814.44 19.19 
Import 
Model: Real Exchange Rate = Official Exchange x Price Index 
Rate GDP Price 
Deflator 
Source: PIDS Macro Model. 
This is consistent with a "crowding out" effect, arising from the issue of 
government debt. 
Other reasons account for high interest rates in the Philippines. 
Compared with other countries in the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), the Philippines has high and variable interest rates, 
both in real and nominal terms (Tables 3.6, 3-7, and 3-8). High and 
variable interest rates exacerbate the shortage of capital by discouraging 
capital, particularly long-term capital, from coming in. The amount of 
resource outflows to pay the external debt, reaching some US$2 billion 
a year or about five percent of the country's gross national product 
(GNP), also aggravates the capital shortage. Both of these causes have 
been partly addressed by recent measures such as the removal of controls 
on foreign exchange, which will hopefully encourage more direct for- 
eign investment, particularly equity capital. The new US$ 5.3 billion 
debt package also hopes to reduce the net resource outflow problem. 
However, the merits of this package, compared with others such as the 
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Brady Plan, may be fewer because of the larger guarantee required, 
which partially negates the favorable effects arising from the lower 
interest rates obtained under the package. 
The Need for a Sizeable Devaluation 
The persistent balance of payments (BOP) problems caused by the 
exchange rate policy of keeping an overvalued peso, which in turn 
hinders industrial restructuring, employment, output growth, and (to 
the extent that supply-side factor matters) inflation, calls for a large peso 
devaluation. 
Devaluation is an increase in the price of foreign exchange (Mundell 
1971, pp. 86-90). In a simple, open economy, terms of trade are given 
by world conditions and the foreign currency price of both imports and 
exports in world markets is fixed. If the so-called terms of trade are fixed, 
a devaluation increases the prices of all international goods. This brings 
about two effects: a substitution effect or an expenditure switching 
move away from international goods toward domestic goods, and a 
liquidity effect in which people attempt to rebuild the value of their real 
money balances reduced by the increase in the prices of international 
goods. An excess demand for the relatively cheaper domestic goods and 
for money will then occur, alongside an excess supply of the relatively 
expensive international goods. The substitution toward domestic goods 
and away from foreign goods will raise domestic prices ceteris paribus. To 
the extent that fewer foreign goods are bought, the excess supply of 
foreign goods will translate into a BOP surplus. If the CB does not create 
domestic credit, foreign reserves will increase. Unless loans are reduced 
by the banking system, this increase in foreign reserves will mean a 
growth in money supply. The added money supply can be used to satisfy 
the excess demand for money such that a momentary equilibrium takes 
place. This is only a temporary equilibrium, however, because as long as 
the authorities and the banks do not make any counter moves, the stock 
of money will be accumulating. The process stops when money and 
inflation increase by an amount proportional to the size of the devalu- 
ation, which implies that the real value of the original money supply has 
been restored. 
Tradeoffs and Problems Associated with a Devaluation 
Despite the theoretical and practical reasons for a devaluation, hardly 
a broad consensus exist on the issue. Several sectors oppose a devalua- 
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'table 3.5 
Daily Movements in Reverse Repurchase Rates 
and Nominal Exchange Rates 
(March-Apol 108) 
CB Repurchase Rates Nominal Exchange 
Overnight Term Rate (P/$) 
March 1988 
Day 
1 NO 16 21.010 
2 NO NO 21.010 
3 NO NO 21.025 
4 NO NO 21.025 
7 NO NO 21.025 
8 NO NO 21.025 
9 NO NO 21.040 
10 NO NO 21.040 
11 NO NO 21.040 
14 NO NO 21.050 
15 NO NO 21.050 
16 NO 18.638 21.050 
17 18 19.250 21.050 
18 16 NO 21.026 
21 NO NO 21.024 
22 NO 16 21.210 
23 NO 16 21.019 
24 NO NO 21.016 
25 NO NO 21.016 
28 NO 16 21.016 
29 NO 17 21.016 
30 NO NO 21.016 
April 1988 
Day 
4 NO NO 21.016 
5 17 17 21.012 
6 19.75 19.75 21.012 
7 NO NO 21.008 
8 NO NO 21.003 
11 NO NO 21.000 
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Table.3-5 (continued) 
CB Repurchase Rates Nominal Exchange 
Overnight Term Rate (P/$) 
12 NO NO 21.000 
13 NO NO 21.012 
14 NO NO 21.012 
15 NO NO 21.015 
16 NO NO 21.015 
17 NO NO 21.015 
18 NO NO 21.015 
19 NO NO 21.015 
20 NO NO 21.058 
21 NO NO 21.073 
22 NO NO 21.073 
25 NO 22.00 21.073 
26 NO 22.68 21.073 
27 NO 23.50 21.073 
28 NO 22.00 21.027 
29 NO NO 21.018 
NO indicates no quote. 
Source: Central Bank. 
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tion. These include protected industries especially those which rely 
heavily on imported inputs, industries dominated by nontradeables, 
industries with investments in the import-dependent sector, groups who 
associate devaluations with recession because of the tight monetary and 
fiscal policies that usually accompany them, and the deficit-conscious in 
government who realize that a devaluation increases debt service be- 
cause of the large size of the external debt (41 percent of total national 
government debt is foreign). The CB's foreign exchange liabilities, for 
example, amounted to approximately US$5.4 billion in 1990 or about 
20 percent of total foreign exchange liabilities of the public sector, as 
cited by Treasury and CB sources. Interest expenses on CB's foreign 
liabilities comprise the largest expense item of the CB, amounting to 
P16.2 billion in 1989 (Lamberte 1991b). At an average exchange rate 
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table 3.8 
Standard Deviation of Nominal Lending and Deposit Rates 
in ASEAN, the US, Japan and Germany 
(Averages, 1982-1988) 
Philippines Indonesia Malaysia Singapore 
Lending Rate 5.51 4.238 1.61 1.51 
Deposit Rate 4.21 4.94 2.61 1.74 
Thailand U.S. Japan Germany 
Lending Rate 1.63 2.17 0.85 1.65 
Deposit Rate 1.69 1.92 0.91 1.37 
alIn the absence of data, weighted average commercial bank rates 
were used for the 1983-1985 lending rates in Indonesia. 
Sources: World Bank-IFS (October 1989); Enriquez (1987). 
If the exchange rate were to change to P35/$1, this interest expense 
would balloon to P25.2 billion. A devaluation also raises the cost of 
counterpart funding for foreign-assisted projects. 
A 1991 study by UPEcon gave several explanations for the absence of 
any vocal constituency for a devaluation, with exception of some academ- 
ics. It cited, for example, that although the agricultural sector may be 
expected to gain from a devaluation, it does not strongly advocate a 
devaluation. The reasons include the fact that agriculture is dominated by 
a non-tradeable input (labor), imported inputs such as fertilizers which 
would become more expensive with a devaluation, and output price ceilings 
which would not allow output price increases after the devaluation. Rice 
and corn farmers, therefore, would pay more for their inputs like fertilizer, 
but be unable to pass on some of these increases to customers since output 
prices are fixed. Hence, their profits would decline. For non-traditional 
export industries like garments and textiles, the high import content of 
inputs, despite the absence of output price ceilings, would make them less 
than favorable adherents of a devaluation. The absence of output price 
ceilings may also lead to increases in wage demands, with the costs of the 
latter wiping out the gains from a more favorable output price, relative to 
world prices following a devaluation. 
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The Timing of a Devaluation 
A one-time, unannounced devaluation should be done quickly to 
minimize the possibility of destabilizing capital outflows, to prevent an 
opposition from coalescing and mounting, and to enhance the credibil- 
ity of policymakers. It is best done when a deficit in the BOP occurs but 
not yet reaching crisis proportions, when the inflation rate is low 
(preferably in the single digits), when the CB has an adequate stock of 
international reserves with which to stave off potential destabilizing 
outflows, when the country's trading partners are not in recession, when 
there is some slack in the economy but is not so severe that expenditures 
switch toward domestic goods, when output can still be increased 
thereby minimizing inflationary tendencies, and when the size of the 
external debt is not so large that budgetary financing problems will arise 
when a devaluation is undertaken. At present, the economy may be 
near or at the desired stage for a devaluation based on some of these 
criteria; yet, devaluation remains a particularly difficult problem for the 
country. In fact, most of the contractionary monetary and fiscal policies 
accompanying exchange rate adjustments in the 1980s were precisely 
aimed at trying to contain the size of the budget deficit. The authorities 
were perhaps more successful at doing this and preventing the BOP 
deficit from becoming unmanageable, but not via the expenditure 
switching role of a devaluation in which exports increase because 
foreign goods have become expensive. Instead, the recession induced by 
contractionary monetary and fiscal policies drastically cut domestic 
income and dampened import demand that, even without an increase 
in exports, the BOP would still improve or stabilize. But this is not how 
a devaluation is supposed to work. If the BOP improves because imports 
decline drastically, export promotion and industrial restructuring based 
on comparative advantage do not occur; there is no stimulus to output 
growth and, hence, to employment. 
The UPEcon study also proposed two accompanying measures to a 
devaluation which this paper endorses: 
1) Some safety nets to cushion the short-run stagflationary effects 
of devaluation particularly on the poor and fixed-income 
groups; 
2) Foreign financing or significant debt relief to mitigate the 
direct adverse budgetary implications of a devaluation, as well 
as those arising from no. 1. 
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Effects of Devaluation on the Central Bank's Accounts 
Let M = monetary liabilities, 
W = non-monetary liabilities, 
R = foreign reserves, 
z = other assets, 
NW = net worth, and 
e = nominal exchange rate. 
From the CB balance sheet we have: 
eR+Z=M+W+NW (1) 
where the lefthand side shows the assets and the righthand side 
shows the liabilities and net worth of the CB, all in terms of domestic 
currency. 
Re-write equation (1): 
M = eR + (Z - W) - NW (2) 
and let (Z - W) = D where D is the net domestic assets of the CB. The 
money supply equation can be re-written as: 
M=eR+D - NW (3) 
Equation (3) states that the money supply is equal to the sum of net 
foreign assets (eR) and net domestic assets (D) less net worth (NW). 
From equation (3), ceteris paribus, a larger CB deficit, which lowers the 
CB's net worth, implies an increase in money supply. 
To determine the effect of a devaluation on the CB position, one can 
differentiate equation (3) with respect to e and obtain: 
dM = e dR + R + dD - dNW 
ec  _Je T e- 
If dD/de = 0, i.e., the CB does not purchase domestic assets following 
a devaluation and, therefore, credit does not expand; then rearranging 
the above yields: 
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e dR R- dNW _ dm e M eR M 
i R dei de (de- M e i iM i e 
or 
£ ' dNW = (E a) M (4) R de m e 
where ER= (e/R)(dR/de) is the elasticity of reserves with respect to the 
exchange rate, E. = (e W WM/de) is the elasticity of money supply 
with respect to the exchange rate, and a = eR/M is the ratio of reserves 
(in domestic currency) to total money supply. 
The effect of a devaluation on the CB's net worth can be derived by 
further rearranging equation (4): 
dNW 1 { [ (1 + ER) a - EM] M) de (5) 
NW NW e 
Equation (5) shows that the effect of a devaluation on CB's net worth 
depends on the parameters ER, £m, and 6. A devaluation increases the 
CB's net worth if: 




and the Optimal Deficit Financing Mix 
The equilibrium approach to fiscal policy (or the tax smoothing 
model of budget deficits and public debt) contends that the authorities 
optimize tax and deficit policies in order to reduce the excess burden of 
taxation. Tax rates for various types of distortionary taxation, including 
seignorage from money creation, are selected so that the expected 
present value of the losses deriving from them are minimized. To do 
this, the marginal cost in welfare loss from each type of tax has to be 
equated in each period. 
Edwards and Tabellini (1991) and Roubini (1991) presented evidence 
for a group of developing countries including the Philippines over the 
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period 1963-1987 and 1958.1988, respectively; both sets of findings reject 
the optimal tax smoothing model. Several points of disagreement surfaced. 
The first concerns the first-order conditions of the optimal tax policy 
problem which imply that the inflation rate and income taxation are 
correlated significantly and positively (see Appendix A). Both of the cited 
studies found the contrary. Roubini (1991), for example, regressed the 
inflation rate on government revenues as a share of GNP and a time trend; 
he obtained a statistically significant coefficient of - 4.28 on the government 
revenue variable. Second is the implication of the first-order conditions that 
both the inflation rate and tax rate should be non-stationary processes, i.e., 
they drift over time rather than approach some average or trend value. 
Roubini's unit root test results showed that both are stationary rather than 
being "martingales." Third, the first-order conditions also imply a simple 
linear relationship between the inflation rate and the income tax rate. The 
equilibrium inflation rate will fall, the greater the weight placed on inflation 
in the authorities' expected loss function. However, the equilibrium infla- 
tion rate will tend to climb the larger the holdings of money, which is the 
base of the inflation tax. In technical terms, the inflation rate and the 
income tax rate are "cointegrated." Roubini tested for cointegration and 
obtained a statistic called the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Statistic of 1.58 
which is less than the critical value of 3.08 at the five percent confidence 
interval for the test of the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Since the 
hypothesis was not rejected, this implies that the inflation rate and tax rate 
are not cointegrated. Roubini also tested whether seignorage or money 
creation is a secondary source of government finance whenever unexpected 
changes occur in government spending or revenues. He regressed the 
change in base money to GNP on the tax ratio and base money to GNP 
ratio. His result for the Philippines showed no evidence that seignorage 
serves as a residual form of taxation when there are unexpected shortfalls in 
revenues. Gochoco's (1990a) study also found that the coefficient on the 
logarithm of the surprise in monetized debt was statistically insignificant; 
the coefficient would give the effect of a fall in taxes financed by debt issue 
matched by an open market purchase of bonds by the authorities. 
All the above suggest that deficit financing is non-optimal and does 
not rely sufficiently on seignorage or money creation. Recently, how- 
ever, some authors questioned the validity of the optimal tax smoothing 
model (Burdekin 1991, for example). The problem lies essentially in the 
endogeneity of the budget deficit. Inflation, for example, may lead to an 
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increase in public spending if the government attempts to support 
certain groups adversely affected by the redistributive effects of infla- 
tion. The optimal degree of seignorage, therefore, must take into ac- 
count the effects on the overall budget deficit. With this, the tradeoff 
between seignorage and tax rates will tend to become less favorable and 
more complicated. Problems associated with the endogeneity of the 
budget deficit, which would invalidate the predictions of the optimal 
tax smoothing model, can also be gleaned from the following: Raising 
tax rates will tend to raise revenues but, at the same time, lower 
aggregate demand. Lower aggregate demand, in turn, will bring down 
the inflation rate (tax rate) as well as decrease money demand (the tax 
base). This means that tax rates and the seignorage tax will not move 
together as predicted by the tax smoothing model. 
More obvious for a small, open economy like the Philippines is the 
fact that commitment to maintaining a fixed exchange rate implies that 
the domestic rate of inflation is determined by the world rate of infla- 
tion via the law of one price. This means that pegging the exchange rate 
not only necessitates keeping the inflation rate low and constrains the 
use of seignorage taxation to raise revenues as argued earlier, but also 
diminishes the control authorities have over the domestic inflation rate. 
If the inflation rate is not a policy variable, therefore, it is difficult to 
obtain the results of the optimizing model. 
A small (and optimal) inflation tax revenue may also come from 
inflation uncertainty, which rise with the level of inflation. The mar- 
ginal revenue gains from the inflation tax would decline and deadweight 
losses from it would increase. It would, therefore, be optimal for the 
authorities to lessen their reliance on the inflation tax. Hence, the 
finding that seignorage or inflation taxes are small may be optimal. 
In view of the above, it is apparent that while money financing of the 
deficit has not been used to any great extent, perhaps in part because of 
the need to keep inflation low in order not undermine the exchange 
rate target, it is difficult from a purely public finance perspective to say 
whether this is optimal or not. This makes the argument for a large 
devaluation even more compelling. 
A large devaluation would remove the need for "tight" money to 
maintain an indefensible exchange rate. To the extent that the authori- 
ties do not make any counter moves to reduce domestic credit, a 
devaluation will also increase money supply. This increase will accrue 
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to the government as revenues. Additional government revenues will 
also result from a devaluation in the form of customs duties and taxes 
related to trade. 
In some sense, all the above negate the issues relating to optimal 
financing mix of the deficit, except for the fact that the devaluation 
itself will also worsen the budgetary deficit as the value of the assets of 
the CB will decline. A devaluation may also worsen the budgetary 
deficit if the government becomes complacent and increases expendi- 
tures as revenues resulting from a devaluation accrue to it. It is impera- 
tive, therefore, that the devaluation be accompanied by a significant 
amount of debt relief or a foreign loan to cushion its adverse impact on 
the public sector's debt. 
Financial Liberalization 
Financial liberalization moves undertaken in the early 1980s sought 
to address two issues: 
O Increasing the degree of competition in the financial sector, 
and 
0 Increasing the amount of long-term lending in the economy. 
Short-term interest rate ceilings were removed in 1981; by 
1983, ceilings on long-term rates were also removed. 
The move to liberalize the financial sector, however, was ill-timed. The 
Dewey Dee affair in 1981 precipitated a crisis in which several financial 
institutions were left holding the bag. In 1983 and 1984, the country 
experienced its worst BOP crisis in the post-war period. Many banks 
collapsed; between 1980 and 1989, 202 banks collapsed including six large 
ones (Lamberte 1991a). The amount of financial/loan assistance by the CB 
to banks in distress. increased from P 306 million in 1980 to P 14.8 million 
in 1990. While the interest rates charged by the CB on these loans were very 
high, most of them are claims on failed banks as shown in Tables 3-9 and 
3-10. The CB correctly viewed them as losses. 
In retrospect, it is incorrect to have pursued financial liberalization at 
a time when financial institutions were struggling for survival. The CB 
also allowed unibanking and mergers, supposedly to take advantage of 
the economies of scale. If these economies of scale were to be availed of 
by allowing banks to become larger in size, the price of credit, i.e., 
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Table 3-9 
Interest Rates Charged by the Central Bank 
on Erme jwq Loans, 1980.1991 
00) 
Year Commercial Thrift Banks N B Q B s 
Banks 
1980 9.5 a a 





1982 9.5 12.00 a 
12.0 
1983 9.5 12.00 9.5 
19.0 20.81 18.0 
20.89 24.0 
20.94 
1984 9.5 12.0000 9.5 
12.0 18.8125 18.0 














a I No loans were granted. 
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines. 
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Table 3-10 
Interest Rates Charged by the Central Bank 
on Overdrafts, 1980-1991 
N 






1984 21.000 21.000 21.000 
24.662 24.662 24.662 
29.239 29.239 29.239 
29.893 29.893 32.500 





1985 21.000 21.000 21.000 
24.083 27.514 27.514 
25.761 29.004 29.004 




1986 21.000 21.000 21.000 
23.520 31.746 22.786 
23.520 
1987 21.000 21.000 21.000 
21.355 22.752 22.752 
22.752 21.335 
1988 21.000 21.000 21.000 
21.328 
1989 21.000 21.000 21.000 
21.355 
1990 21.000 21.000 21.000 
21.355 
1991 21.000 21.000 21.000 
25.761 
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines. 
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interest rates would decline. Some problems accompany policies en- 
couraging mergers and consolidations, or creating larger banks. One is 
possibly creating a banking industry cartel. Policies aimed at enlarging 
the size of banks, without simultaneously providing for the possibility of 
entry (if banks were asuccessful cartel, they would effectively neutralize 
this threat), then banks would simply enjoy greater monopoly profits; 
interest rates on loans would then tend to rise because of less competi- 
tion. At the time unibanking was started, no parallel moves were 
undertaken to allow greater entry into the industry. The high unibanking 
license fee served to discourage entry by potential competitors and also 
made banks who paid for the licenses more resistant to entry by others 
as this would depreciate the value of the license. Only recently were 
there moves to allow the entry of foreign banks; this should have been 
done a long time ago. The recent moves to liberalize branch banking 
also came a bit late. Moreover, the CB's definition of "overbranched" 
areas may have little economic basis as it neglects completely the issue 
of contestability of a market and relies solely on the number of bank 
branches in a specified geographic area. 
The results of the financial liberalization program are so far unsatis- 
factory. In mobilizing deposits, a regression of the ratio of deposits to 
GNP on real GNP of the Philippines, four ASEAN countries, and 14 
others using data for 1980 and 1989 showed that the Philippine per- 
formance was below average. In fact, the Philippine performance rela- 
tive to the average worsened in 1989 (Lamberte 1991a, pp. 23-27). Not 
only were private financial savings low relative to the trend, but the 
deposit to GNP ratio of the Philippines also lagged behind those of 
other low-income countries. The efforts to mobilize savings were ham- 
pered by the bank failures in the 1980s and the restrictive entry and 
branching policies. 
Available evidence also indicates a high degree of concentration 
which may mean a lack of competition in the banking industry. These 
engender inefficiency and high interest rates. The Herfindahl index, 
which measures the concentration in an industry, rose consistently in 
all years except one during the period 1982-1990. The share of the five 
largest banks in total deposits reached 52 percent in 1990, compared 
with 38 percent in 1975 (Lamberte 1991a, p.69). The amount of real 
deposits per banking office increased only slightly from P 8.35 million 
in 1970 to P 9.33 million in 1990 (Lamberte 1991a, p.31). The banks 
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did not achieve substantial productivity increases in the two decades. 
Commercial banks had the highest transaction cost in mobilizing depos- 
its, according to a study by Untalan (1988). 
The lack of competition in the banking industry also resulted in differ- 
ential pricing for the savings of big and small depositors, and very large 
spreads between savings deposits of small depositors and time deposits of 
large depositors. In 1990, for example, the nominal rate on savings deposits 
was about five percent, which was lower than that in the 1970s. When 
coupled with the fact that inflation rates were very high in the 1980s, except 
in 1986 and 1987, the negative real returns on savings deposits really hurt 
small savers. Financial liberalization and the removal of deposit ceilings did 
not adequately compensate the effects of inflation as the cartelistic banking 
industry could price differentiate and pass on most of the burden to small 
savers. The interest rate differential between savings and time deposits, for 
example, widened in the years after the 1981 interest rate deregulation as 
shown in Table 3-11. 
The effects on lending, particularly long-term, also proved unsatisfac- 
tory. While the volume of bank loans were increasing since 1986, the 
values were much lower than those from 1975 to 1984 as shown in 
Table 3-12. In real terms, the volume of bank loans fell between 1985 
and 1986. As a proportion of core deposits, loans stagnated in the 0.6 
range from 1985 onwards, compared with a high of 1.9 in 1975. Loans 
to total assets between 1985 and 1988 remained in the 0.3 range, versus 
0.7 in 1975. These results should not be surprising as the high-yielding, 
risk-free, and short-term treasury bills became more attractive to banks 
than lending to the private sector. This is also seen in the percentage 
of time deposits to core deposits, which plunged sharply from 1986 
onwards, as treasury bills became the main means of contracting the 
money supply. 
Tables 3-13 and 3-14 show that while a shift took place from short- 
term to medium- and long-term lending since 1983, a sharp decline in 
long-term lending occurred. As Lim (1990, p. 34) pointed out, banks 
preferred to roll over short- and medium-term loans to finance long- 
term projects. The biggest losers were small- and medium-scale enter- 
prises. Table 3-14 shows that the share of loans for production fell 
between 1984 and 1986. While this has recovered somewhat in 1988, 
the figure was still lower than those between 1978 and 1982. 
Recent moves to liberalize foreign exchange transactions are laud- 
able. These will encourage more capital to come in. But so far, only 
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Table 3-11 
Nominal Interest Rates on Savings 
and Time Deposits 
1970-1990 
Year Savings Deposits Time Deposits 
1970 6.000 5.750 
1971 6.000 5.750 
1972 6.000 5.750 
1973 6.000 5.750 
1974 6.000 8.000 
1975 6.000 8.000 
1976 7.000 8.500 
1977 7.000 8.500 
1978 7.000 8.500 
1979 9.000 10.500 
1980 9.000 14.000 
1981 9.812 13.717 
1982 9.811 13.799 
1983 9.729 13.616 
1984 9.855 23.566 
1985 10.842 19.177 
1986 7.993 11.173 
1987 4.530 8.809 
1988 4.100 11.315 
1989 4.374 14.126 
1990 5.063 19.538 
Source: Central Bank: 
191 
short-term portfolio capital rather than long-term equity capital has 
been coming in. This reflects, in part, a continuing risk of devaluation 
and illustrates the need for a credible exchange rate to prevail. Some 
sectors view the current strength of the peso as artificial, despite the 
increased inflows from abroad in the form of workers' remittances, the 
large stock of international reserves (over US$4 billion) at the CB, and 
the reported budget surplus of P4.7 billion in the first quarter of 1992. 
Exporters, for example, estimated that the industry has lost about 30 
percent of the export market because of the strengthening of the peso 
which lowers their competitiveness, resulting in the loss of about 100,000 
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devaluation takes place, these markets and jobs may be permanently 
lost. The fact that the dollar reserves at the CB are unusually large and 
that the budget is in surplus are factors that make a surprise devaluation 
feasible at this time. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This study examined the thrust of monetary policy and its implica- 
tions for exchange rates, interest rates, savings mobilization, the deficit 
financing mix, and the structure and performance of the banking indus- 
try. In general, the thrust of monetary policy has been directed at 
keeping the peso/dollar rate essentially fixed largely through a high 
interest rate regime, resulting from very contractionary monetary and 
fiscal policies. Money creation has not been utilized to any great extent 
to finance the deficit as this would raise inflationary fears and under- 
mine the exchange rate target. This policy hindered the economy's 
ability to grow. An incorrect exchange rate policy, particularly an 
overvalued peso, results in the loss of competitiveness of the export 
sector, protection of inefficient industries, lower output, and less em- 
ployment growth. Part of the reason for maintaining this policy seems 
to be the fear of a devaluation's adverse effects on the budget deficit of 
the public sector, particularly since the CB's foreign exposure is huge. 
The study makes the following points and recommendations: 
0 A devaluation raises revenues for the government as the money 
supply increases following a devaluation, unless sterilization 
operations are undertaken. Also, the elasticity of revenues 
arising from a devaluation is probably greater than unity. 
Customs duties and trade taxes collected will tend to increase, 
canceling out the adverse effects on the budget such as in- 
creased debt service arising largely from the foreign exposure of 
the CB. 
0 Positive factors exist, which augur well for a successful devalu- 
ation. Among these are the budget surplus of the national 
government, the unusually large amount of dollar reserves at 
the CB, and the increased inflows from abroad particularly in 
the form of workers' remittances. Moreover, no BOP crisis is 
forecast, and the inflation rate is near single digits. It is then 
possible to have an unannounced devaluation with a once- 
and-for-all effect on prices. The possible adverse effects of the 
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latter, particularly on poor sectors, can be mitigated by putting 
certain safety nets in place, which is also made affordable 
because of the budgetary surplus. 
O A devaluation makes unnecessary the continuing contractionary 
monetary and fiscal policies which harm output and employment 
growth. With a credible exchange rate, industries can be restruc- 
tured along the lines of comparative advantage. 
0 Other measures to accompany the devaluation include the 
following: A large foreign loan to restore the CB to financial 
soundness and an assurance that certain policies which may 
undermine the desirable effects of a devaluation are avoided. 
Among the policies to be avoided are wage indexation and the 
temptation for government to increase expenditures as rev- 
enues accrue to it from a devaluation. 
Q The CB's institutional structure must be changed to make it 
independent of fiscal functions, to make its operations more 
transparent, and to make policymakers more accountable for 
their actions. 
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Appendix A 
Given money demand: 
M(t)/P(t) = MO (1) 
where M is the stock of money, P is the price level, K is the fraction of nominal 
income held in the form of money, and Y is real income. 
Total Taxes are the sum of income taxes rY(t) and real seignorage taxes 
T(t) = tiY(t) + SW (2) 
where ti represents the income tax rate. Real seignorage taxation is: 
S(t) = nkY(t), (3) 
where n represents the inflation rate. The budget constraint of the govern- 
ment is: 
00 00 
J e'" G (t + j) dj + NO = 1 e-4 T (t + j) dj (4) 
0 0 
where 
G(t) - real government expenditures at time t, 
T(t) - real taxes (including seignorage taxes), 
B(t) - real value of government debt, and 
r - constant real interest rate. 
The government seeks to minimize the expected present value of the losses 
deriving from distortionary income taxation and inflation. 
Assume deadweight losses are quadratic in tax and inflation rate. The 
problem solved by the fiscal authority is: 
0 
Min E, I je.h [ (ti (t+j))Z+ a (n (t + j))Z) } dj (5) 
0 
148 Ma. Socorro Gochoco 
subject to (4). The first-order conditions imply that: 
E, IT (t+j )1 = T(t) (6) 
and 
E, [7t (t+j) ) = n(t) (7) 
i.e., that the tax rate and inflation rate are martingales. The first order 
conditions also imply a simple linear relation between the inflation rate and 
the tax rate: 
n(t) _ (k/a) T(t) (8) 
Equation (8) implies that the equilibrium inflation rate will be lower the 
greater is a, the weight on inflation in the loss function. Conversely, the 
greater is k, the greater is the tax base of money holdings that can be subject 
to seignorage taxation and the greater will be the equilibrium inflation rate. 
Source: Roubini (1991). 
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4 
REAL PROPERTY TAXATION 
AND ITS POTENTIAL 
AS A MAJOR SOURCE OF LOCAL REVENUE 
M to A. Tan 
LAND TAXATION, NOW EXPANDED TO REAL PROPERTY TAXATION (RPT), HAs HAD 
a long history dating back to the taxes collected by the encomienderos 
from those who worked their land. The Malolos Constitution gave local 
governments the power to levy and collect taxes. The first cadastral 
survey of 1932-1933 established the base for the land tax. Municipal 
and city governments collected an ad valorem land tax based on the 
registered properties of the cadastral survey. It is not clear, however, how 
the values were arrived at. In more recent history, the Marcos govern- 
ment sought to strengthen the RPT tax base. Presidential Decree (PD) 
76 decreed in 1973 that property owners make a self-declaration of the 
value of their property for tax assessment purposes. The self-declaration 
apparently raised taxable land values since RPT collection increased by 
32 percent in 1973-1974. A tax amnesty for all back taxes, including the 
real property tax (RPT), was declared in 1975. The tax liability for 
which an amnesty was applied for was to be based on owner-valuation, 
without question as to its reasonableness. The amnesty was a one-shot 
deal which increased RPT collection by 59 percent in 1976-1977. It was 
PD 464 in 1974 that gave the first comprehensive and systematic 
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framework for local government taxation, especially RPT. The decree 
was in line with the decentralization policy of the government. The 
most recent is the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC), a 404-page 
document which contains the provisions for RPT. 
The Code contains major revisions of PD 464 especially those on 
assessment and tax rates. The new law provides for a more complex 
structure of RPT than under PD 464. There are greater differences in 
the assessment rates by use and by value with much progressivity in- 
tended. The assessment schedule implies varying degrees of incentives 
according to property use and value. Under PD 464, local government 
units were allowed flexibility within a range of tax rates, i.e. there is a 
floor and a ceiling. The floor has been removed, but the ceiling rate for 
provincial properties has been raised from 1/2 to 1 percent. Both provide 
for an additional tax on idle lands but the ceiling is raised from 2 to 5 
percent. Subsequent discussions in the paper show the new RPT struc- 
ture to be less efficient and equitable than that provided for by PD 464. 
The RPT is an ad valorem tax whose effectivity depends on the 
accuracy of property valuation. The Code gives the assessment rates for 
different uses (residential, agricultural, industrial or commercial, and 
timberland) and different forms of real property (land, buildings and 
other structures, and machinery and equipment). For some properties, 
the assessment schedule is progressive, i.e. the rate increases with the 
property value; for other properties it is a flat rate. Hospitals, educational 
and religious organizations are assessed at a lower flat rate of 15 percent. 
The law does not discuss the rationale for the schedule of assessment or 
for the tax rates. 
Generally the tax liability is computed as follows: 
Tax = (market value) x (assessment rate) x (tax rate) 
Being an ad valorem tax, the effectivity of the RPT is strongly 
determined by the accuracy of property valuation. In the Philippines, 
property valuation is notoriously understated. This largely explains the 
RPT's poor performance. To get some idea of the undervaluation and 
the reasons for the undervaluation, we obtained some valuation records 
of four localities - Makati, Quezon City, Antipolo and Laguna. The 
paper also assesses the larger picture, as shown in the trend of RPT 
collection and its contribution to the total tax effort at the national and 
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local level. We conclude that the administration of RPT is extremely 
weak, due to a highly ineffective system of valuation and annual collec- 
tion of tax. 
The success of the government's decentralization plan rests heavily 
on the effectiveness of RPT administration. Over the last five years 
(1986-1990), RPT contributed less than two percent of the total taxes 
collected by the government and its share in local government revenue 
was only about 23 percent. Local governments have had to depend on 
the national budget to finance more than half of their expenditures. If 
they are to take the active part in development efforts as envisaged in 
the LGC, they have to find their own sources of finance. The RPT is 
a potential major source. 
There is a need to confront the political economy of RPT, for it goes 
directly against the interests of powerful elites who wield a strong 
influence in government decisionmaking or are government officials. 
At the local level, the common resistance to RPT among government 
officials and the economic elite may even be stronger. There are only 
a few decisionmakers in the local communities and these few are the 
more articulate citizens who have close links with one another. For 
them, resisting RPT is not difficult. Two instances of such resistance 
were the suits for injunction filed against the proposed adjustments of 
property values in Makati and Quezon City. Predictably, a mayoralty 
candidate in Quezon City has promised to work against the adjustment 
if elected. More of such cases are to be expected when the Code begins 
to be implemented. Here, we suggest that the national government 
establish a systematic basis for property valuation for the local govern- 
ments through nationwide tax mapping. While resistance to such efforts 
is also likely to materialize, the cost of organizing group resistance is 
expectedly higher at the national level than at each locality. For this 
reason we suggest that the national government provide the local 
governments with a systematically established basis for property valua- 
tion as a first step towards the implementation of the new LGC. 
Specifically, it is recommended that the Department of Finance engage 
itself in a national tax mapping effort and help institute in each local 
government unit (LGU) a common systematic methodology for prop- 
erty valuation. Without this, the innumerable LGUs who are faced with 
the pressure politics against RPT will likely implement the tax with 
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief economic 
analysis of the key provisions of the Code on RPT, Section 3 is a brief 
survey of RPT performance, Section 4 discusses case studies of valuation 
in three localities, and Section 5 discusses some problems of enforce- 
ment, ending with a strong recommendation for tax mapping. 
Distributive and Allocative Implications of RPT 
To appreciate the distributive and allocative implications of the RPT 
structure, we reproduce the stipulated assessment rates under the new 
Code. We focus on the assessment rates, since the Code sets only three 
tax rate ceilings: 1 percent for all provincial properties, 2 percent for 
Metro Manila cities and municipalities, and an additional 5 percent for 
all idle lands whether in the city or in the provinces. Note that the rates 
are ceilings and the LGUs can set the actual rate at or below them. 
Land and Machinery 
The assessment rates for land and machinery differ only according to 
use and not by value: 
Land Machinery 
Residential 20% 50 % 
Agricultural 40% 40% 
Commercial/ 
industrial 50 % 80% 
Mineral 50 % - 
Timberland 20 % - 
Buildings and Other Structures 
The assessment rates for buildings and other structures is progressive 
and based on market values (MV). But they differ according to use. 
Residential 10-60 %, MV= P.175 to P10 M + 
Agricultural 25-50 % MV = P.300 to P 2 M + 
Comm/industrial 30-80 % MV = P.300 to P10 M + 
Timberland 45-70 % MV = P.300 to P 2 M + 
zero assessment for lower values 
For Special Classes (cultural, scientific, hospitals, water districts) 
the assessment rate is 15 percent for all forms of real property. 
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The Code does not state the rationale for the structure of the assess- 
ment rates, but it effectively discriminates between various forms and 
uses of real property. Some generalizations and implications of the 
structure of the assessment rates may be drawn. 
D The assessment rates for various forms of property for residen- 
tial use are lower than those for the production of goods, i.e., 
for agriculture, commercial and industrial. The assessment rate 
for residential land is the lowest (20 percent), and shows no 
progressiv ity. 
O Machinery is assessed at a higher rate than land and buildings; 
the rates for commercial and industrial uses are higher than for 
agriculture and residential uses. 
O The assessment schedule for buildings and other structures is 
progressive but that for land and machinery is not. 
C Timberland has the highest assessment for buildings and struc- 
tures but the lowest assessment for land. 
As a whole, the RPT structure goes against distributive and allocative 
criteria. Of all forms of taxation, it is generally known that a tax on land 
has the most desirable effect on equity and efficiency. With land supply 
fixed, the full burden of a land tax is borne by the owner. The tax lowers 
the capitalized value of land and therefore discourages wealth-holding 
in this idle form. Yet, surprisingly, land for residential and timberland 
uses has the lowest assessment rate of 20 percent. The incentive for 
landholding is increased by the non-progressivity of the land assessment 
schedule. By contrast, the assessment rate of land used for production of 
goods and services is 2 times higher for agriculture and 2.5 times higher 
for the commercial, industrial and mineral enterprises. Thus the assess- 
ment schedule for land encourages its allocation for residential and 
timberland uses and discourages its productive use. 
There is also a bias against productive use in the case of buildings and 
machinery. Assessment rates are higher for every range of property value 
of these assets when used in agriculture, commercial and industrial. For 
example, buildings and other structures valued at P1-P2 million are to 
be assessed at 35 percent for residential use; 45 percent for agriculture; 
60 'percent for commercial and industrial use; and 65 percent for 
timberland. Machineries are assessed at 50 percent of market value for 
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residential use, 40 percent for agricultural use, and 80 percent for 
commercial/industrial uses. 
In contrast to the supply of land, the supply of buildings and struc- 
tures and machineries is variable and upward sloping. Land is fixed in 
supply, its optimal level use remaining unchanged though its value falls 
with the RPT. The burden of the land tax is borne fully by the owner. 
It therefore becomes less attractive to hold. Compare this to the tax on 
the other forms of real property. The tax on structures and machinery 
would lower the supply price and the level of investment. The tax 
burden is then partly passed on to the supplier of the capital goods, and 
partly to the property owner. The burden-sharing depends on the 
elasticities of demand and of supply. The elasticities are likely to differ 
across the various uses. Construction, which is partly non-tradable, is 
likely to have a smaller supply elasticity than machinery, which is a 
highly tradable good. More of the tax burden can therefore be passed on 
to producers of buildings and other structures than to producers of 
machinery. On the other hand, machinery makes up a much larger share 
of the assets of productive enterprises than of residential households. 
Enterprise machinery may also possess a higher degree of substitutability 
with other inputs like labor. As a result, the elasticity of demand for 
machinery is likely to be larger. On both counts (demand and supply 
elasticities), the negative effect of the tax on the level of investment in 
machinery is likely to be larger. This problem is worsened by the fact 
that the assessment rate is higher for the productive uses of machinery. 
Simply put, the RPT system encourages purchases of consumer durables 
such as power generators, cable TV, air-conditioning units, electronic 
equipments and athletic equipment. But it discourages investment in 
textile Mills, canning machinery and other productive equipment. 
The RPT on timberland industry is another anomalous feature of the 
Code. There is a much higher assessment rate on machinery and improve- 
ments than on land in the timber industry. These assessment rates would 
discourage wood processing and investments in forest renewal activities. 
As a whole, the incentive effects of the RPT schedule run counter to 
the key development objectives of the government which are to stimu- 
late productive investments in all sectors of production, preserve our 
forests and encourage their optimal social use. 
Note, however, real property taxes used for production or business are 
tax deductible. For corporations which have a uniform 35 percent profit 
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tax, the effective tax on real property is (1-.35) (RPT rate x assessment 
rate x market value). The deductibility of RPT reduces but does not 
eliminate the bias against productive uses. 
,poth PD 464 and the Code provide for the taxation of idle property, 
earlier at 2 percent and under the new Code, at 5 percent. Idle land is 
defined as any agricultural land exceeding one hectare of which one half or 
more is uncultivated, and real estate with an area exceeding 1000 square 
meters of which one half or more is unimproved. This tax is additional to 
the regular real property tax. The tax rate ceiling is relatively high and, if 
implemented, will go a long way towards land redistribution. If a piece of 
land is idle, then it is not producing any income. The tax would add to the 
cost of holding idle land which is the implicit interest cost on the value of 
the land. A tax on idle land definitely discourages its being held. And for 
very large landholdings, the tax liability could be prohibitive and so force 
the owners to sell. There are still many passive owners or absentee landlords, 
especially those who merely inherited their property and who are likely to 
find the tax burdensome. The tax is also expected to hasten land registration 
and to improve land valuation. Every time a piece of land changes ownership, 
its market value is updated and its titling and registration takes place. The 
idle land tax therefore improves future land tax administration. Moreover, 
it works parallel with land reform. As Bahl and Miller would argue, land tax 
and land reform are mutually reinforcing. Land taxation hastens the break- 
up of large landholdings while land reform helps break the resistance to land 
taxation. Every change in landholding such as its division into smaller lots 
also entail a new valuation and registration, meaning improvement in the 
taxable base. A more equitable distribution of land ownership also likely 
results in a weaker resistance to RPT implementation. They cite the 
Mexican experience where RPT collection increased after the land reform. 
But they caution that the land tax is not a substitute for land reform. They 
pose the challenge that the effective implementation of both land reform 
and land taxation is mainly determined by the political will of a government. 
If it is determined to achieve equitable land distribution, it can likewise 
enforce land taxes. 
RPT Performance 
The country's tax effort is lower than its Asian neighbors though we 
have already established a relatively strong institutional structure for 
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provided on average about 30 percent and real property taxes 2.5 
percent of total tax revenue. Though relatively small in comparison to 
direct taxes, RPT is the most important tax source for the local govern- 
ments with a share of about 60 percent in total tax revenues and 24 
percent in total financial resources. The trend in RPT collection is 
discouraging. There has been a downward movement in the ratio of 
RPT to total government taxes from close to 4 percent between 1978 
to 1983 to less than 2 percent in 1990. There is also a downward trend 
in RPT contribution to local government revenue from 27 to 15 percent 
and in the ratio of RPT revenue to GNP from 1/2 of one percent to 1/ 
4 of one percent. The real value of RPT revenue in 1990 is virtually the 
same as two decades earlier. 
As stated earlier, the effective RPT rate is determined by the accuracy 
of property valuation. The impression that property valuation for tax 
purposes is seriously flawed is validated by our investigation of the 
valuation processes practiced in four localities - Makati, Quezon City, 
Antipolo and Laguna. PD 464 required a general revision of property 
values by LGU assessors three years from its date of effectivity or around 
1980. The dates of the last general revisions differ across localities - 
1980 for Quezon City, 1983 for the province of Laguna and 1985 for 
Makati. These localities, together with Antipolo, Rizal conducted new 
general revisions around 1990. But these have not yet been enforced. 
The revised valuation for Makati and Quezon City is now the subject 
of court cases. A few observations are noted about the valuation process. 
1. The revised values are dated long after the deadline set by PD 464, 
which is three years from 1977. Moreover, there is a fairly long interval 
between general revisions of property values; the intervals differ among 
localities. The last revisions have not even been approved for imple- 
mentation, and in the meantime, the old values are still in use. With 
property values rising through time, the tax base has become increas- 
ingly understated. The understatement is partly reflected in the rate of 
growth of the revised values as shown in Tables 4-3 and 4-4. The 
majority of the properties listed in the revisions gained by about 100 
percent over the 1985-1990 period with very few at less than 50 percent. 
Property values continued to rise and at a faster rate between 1990 and 
1992. The official market valuation of virtually all the listed properties 
in Makati rose by more than 200 percent over the 1985-1992 period 
even if the valuation made is below market prices. 
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T 4 bl 3 a e - 
Growth Rate of Revised Valuation 
in Selected Areas of Makati 
1985-1990, 1985-1992 
1985-1990 1985-1992 













Source: Makati Assessors' Office. 
In Antipolo, Rizal, the growth rates in revised values are even higher 
with ranges of 130 to 1,718 percent for residential land and 361 to 1,718 
percent for industrial land. The higher growth rate in revised values is 
partly explained by the valuation method used by the Antipolo assessors 
which more closely approximates market prices. 
II. The valuation method followed by the assessor of each locality 
makes a big difference in terms of accuracy. The Antipolo assessor based 
his revised valuations on the record of actual sales for different catego- 
ries of property in his municipality. For each category of property, the 
sale prices of the properties sold for the year of assessment (1990) are 
averaged. The average price is then used as the revised value for the 
category. In Makati, Quezon City and Laguna, the estimation procedure 
is not discussed, but there appears to be gross undervaluation. The 
revised property values for 1990 to 1992 are obviously lower than the 
corresponding market prices. To illustrate the degree of undervaluation, 
Table 4-5 gives the advertised sale prices for specific pieces of properties 
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Table 4-4 
Comparative Statements of Percentage 
of Increase or Decrease 
for Each Class of Real Property 
1985 M.V. 1990 M.V. 
(P/n-?) (P/rr?) % 
Residential 
R-1 P 110.00 P2,000.00 1718.18 
R-1 170.00 2,000.00 1076.47 
R-3 170.00 1,200.00 605.88 
R-3 220.00 1,200.00 445.45 
R-3 110.00 1,200.00 990.90 
R-4 110.00 900.00 718.18 
R-4 170.00 900.00 429.41 
R-4 100.00 900.00 800.00 
R-4 75.00 900.00 1100.00 
R-4 220.00 900.00 309.09 
R-4 65.00 900.00 1284.61 
R-5 75.00 500.00 566.66 
R-5 110.00 500.00 354.54 
R-5 65.00 500.00 669.23 
R-5 50.00 500.00 900.00 
R-5 220.00 500.00 127.27 
R-6 110.00 300.00 172.72 
R-6 65.00 300.00 361.53 
R-7 65.00 150.00 130.76 
R-7 30.00 150.00 400.00 
Industrial 
1-1 110.00 2,000.00 1718.18 
1-1 170.00 2,000.00 1076.47 
1-3 170.00 1,200.00 605.88 
1-3 710.00 1,200.00 445.45 
1-4 110.00 900.00 718.18 
1-4 65.00 900.00 1284.61 
1-4 170.00 900.00 429.41 
1-5 110.00 500.00 354.55 
1-5 65.00 500.00 669.23 
1-6 65.00 300.00 361.53 
Source: Office of the Assessor, Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. 
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Table 45 
Assessors' Market Valuation and Advertised Market Prices 
for Selected Prices of Property, 1992 
Assessors' Actual Assessors Valuation 
Market Value Market Value Market Price 
(P/m2) (P/m2) N 
Diliman, Quezon City 
Commonwealth Avenue 1800/m? 8000/mz 22.5 
(Don Mariano Marcos Ave.) 
Ayala Heights Subd. 2000/mz 6000/mz 33.3 
La Vista Subd. 800/rr? 2900/mz 27.6 
Xavierville Subd. 800 rr? 7000/rr? 11.4 
Makati 
Forbes Park (Residential 3500/mz 15000/m2 23.3 
properties bounded by 
EDSA, Alm, McKinley, Pili, 
Tamarind, Buendia and 
Guingua 
Pasay Road (Commercial 8500/mz 41000/rr? 20.7 
properties from EDSA to 
Pasong Tamo) 
Pasong Tamo (Vito Cruz 28Wn-? 9300/rr? 30.1 
to J.P. Rizal St.) 
Makati Avenue (Commercial/ 4000/m2 38OWrr? 10.5 
residential properties 
from Gen. Luna St. to 
J.P. Rim St.) 
Makati Avenue (Commercial 10500/m2 64000/m2 16.4 
properties from Pasay Rd. 
to Jupiter St.) 
San Miguel Village 3000/mz 50000/m2 6.0 
Proposed Actual Assessors' Valuation 
Market Value MarketValue Market Price 
(P/m2) (P/m2) N 
Agricultural Land 
Laguna 
Coconut Land P18/rr? P50/n-? 3.6 
Fish Pond P120/rr? P421/mz 28.5 
Source: Newspaper advertisement and Assessors' Office. 
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Table 4-6 
Growth Rates of Real Property Taxes, By City 
N 
1985.1986 1986-1987 1987-1988 1988.1989 1989-1990 Average a/ 
NCR 48 5 5 (5) 48 16.92 
R-1 7 66 (41) 113 29 28.84 
CAR 44 (1) 25 (0) 1 11.53 
R-III 8 (3) (31) 48 79 16.84 
R-1V 30 (23) (23) 107 18 18.07 
R-V (1) 2 (38) 65 36 10.55 
R-VI (3) 11 69 (13) 9 12.13 
R-VII (8) 5 49 (7) 9 8.07 
R-VIII 13 (18) (22) 28 138 23.17 
R-IX 4 (6) (88) 797 (1) 117.77 
R-X 19 (37) (12) 40 10 3.40 
R-XI 14 (58) (34) 385 6 52.03 
R-X1I 10 2 24 82 10 21.38 
a / Average = Sum of growth rates 
6 
Source: Budget of Receipts and Expenditures, various issues. 
and their corresponding revised, official valuations. In Xavierville, 
Quezon City for example, the assessor's valuation is P800 which is only 
11.4 percent of its advertised price of P7,000. Another case is San 
Miguel Village where the assessor's valuation is only 6 percent of the 
advertised price. A more glaring case is a Forbes Park property officially 
valued at P3,500 while the advertised price is P15,000. The undervalu- 
ation of agricultural land may be just as serious as in the case of real 
estate. This is seen in the advertised prices for a piece of coconut land 
and a fish pond in Laguna. The market price of the coconut land is 
about 26 times, that for the fishpond is two times their official valuations. 
These figures are not necessarily representative, and it is possible that 
the undervaluation may be less serious for the country as a whole. 
III. Differences in RPT effort are partly reflected in the differences 
in the RPT revenue per land area across regions. The data are for the 
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cities of each region. The figures are not conclusive, since there could 
be significant differences in land values across cities. The cities of 
Region IV (Lucena, San Pablo and Batangas) which are probably not 
much poorer than the cities of Region I (Dagupan, Laoag and San 
Carlos) have very unequal RPT collection per hectare of land: P11.7 for 
the former and P38.6 for the latter. Davao and General Santos of 
Region XI collect only P8.2 while Cagayan de Oro of Region X collects 
P16.5 per hectare; Bacolod and Iloilo of Region V collects P34.9. These 
differences call attention to the possibility of unequal tax efforts and 
problems of implementation. 
IV. We have no information on the punctuality of RPT payment but 
it is likely that RPT's poor performance is partly due to high delin- 
quency rates. The law does not impose a high penalty for delinquency; 
this possibly encourages late payment. Unlike the penalty for income 
tax delinquency which includes imprisonment, the penalty for RPT 
delinquency is limited to a 36 percent surcharge beyond 18 months 
delinquency. 
V. There is no information on the RPT of other forms of real 
property such as land improvements and machinery and equipment used 
in business. Their total value may be just as large as that of land. 
Assuming a capital output ratio of 3.0, an average assessment rate of 50 
percent and a tax rate of 1.0 percent, as much as 1.5 percent of GNP 
could be collected from business assets. 
Substantially, more revenues can be collected from RPT than have 
been collected in the past. Other developing countries collected a much 
higher RPT than the Philippines. Bahl and Miller (1983), give the 
following figures, which further strengthen the case for a more effective 
RPT administration. 
RPT/Central Government Tax, 1966 (in %) 
Costa Rica 5.7 
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India 5.0 (1964-65) 
Japan is notable for having relied on land tax to finance its agricul- 
tural and industrial growth in the early history of its development. The 
land tax during the Tokugawa shogunate and in the first decades of the 
Meij i restoration was the single most important tax source, contributing 
as much as 72 percent of total government revenue from 1873 to 1883. 
The share declined gradually, reaching 15 percent in 1901 to 1911 as 
other taxes rose in relative importance. In India, the land tax was the 
main source of the British government's finances and until now pro- 
duces a significant share of state revenue. In Mexico, the land tax 
complemented the land reform program. Its share of central government 
tax revenue rose from 3 to 7 percent from 1950 to 1965. Considering 
that industrialization was taking place during this period, the propor- 
tionate increase in land tax contribution must imply large increases in 
effective tax rates. 
Problems of Enforcement 
The legal framework and machinery for RPT administration are 
already in place, and according to Bahl and Miller are adequate. The 
first nationwide cadastral survey in the 1930s established the physical 
boundaries, official registration and titling of private land. The legal 
provisions for succeeding transfers, subdivisions, and registration of 
ownership have been also popularly followed. There are, in addition, 
provisions for claims and registration of homesteads from public lands 
which have been taken advantage of by landless farmers. With regard 
to other real properties - construction and other improvements and 
machinery - the RPT law is quite advanced. It provides that the 
assessment for old property be based on replacement or reproduction 
cost of the undepreciated part of the property. For newly acquired 
machinery and equipment, the market value is equal to the market 
price. The problem is implementation. There are at least four problems: 
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0 Within each locality, the valuation of land for tax purposes is 
generally below market value. The degree of understatement 
varies by use and location. 
O The methods used by different localities differ. This further 
adds to the unsystematic valuation of property. 
0 The valuation of construction and other structures may be 
worse than in the case of land, since it requires the valuation 
of individual property units. In the case of land, market values 
can be set for blocks of similar characteristics. Here each unit 
is assessed separately. 
O Even more disaggregated valuation is required for machinery 
and equipment. The individual units which number in mil- 
lions have to be identified and their undepreciated market 
value established. 
The basic problem is the absence of systematic valuation methods 
that the numerous local assessors can apply with greater ease and 
objectivity. The principal method used now is case-to-case valuation 
which is extremely time-consuming and highly subjective. At this time, 
the LGUs do not have the staff to accomplish their task within a 
reasonable period. What typically happens is that they work on specific 
cases at a time, making slow progress over the years. This slow process 
results in unequal market valuation. Properties assessed at time t and 
valued at the market prices prevailing at the time keep this valuation 
until the next assessment takes place at say, t+n. As property values 
increase, the valuation becomes increasingly understated. Furthermore,- 
the degree of undervaluation increases as the time interval between 
assessments increases. 
Case-to-case valuation tends to be biased against new construction 
and improvements since there is usually better information on market 
values, or it is easier to establish those values. The cost of construction 
per square meter of concrete or wooden house is fairly well known at the 
time of construction, while the replacement cost of an old house is 
much more difficult to establish. Moreover, new houses and business 
buildings have to be registered so there is no escaping up-to-date tax 
assessment of a newly acquired property. A situation is conceivable 
where a ten-year old mansion with a P20 million replacement value but 
built originally at P2 million would have a lower valuation than a newly 
built house that costs P4 million. 
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Our case studies show that the interval between revaluation of real 
estate is more than 10 years. The last general revision of land values was 
around 1983. It is not clear when these values will be adjusted to current 
market prices considering the controversy surrounding the proposed 
revisions in Makati and Quezon City. 
The most important obstacle to effective implementation of the RPT 
is the case-to-case method of valuation, which makes it physically 
impossible for the local governments to achieve a fair and accurate 
valuation. The method is also prone to corruption, since each property 
owner is given the opportunity to negotiate with the assessor on the 
valuation of his property. This problem, combined with power politics 
at the local level, works against the implementation of the RPT. The 
national government should establish the institutional infrastructure for 
a simultaneous and nationwide implementation of the RPT by local 
governments. A nationwide tax mapping using modem electronics and 
space technology is suggested. The mapping should provide within a 
short period a detailed geography categorized by the variables that 
determine their market value such as elevation, access to water, electric- 
ity, roads and social service; and for urban land, the social classification 
of areas and their uses, whether residential or commercial/industrial. 
The market value of each category of land will be determined through 
a common practical method such as the one used in Rizal. The nationwide 
tax mapping can be completed within a reasonable period,complemented 
by massive land titling and registration. With this centralized activity, the 
different LGUs will no longer have the flexibility of postponing indefinitely 
or undervaluing infinitely the properties under their respective jurisdictions. 
The Code unfortunately does not provide for this task. It implicitly 
stipulates separate and independent assessments by individual LGUs. It 
has no clear statement on the responsibility of the Department of 
Finance over local taxes. In order to appreciate the difficulties that are 
likely to arise if the central government does not step in, the key 
provisions of the Code are briefly stated below. 
O "The provincial, city, or municipal assessor shall undertake a 
general revision of real property assessment within two years after 
the effectivity of the Code and every three years thereafter." 
O He/she shall "prepare a schedule of fair market values for the 
different kinds and classes of real property located within his/her 
170 Eaita A. Tan 
territorial jurisdiction within one year from the effectivity of the 
Code." 
Q "The general revision of assessments and property classifica- 
tion shall commence upon the enactment of an ordinance by 
the sanggunian adopting the schedule of fair market values but 
not later than two years from the effectivity of the Code." 
Thereafter, the provincial, city, or municipal assessor shall 
undertake the general revision of real property assessment and 
real property classification once every three years. 
n "In every province and city,there shall be prepared and main- 
tained by the provincial, city or municipal assessor an assess- 
ment roll wherein all real property located within the territo- 
rial jurisdiction of the LGU concerned shall be listed. 
These provisions are virtually the same as those provided for by PD 464 
except that in the latter, the Department of Finance has the responsibility 
for reviewing and approving the schedule of market valuation undertaken 
by local government assessors. Now, revisions in market valuation are to be 
submitted to the local sanggunian for adoption. The Department of Finance 
role is confined to providing the local governments guidelines and proce- 
dures including forms to ensure fairness and administrative efficiency. 
The new Code provides a common set of deadlines for property 
valuation assessment, the preparation of the complete property roll for 
each local government unit, and the individual self-declaration of 
property ownership and valuation. While the law envisages simultane-. 
ous and regular assessments of real property as per the schedules given, 
it does not say how the deadlines are to be met or what are the 
consequences of failing to meet them. In fact, a year has passed since the 
Code was signed in October 1991 but hardly anything has been done to 
implement the RPT provisions. The work on the implementing guide- 
lines has barely started. Unfortunately, the law was signed so close to the 
1992 presidential election that it is unrealistic to expect any action until 
a new administration is installed. 
The LGUs are given autonomy in making their own valuation and 
deciding on the RPT rates, since only ceiling rates and assessment rates 
are provided for in the Code. With so little stated about principles of 
market valuation and given only ceiling rates, the LGUs are in effect 
granted very wide taxing flexibility. Lessons from the past show that the 
LGUs have very little initiative in enforcing the RPT, and probably 
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require to be prodded by the central government, especially at the early 
stages of the Code's implementation. 
Another reason for the necessity of a nationwide tax map and 
revision of property values is the uneven power politics and administra- 
tive abilities among the 1,500 LGUs. Their autonomy and differences 
will likely result in varying RPT collection performance. As a result, the 
effective tax rates among the country's property owners will also vary. 
Localities with a greater concentration of wealth, including land, will 
likely put up a greater resistance to more accurate valuation. It is a fact 
that in many localities, wealth and political power are concentrated in 
the same group of individuals and families. They would naturally have 
a vested interest in opposing effective RPT implementation. The recent 
opposition to the modest adjustments in property values in Quezon City 
and Makati are examples of the strength of vested interest ranged 
against RPT. 
Tax mapping is best done by the national governments which has the 
resources for the task, and which faces a more remotely placed vested 
interest group as far as RPT is concerned. At the local level the 
government and the taxpayers face each other or belong to one and the 
same group. Additionally, modem technology such as satellite photog- 
raphy possibly has significant economies of scale. Satellite photography 
can give a good comparative picture of sites and allow for a more 
accurate drawing of boundaries for the different property categories. 
This would vastly facilitate valuation. Pictures instead of individual 
negotiations will be used. Secondly, the assessments can be made simul- 
taneously and within a short period instead of on a staggered basis as in 
the past. In this regard, a regular updating of the nationwide tax map 
and market valuation of, say, every five or ten years would be needed to 
avoid possible wide differences in effective RPT rates. Usually,the pace 
of development is uneven. Some areas grow more rapidly than others: 
the rate of infrastructure build-up varies and people migrate across towns 
and provinces. These and other changes would lead to differential 
changes in classification of properties and their value. Regular nation- 
wide updating of the tax map would be required. 
RPT: Benchmark Collection and Land Reform 
We have shown that the RPT has not been effectively implemented. 
Despite the large increases in property values experienced in the past, RPT 
collection in real terms has remained at the same level as in 1970. Note that 
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collection rose gradually until 1981 but has since declined. RPT revenue as 
a proportion of GNP declined by half from its 1977 peak of .0046. Easily, 
RPT revenue can be increased and here we offer possible target figures. 
O Target land valuation at, say, 500 percent more from 1980 to 1990 
which is not unreasonable as seen in Tables 4-3, 4-4, 4-5. This 
would mean a five-fold increase in collection to P11.990 billion. 
O Assume a capital-output ratio of 3, apply 50 percent average 
assessment rate. The RPT/GNP ratio would be 1.5 percent instead 
of the current level of .23 percent. The target could be as high as 
P16.027 billion (P1,068,486 x.015). This target does not include 
the RPT on idle lands and other properties that are not included 
in the conventional estimation of capital. 
O Alternatively we can aim to collect as much as the other coun- 
tries mentioned in page 15. Note that Philippine RPT/total tax 
revenue is only 1.5 percent in 1990. We can raise this to 5 percent. 
We have no report on the breakdown of RPT collection by form and 
use of real property. It appears that much of RPT is imposed on agricul- 
tural land and real estate. This collection focus or bias has desirable 
implications considering the questionable schedule of RPT assessment, 
rates which favor real estate and consumer durables as compared to 
productive capital. 
Raising the effective tax rate on land and residential capital would 
help strengthen both the rural and the urban land reform programs of 
the government. As discussed under the section "Distributive and 
Allocative Implications of RPT," a tax on land, a factor of fixed supply, 
would be borne mainly by the owner. The RPT directly reduces the 
return on land and residential investments and so discourages invest- 
ments in these properties. Raising the effective tax rate on real estate 
especially in the big cities would have some equalizing effect on the 
distribution of housing. Investment in affluent housing and residential 
land would tend to fall while the local governments will earn more RPT 
revenue which can finance socialized housing for the poor. 
The Urban Development and Housing Law, otherwise known as the 
urban land reform law, was passed in March 1992. The law encourages 
local governments and the national housing agencies to build socialized 
housing. While the law does not force a redistributionof private real 
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estate, it empowers the national housing authority and the local govern- 
ments to expropriate private idle lands and to use their own lands for 
socialized housing. An additional RPT tax of 1/2 percent of assessed 
value of land in urban areas whose value exceeds P50,000 is to be 
collected to finance the program. 
The effect of RPT on agricultural land is similar to that on real estate. 
It will discourage investment in land as a whole and in unproductive 
land especially. It will likely induce sale of idle lands and lands which 
are not very productive. So far the provision for taxing idle lands has not 
been implemented. The RPT and the provisions for an idle land tax will 
have the desirable consequence of lowering land values so that more 
small tillers can afford to buy land, and discouraging large holdings of 
unproductive land. Land and real estate taxes, effectively collected, 
would therefore help strengthen the local government and support both 
the urban and rural land reform programs. It will provide the financial 
resources to carry out the programs, at the same time inducing land 
redistribution. 
Summary and Conclusion 
This paper focused on the implementation of property taxation for 
revenue purposes. The case studies of four localities - Makati, Quezon 
City, Antipolo and Laguna - give some indications of the undervalu- 
ation of property for tax purposes. There is a systematic undervaluation 
of real property almost everywhere, mainly because of the apparent lack 
of political will to collect and the extremely inefficient case-to-case 
valuation methods practiced. While the law provides for general revi- 
sions of property values and assessments by all local governments, the 
revisions use different criteria for market valuation resulting in varying 
degrees of undervaluation. Additionally, the general revisions are made 
at different time intervals and are not immediately adopted by each 
local government. Even with the general revisions, the revised values 
are not applied to all properties at the same time. They appear to be used 
merely as a standard for case-to-case assessment. This method is nego- 
tiated between a property owner and an assessor with the negotiation 
subject to personal influence. This system of tax assessment is the main 
reason for the rather poor performance of the RPT. The paper suggests 
that a nationwide tax mapping and application of simple but common 
market valuation criteria be undertaken by the central government as 
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an initial step to its decentralization program. These will provide the 
local governments with the necessary institutional structure for enforc- 
ing the RPT and collecting more taxes. Assuming that this will be done, 
other issues are raised. They are: 
C] LGUs are given the right to choose the tax rates below the 
ceiling rates provided for by the new Code. In the past, the 
LGUs imposed the maximum rates provided for by PD 464. 
The ceiling rates have been raised from 1/2 to l percent. It is 
not certain if LGUs will choose the maximum again or any- 
thing below it,since there are no floor rates stipulated. We may 
have a situation where two adjacent properties of equal market 
value, one located in Manila, another in Makati, are imposed 
tax rates of 1 percent and .25 of 1 percent, respectively. 
O A similar situation may occur with reapect to the tax on idle 
land, or a rate which is left to the LGU to impose. We may one 
have locality imposing an idle land tax of 5 percent, and 
another a zero rate. 
O Of serious concern is the incentive system implied by the 
schedule of assessment rates for the various forms and uses of 
real property. The schedule is generally favorable to residential 
uses of property as compared to productive uses. The lowest 
assessment rate is on residential land which is a flat 20 percent. 
The assessment rate for household durables and improvements 
is much lower than for productive machinery and commercial/ 
industrial construction. This structure is definitely inefficient 
and inequitable. Future studies must address the incentive/ 
disincentive effects of the Code on the various forms and uses 
of real property so that the law can be amended to make it 
consistent with the development objectives of the nation. In 
order to avoid the allocative inefficiencies that would result 
from its full enforcement, the national and local governments 
must give priority to the collection of the RPT on agricultural 
land, idle land and real estate. They must defer the enforce- 
ment of the RPT on commercial and industrial properties. 
After all, income taxes are already being collected from busi- 
ness enterprises. 
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5 
INDUSTRIAL AND TRADE POLICY 
FOR POVERTY ERADICATION 
Gonzalo M. Juraao 
Introduction 
SHOULD THE PHILIPPINES CONTINUE WITH LIBERALIZATION IN ITS ECONOMIC 
policy, specifically liberalization in its policies on trade, domestic and 
foreign investment? How should it view technology in industry? 
The answers to these questions have a direct bearing on the the revival 
and acceleration of growth in the industrial sector. Sharply expanded 
production is necessary if the sector is to create employment and thus make 
a contribution to the eradication of poverty in the country. 
This paper argues for the continuation of the current liberalization of the 
economic environment, including the liberalization of trade policy and 
domestic and foreign investment policy; and the installation of more 
productive technology in the industrial sector. 
In some ways, the question of economic liberalization has been rendered 
academic by domestic and external developments. First, the policy of import 
substitution pursued in the 1950s and 1960s, has been shown by historical 
experience to have been inefficient. It caused the economy to perform way 
below its potential and to lag far behind its neighbors. Good economic sense 
suggests that new and more efficient approaches in the mobilization of 
scarce resources be explored and tested. Secondly, the Philippines has been 
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liberalizing slowly but steadily in the last 15 years. The process deserves to 
be given the opportunity to work itself out, to produce the benefits which, 
according to theory and empirical studies, it is capable of bringing about. A 
reversal at this time will also be disruptive and destabilizing, since many 
enterprises have already geared themselves for competition in a freer envi- 
ronment in the days ahead. Finally, the rest of the world has been moving 
gradually toward greater openness in economic relations. ASEAN itself has 
decided to establish a free trade area in the region beginning in 1993. 
Sharing in the benefits of this more open trading system requires a reciprocal 
gesture of allowing the rest of the world to take advantage of opportunities 
offered in our own domestic economy. 
As regard foreign investments, pragmatism suggests tapping resources 
mobilizable from abroad if domestic resources are not sufficient enough to 
meet national targets. Safeguarding the national patrimony, preserving the 
leadership of Philippine nationals in developing the country's natural 
resources, and exploiting economic opportunities can be addressed as sepa- 
rate issues. Dependence on the domestic market and exclusive reliance on 
domestic resources are both restrictive of growth. 
The technological issue is fundamentally important if Philippine indus- 
tries are to compete in international markets. At this juncture in history, 
national markets have all been absorbed into one international market, 
thus, technological "modernization" is the only way our industries can 
survive and prosper. The industrial sector must adopt "modem" technology 
and should be assisted in doing so. 
The next two sections of this paper review the industrial sector's perform- 
ance in the last two and one-half decades and the evolution of policy during 
that time. The last two sections present suggestions on trade, domestic and 
foreign investment, and technology policy that can be adopted in the 1990s. 
Industrial Performance 
Historical and Regional Perspective 
A historical and regional perspective of Philippine industrial develop- 
ment is provided by Table 5-1. The industrial sector's record in the last two- 
and-one-half decades is clearly one of stagnation. From a respectable 8.0 
percent average in 1965-1980, the sector's growth rate fell to -1.8 percent 
average in 1980-1988. 
The same deterioration is manifested in the record of the manufac- 
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in 1980-1988 from an average 7.5 percent in 1965.1980. Merchandise 
exports follow the same pattern. Manufactured exports grew at the 
microscopic rate of 0.4 percent average in 1980-1988 whereas they 
expanded by an average 4.7 percent in 1965-1980. 
The performance of the sector over the entire 23-year stretch is 
clearly mediocre when placed in a regional context. Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand also suffered declines in growth in the 1980s as compared 
to their growth in 1965-1980 but in each period their accomplishment 
was markedly superior to that of the Philippines. 
Relative to the performance of Singapore, South Korea and Hongkong - three newly industrialized economies - that of the Philippines pales 
into insignificance. 
Developments in the 1980s 
Focusing only on the 1980s, the picture appears in Table 5-2. The 10- 
year period 1981-1990 is clearly divisible into two segments: 1981-1986 
and 1986-1990. During the first segment the industrial sector persist- 
ently stagnated, with its growth decreasing from 3.4 percent in 1981 to 
negative rates in 1984-1986. Stagnation also aptly describes the status 
of the manufacturing sector whose growth rate fell from 3.4 percent in 
1981 to negative rates in 1984-1985. 
On the other hand, the second segment, reflecting the period after 
the Edsa Revolution, shows recovery, with the growth rate reaching an 
average of 7.4 percent each for industry and its manufacturing sub-sector 
in 1987-1989. 
Much the same story can be told of manufactured exports. After the 
relentless decline of 1981-1985, during which the growth rate fell from 22 
percent in 1981 to -14.3 percent in 1985, manufactured exports recovered, 
growing at the rate of almost 20 percent per year in 1987-1989, with the rate 
actually attaining a record high of 27.2 percent in 1988. 
The years 1990-1991 represent a sudden collapse. Most analysts agree 
that this was precipitated by the December 1989 coup attempt and 
intensified by a series of natural and man-made calamities: the destruc- 
tive earthquake of 1990, the Gulf War which raised oil prices and shut 
off workers remittances from abroad in 1990-1991, and the devastating 
eruption of Mount Pinatubo in 1991. Whether economic policy could 
have reversed the decline is difficult to tell. What is easier to assert is 
that the infrastructure system failed to provide the necessary safeguards 
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Table 5-2 
Growth Rates, Philippines 
N 
Total Exports of 
Year GDP Industry* M anufacturing Exports Manufacturing Sector 
1981 3.9 4.5 3.4 -1.2 22.1 
1982 2.9 2.1 2.4 -12.2 -4.3 
1983 0.1 0.6 2.3 -0.3 3.1 
1984 -6.0 -10,2 -7.0 7.7 17.9 
1985 -4.3 -10.2 -7.6 -14.1 -14.3 
1986 1.4 -2.0 0.8 4.6 4.7 
1987 4.6 7.4 6.3 18.1 25.6 
1988 6.4 9.0 9.6 23.7 27.2 
1989 5.6 6.9 6.3 10.6 16.6 
1990 2.5 1.9 1.4 4.7 9.4 
1991 -1.0 -3.3 -4.0 4.6 n.a. 
Consisting of mining and quarrying, construction and utilities, in addition to 
manufacturing. 
n.a. = not available 
Source: Philippine Statistical Yearbook (various issues). 
for envigorating production activity, and for facilitating the process of 
economic recovery. 
The Evolution of Policy 
Import Substitution 
The import substitution strategy of the 1950s and 1960s came under 
criticism for a number of reasons.' Because of the various measures 
carried out to promote and protect local industries, relative prices were 
disturbed directing resources away from more efficient uses to less effi- 
cient uses, favoring manufacturing at its finishing stages, handicapping 
agriculture, and penalizing exports. The main instruments of protection 
were the tariff system, supplemented by quantitative and other non- 
1. See Bautista, Power and Associates (1979); and Medalla (1990a) and Medalla, 
(1990b). 
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tariff restrictions, and a rigid exchange rate. Fiscal incentives, given in 
the later stages of the strategy, neutralized some of the anti-employment 
bias of the protective system, but on the whole, served to reinforce the 
capital intensive thrust of the industrial and trade policy regime. 
Phases of Liberalization 
On the tariff. The first effort to modify the policy regime came in the 
early 1970s. This was when the first tariff systematization effort was 
launched. As a result, the number of tariff rates applicable on imports 
was reduced from 34 to 6, a uniform revenue rate of 10 percent ad 
valorem was established, and a schedule of protective duties was added 
consisting of 10, 20, 30, 50, 70 and 100 percent ad valorem.' 
But the more thorough going reductions were not made until 1981- 
1985. Revision efforts during this time culminated in the abolition of 
the rates above 50 percent and the clustering of the tariff items around 
the 10, 20, 30 and 50 percent levels. By the middle of the 1980s, the 
tariff was lower and less dispersed than at any previous period. 
The latest tariff revisions were those introduced in 1990 to take effect 
over the five-year period 1991-1995.3 Promulgated under Executive 
Order No. 470, these changes cover some 50 percent of the Tariff and 
Customs Code. In the revised scheme, tariff rates cluster around four 
levels: 3, 10, 20, and 30 percent compared to the 1990 levels of 10-50 
percent. The average nominal tariff is reduced from the 1990 level of 28 
percent to only 20 percent at the end of the adjustment period, or a drop 
of 28 percent. Weighted by imports the average tariff declines from the 
1990 average of 20 percent to the 1995 average of 14 percent or a drop 
of 27 percent. (See Table 5-3.) 
Among the three major economic sectors the biggest reductions on 
the tariff are made on manufacturing whose average tariff (unweighted) 
are now down to 19 percent in 1995 from the 1990 level of 27 percent. 
For agriculture, the average tariff declines by 27 percent, from the 1990 
level of 35 percent to the 1995 level of 25 percent. 
The new tariff structure also reduces the average effective protection rate 
(EPR), from 25 percent in 1990 to 19 percent in 1995. Along with effective 
2. Jurado (1976). 
3. This and the next two paragraphs are based on Azarcon (1991). 
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Table 5.3 
Percentage Distribution of Tariff Rates, 1990-1995 
Tariff Rates 
(%) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
0 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
3 - 0.050 0.050 0.055 0.055 0.051 
10 0.264 0.286 0.354 0.350 0.352 0,352 
20 0.206 0.174 0.134 0.159 0.164 0.186 
30 0.198 0.176 0.153 0.187 0.182 0.354 
40 0.090 0.087 0.068 0.120 0.006 - 
45 - - 0.112 - - - 
50 0.231 0.211 0.095 0.090 0.090 0.037 
Total (%) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Total (no. of tariff lines) 6,193 5,561 5,561 5,561 5,561 5,561 
*Details do not add up to 1.000 due to omission of values less than 0.001 
Source: Chulia Azarcon, (1991 ), Table 4. 
protection rates, the structure of effective protection is also changed. To 
reduce the bias against agriculture relative to manufacturing, EPRs for 
selected manufacturing industries which had been previously highly pro- 
tected are now down to more reasonable levels, closer to those in the 
primary sector and other less protected manufacturing industries. For manu- 
facturing industries, the average EPR falls from 35 percent in 1990 to 28 
percent in 1995. The manufacturing subsectors for whom protection levels 
are substantially lower include: textiles and footwear, chemicals and chemi- 
cal products, non-metallic mineral products, basic metals and metal prod- 
ucts, and machinery including electrical and transport equipment. In the 
case of agriculture, fishery, and forestry, effective rates decline from 4 
percent in 1990 to 2 percent in 1995. 
Today, the tariff is clearly less protective than it was 15 years ago, less 
biased against agriculture and exports although it is still higher than can 
be justified on purely revenue grounds. 
Non-tariff measures. Much has also been accomplished to dismantle 
non-tariff barriers. In 1977, 33.5 percent of the total number of Philip- 
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pine Standard Commodity Classification (PSSC) lines were regulated. 
By the time the current import liberalization program began in 1986, 
this proportion was down to 17.3 percent. Following liberalization, only 
14.2 percent remained regulated in 1987 and 10.2 percent in 1988.4 
The decline in the coverage of non-tariff measures (NTM) can be 
seen in the various sectors. In 1985, the NTM coverage in agriculture 
was 31 percent and that of manufacturing was 32 percent. After the 
removal of restrictions in 1988, the NTM coverage in agriculture went 
down to 1.6 percent while that on manufacturing declined to 9.4 
percent. 
Within manufacturing itself, the extent of liberalization varied. For 
beverages and tobacco, the NTM coverage fell to zero percent in 1988 
from as much as 91 percent in 1984. In contrast, the electrical machin- 
ery and transport sector was hardly affected, its NTM coverage remain- 
ing unchanged at about 21 percent. 
There are currently 579 items of merchandise still subject to trade 
regulation. Of these, 10 items are scheduled to be liberalized in due 
time, 455 items are for review, and the remaining 114 are for continued 
regulation. Following a commitment of the government to the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund, the liberalization of these items, except those for 
continued regulation, will be completed by 1994. 
On the basis of the evidence, it can be said that non-tariff restrictions 
have been abolished for the most part and do not constitute today a 
significant barrier to trade. 
On investment incentives. Investment incentives were also used to pro- 
mote industrialization. These were first put forward in 1967 through the 
Investment Incentives Act, supplemented in 1970 by the Export Incentives 
Act and, over time, amended and codified. Today, they are embodied in EO 
226 otherwise known as the 1987 Omnibus Investment Code (OIC). 
EO 226 embodies various investment incentives consisting of exemp- 
tion from duties and taxes on imported capital equipment, tax credit on 
domestic capital equivalent to the duties and taxes on similar foreign 
equipment, tax holidays of six to eight years for pioneer domestic and 
export producers, and four to seven years for non-pioneer domestic and 
export producers, and deductions from taxable income of 50 percent of 
4. This and the next three paragraphs are based on Medalla (1990a). 
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incremental labor expense for five years. The incentives represent a 
drastic reduction from those offered in previous years. 
EO 226 extends perfectly neutral incentives with respect to exporters 
and non-exporters. It therefore fails to neutralize or reverse the anti- 
export bias of the protection system. At the same time, the incentive 
system has a strong capital bias, failing to provide support to more labor 
intensive, export-oriented industries. 
On foreign investments. Philippine policy toward foreign investments 
has always been favorable, but because of the country's basically 
protectionist economic environment, it failed to attract foreign 
investment in any significant amount. This can be seen from the 
evidence of the 1975-1985 period (see Table 54). Of the ASEAN 
countries, the Philippines has attracted the least amount of foreign 
investments. In 1975-1980 and 1981-1985, it attracted an average of 
$74 million and $58 million, respectively, as against $85 million and 
Table 5.4 
Foreign Direct Investments and their Distribution in Asia-Pacific Region, 
1975-1986 
on million US$) 
1975-80 1981-85 Annual Flows 
Average Average 
Country Amount % Amount % 1984 1985 1986 
Philippines 74 4 58 1 9 -11 127 
Indonesia 290 14 229 5 226 272 259 
Malaysia 524 26 1,083 22 797 694 530 
Thailand 85 4 280 6 404 161 264 
China - - 796 16 1,258 1,659 - 
Hong Kong 241 12 562 12 682 -216 779 
South Korea 61 3 116 2 112 230 428 
Singapore 502 25 1,130 23 884 974 673 
Taiwan 91 5 189 4 201 340 - 
Other Asia- 
Pacific Countries 140 7 372 7 200 392 375 
Total 2,007 100 4,817 100 4,773 4,495 3,435 
Source: UN, ESCAP (1988), p.81. 
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$280 million for Thailand and $524 million and $1,083 million for 
Malaysia. Even the flow of $127 million in 1986, which represents a 
vastly expanded amount relative to the negative flow in 1985, and $9 
million in 1984, is less than one-half of Thailand's and less than one- 
fourth of Malaysia's during that year. 
The new Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7042) 
should go a long way in promoting the Philippines as a haven for foreign 
investments and should help bring in substantial capital from abroad. 
Under the Act, non-Philippine nationals may invest in any domestic 
enterprise up to 100 percent of its capital, except only in a number of 
areas where foreign ownership is either wholly prohibited or is limited 
to 40 percent of the enterprise's capital. These are the areas restricted 
by mandate of the Constitution and specific laws (the so-called Negative 
List A); those where foreign ownership is limited for reasons of security, 
defense, risk to health and morals, and protection of local small- and 
medium-scale enterprises (Negative List B), and those other areas 
covered by the Act and other legislation, administrative regulations and 
practices (Negative List Q. After a transitory period of 36 months, the 
Negative Lists B and C may be revised to reflect changes in the country's 
economic needs and the government's policy directions. 
Policy Agenda for 1992 and Beyond 
The National and International Context 
Policymaking for accelerated growth for the Philippine industrial 
sector cannot now ignore the momentum that has built up in the 
domestic economy for wider and deeper liberalizaion. Many enterprises 
in the country now look forward to the day when tariffs are lower, non- 
tariff measures are less restrictive and incentives for domestic and foreign 
investments are less discriminatory. The movement toward a freer 
economic environment must be continued. But in addition to 
compulsions of internal dynamics, policymaking must take into account 
another source of pressure for liberalization, and this is the birth of the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTAV 
5. AF FA is one of the free trade areas that are emerging across the world economy. Free 
trade areas established earlier include, in North America: US-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 
U&Mexico Free Trade Agreement, US-Carribean,Basin Initiative; in Europe: the European 
Economic Community of 1992; in Africa: East African Community, and West African States; 
and in the Pacific: Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement. 
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The decision of ASEAN to establish a free trade area included an 
agreement to use a Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme 
as the main mechanism for the attainment of eventual economic inte- 
gration. The CEPT scheme provides for the progressive reduction of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers on all products traded among ASEAN 
countries starting 1 January 1993 and- culminating 15 years later. It 
covers trade in all manufactured products, including processed agricul- 
tural products. Under AFTA, member countries seek to abolish virtu- 
ally all tariffs among themselves but reserve the right to determine 
individually the level of duties with respect to the rest of the world.6 
The AFTA presents Philippine industries with two broad and far- 
reaching challenges: the challenge to compete with foreign industries in 
foreign markets, and to retain their dominance in the domestic market 
over imports. The Philippines really has no alternative except to liber- 
alize, unless it decides to opt out of ASEAN. 
Actually, Philippine industries have little to fear from liberalization. 
Countries which have been more open to the rest of the world have 
grown faster than those which have been less open. The evidence from 
ASEAN itself confirms this. Of the ASEAN-4 (not counting Brunei 
and Singapore), the Philippines has been the least open, its export/GDP 
ratio being only 18.7 percent as against 29 percent for Thailand and 
63.6 percent for Malaysia. Even Indonesia has a higher measure of 
openness, at 26.5 percent (see Table 5.5). 
There is nothing to fear on the import side either, i.e., that imports 
will flood the domestic market. Import liberalization notwithstanding, 
the "liberated" imports of 1990 constituted only some $3.7 billion of the 
total import bill of some $13 billion, or 28 percent of the total.' 
Philippine industries should view liberalization in trade policy as an 
opportunity to expand markets and to demonstrate staying power, if not 
superiority, in the domestic market. 
The direction for Philippine industrial and trade policy in the 1990s 
should definitely be toward greater liberalization and, as will be pointed 
out below, accelerated technological modernization in the industrial 
sector as well. 
6. Chulia J. Azarcon, "ASEAN Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme" (typescript). 
7. Azarcon (1991), p. 1. 
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Table 5-5 
ASEANA, Selected Statistics 
(In billion US$, 1988) 
Merchandise 
Total Exports/ Total Trade 
Countries GDP* Exports Im rts Trade GDP GDP 
Philippines 37,737 7,074 8,159 15,233 18.7 40.4 
Indonesia 76,912 19,677 15,732 35,409 25.6 46.0 
Malaysia 32,786 20,848 16,584 37,432 63.6 114.2 
Thailand 54,500 15,806 17,876 33,682 29.0 61.8 
*Figure arrived at by multiplying population by per capita GDP. 
Source: World Bank (1990), Tables 1 and 14. 
Specific Policy Thrusts 
Trade policy. The objective of policy in this area should be to reduce 
the differences in protective rates in order to lessen and eventually 
eliminate the discriminatory character of the tariff system. We share 
Erlinda Medalla's proposals s in this regard, viz.: 
With respect to tariffs - these should be steadily reduced until they 
reach a uniform 10 percent level for all imports. For revenue purposes, 
these rates may be supplemented by a 2-tiered value-added tax, a higher 
rate for luxury goods, and a lower rate for non-luxury goods, applicable 
on both domestic products and imports. 
With respect to quantitative restrictions - these should be abolished 
to the extent possible but in any case should be imposed only for reasons 
of security, health, and sanitation. 
Investment incentives. The current investment incentives (including 
accelerated depreciation, tax exemptions, reduced taxes, tax credit, 
reduced income taxation, in consideration of employment creation) 
should be retained, but should be amended to give additional incentives 
for employment creation in order to moderate the capital-intensive 
8. Medalla, "On the Overall Trade and Industrial Policy Framework," (typescript). 
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thrust of the incentives as a whole. Also, the incentives should remain 
over a definite period of time, like another five years. Moreover, the 
incentives should hold their recipients to some standard of performance 
as a basis for the continuation of privileges. For example, they can be 
kept by recipients only so long as recipients satisfy some increasing 
export performance targets, for example, an export ratio of 30 percent 
of output in year 1, 35 percent in year 2, up to 60 or 70 percent in year 5. 
Foreign investments should be given the same privileges except that 
foreign investments accepted into the country by virtue of their being 
export-oriented shall be given higher export performance targets which 
are also to be attained sooner. 
Close monitoring is essential to the success of this policy. 
Foreign investments policy . The objective of policy in this area should 
be to make the country competitive with its ASEAN neighbors in 
attracting foreign investments. Negative List A in the new Foreign 
Investments Act may not be touched given the parameters laid down in 
the Constitution but Negative List B can be shortened and Negative 
List C can be deleted altogether after the transition period. The ulti- 
mate goal is to cut down restrictions on foreign investments except 
those expressedly imposed by the Constitution. 
One matter of continuing concern to implementing authorities re- 
lates to registration requirements for business. These should be drasti- 
cally reduced to make them less burdensome and less time consuming 
for both local and foreign investments. 
Technological Modernization 
General Considerations 
This study, whose fundamental objective is to focus on the creation of 
expanded employment opportunities in the industrial sector as a means for 
eradicating poverty, also concerns itself with technological modernization 
in industry, a process that is clearly labor-saving. The current Philippine 
context makes this concern necessary. For one thing, the Philippine manu- 
facturing sector is notorious for its low productivity. During the period 1956- 
1970, productivity declined by an average 0.71 percent per annum, by an 
even worse 2.23 percent during 1971-1980 and by something like 2.5 to 3 
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percent during 1980-1983.' The figures are dated but there is no reason to 
believe that more recent ones will tell a different story. This characteristic 
must be remedied if Philippine manufacturing industries are to compete 
successfully in international markets. One remedy clearly lies in technologi- 
cal improvement. 
Secondly, the technological modernization will necessarily start at 
the top of the industrial pyramid, affecting the giants and the leaders, 
and those that are yet to be established. It will not start with the existing 
medium - or small-scale industries. Improved technology at the top and 
among new enterprises can mean larger and stronger linkages with 
industries at the lower level of the industrial structure, strengthening 
the employment capability of these industries. 
One can add a third point. In a globally free and open economic 
environment, national industries have no other viable alternative ex- 
cept to improve their technology. It is their only way of preserving their 
profitability and their capacity for creating any employment at all. 
Participation in international markets exposes local industries to a 
wide range of technologies. Such exposure makes them aware of the 
possibilities of acquiring superior foreign technology or modifying or 
improving the technology they already possess. In each instance, the 
ultimate result is an increase in the industries' productivity and an 
enhancement of their international competitiveness. 
Indigenous and Transferred Technology in Philippine Industry 
Improved technology can be developed by indigenous efforts or can 
be acquired or transfered from foreign sources. Vehicles for transfer 
include imported machines which embody technology, direct foreign 
investments, joint ventures and various forms of licensing, franchising, 
marketing, and technical service arrangements. 
The Philippines has a high technology potential, judging from the 
ratio of science and engineering graduates to total population.10 How- 
ever, the actual mobilization of this potential is well below the standard 
for countries at the same stage of development as the Philippines. 
Research and development (R&D) expenditures in the Philippines are 
9. Hooley (1985), p. 56. 
10. See De Dios (1992) for a detailed discussion. 
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small and declining. As a percentage of GNP they fell from 0.26 percent 
in 1979 to 0.12 percent in 1984. The figure for 1984 is smaller than the 
corresponding figures for Thailand (0.36 percent), Indonesia (0.23 
percent), Singapore (0.89 percent) and even for Sri Lanka (0.18 per- 
cent). The number of R&D professionals per million of population also 
declined, falling from 215 in 1979 to 191 in 1984. 
The level of R&D effort is not only low and sliding, it is marked by 
an extremely low level of participation by the private sector. Of total 
R&D expenditures in 1979, only 16 percent came from the private 
sector, and 19 percent in 1984 (see Table 5-6). The number of R&D 
people in the sector is similarly small, representing 16 percent of total 
in 1982 and 10 percent in 1987." 
R&D expenditures go into basic research, applied research, experi- 
mental development, and unspecified activities (see Table 5.7). Of 
these, applied research and experimental development are the most 
pertinent for the economic purposes of industrial enterprises. 
The state of reliance on foreign technology is also quite overwhelm- 
ing. Up to 1990, the Philippines continued to source its major industrial 
technologies from abroad. The dependence also seems to have intensi- 
fied as time passed. While 42 percent of patents granted in 1977 went 
to Philippine inventors, only 23.5 percent went to them in 1990 (see 
Table 5-8). 
Related to the matter of low participation in R&D by the private 
sector and the declining share in inventions by national inventors is the 
low productivity of the Philippine manufacturing sector. This low 
productivity implies that the capital imports availed of under the vari- 
ous investment incentive schemes have not given the industries access 
to any technology resembling cutting edge. Data show that capital goods 
imports over the period 1986-1990 have been increasing as a percentage 
of total imports. Of capital goods imports, specialized machines (along 
with power-generating machines), office equipment and electrical ma- 
chinery (along with telecommunications equipment) which have a 
direct bearing on industrial productivity constitute a decisive part, some 
80-85 percent of total (see Table 5-9). 
At least two reasons can be advanced for this low productivity feature 
of Philippine manufacturing industries. One, the equipment Philippine 
11. Ibid., p. 4. 
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Table 5-6 
Percentage Distribution of R&D Expenditures by Sector 
1979-1984 
Sector 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Government agencies 70.8 68.2 62.9 65.9 65.8 68.3 
Private industry 15.9 18.6 19.8 16.4 20.2 19.4 
Higher education 4.0 3.4 7.2 8.7 8.2 6.2 
Non-profit institutions 9.3 9.7 10.0 8.9 5.8 6.0 
Total 
N 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(P million) 563.12 690.42 528.34 634.46 514.59 613.41 
Source: DOST based on NSTA Surveys on R&D Expenditures and Manpower, 197980,1981-82,198384. 
industries imported is not new, certainly not top of the line. Two, if it 
is new, the industries did not have the necessary complementary soft- 
ware and human resources, in the form of skilled labor, engineering 
knowhow, and managerial ability and vision, to exploit the advantages 
of the new technology. 
These imply two things for policy development with respect to the 
installation of a more productive technology in the industrial sector: 
CI Access to foreign technology via machinery for products in the 
matured portion of the product cycle, foreign investments, 
joint ventures and the various forms of licensing must con- 
tinue, with the Philippines giving serious consideration to the 
development of an independent technological capability in 
the country; and 
CI The steady shifting of the burden of R&D efforts for commer- 
cial purposes to the private sector. 
Developing an independent capability does not mean reinventing 
the steam engine. It means that we must be capable of discovering new 
things in addition to improving or making foreign technology more 
appropriate to our circumstances, i.e., more compatible with our factor 
proportions. Put another way, while it should not ignore the enormous 
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Table 5-7 
Percentage Distribution of R&D Expenditures by Type of R esearch 
1979-1984 
Type of Research 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Basic research 4.4 4.9 11.6 16.4 14.3 14.5 
Applied research 42.3 41.6 56.5 54.2 58.0 52.6 
Experimental dev't. 39.6 39.8 30.0 27.7 27.5 32.8 
Unspecified 13.7 13.7 1.8 1.7 - - 
Total 
N 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(P million) 563.12 690.41 528.34 634.47 514.59 613.41 
Source: DOST based on NSTA Surveys on R&D Expenditures and Manpower,1979M,1981-82,198 W 
possibilities of acquiring technological capability through foreign sources, 
the government must also continue to give high priority to the devel- 
opment of indigenous R&D capability. 
The government should continue to provide the lead in R&D in basic 
and fundamental research but the private sector should take on an increas- 
ing responsibility in applied research and experimental development. After 
all, the private sector is the principal beneficiary from the proprietary gains 
that accrue from efforts in these fields. If the private sector is not swayed by 
public encouragement to improve its technology, it will certainly be per- 
suaded by the forces of competition in the international market. Liberali- 
zation will thus contribute in making the private sector more appreciative 
of the need for technological modernization. 
Policy Suggestions 
The government's role in technology development. The objectives of 
policy in this area will be to give a clear focus on the role of the 
government in the development and transfer of technology to Philip- 
pine industry. The government should continue to take the leadership 
in basic and fundamental research and intensify efforts at developing an 
independent indigenous capability. It should continue to show interest 
in applied research and experimental development and should intensify 
its efforts to transfer these results to the private sector. 




Total Patents % Granted to 
Year Granted Local Inventors 
1977 1708 41.9 
1978 1639 49.1 
1979 1518 47.1 
1980 1774 50.1 
1981 1547 47.9 
1982 1134 45.1 
1983 1749 25.7 
1984 1478 24.2 
1985 1695 22.9 
1986 1766 24.9 
1987 1780 26.6 
1988 1659 27.8 
1989 1594 24.3 
1990 1645 23.5 
Source: Philippine Statistical Yearbook, (various issues). 
At the same time, the government should give increased attention to 
the modernization of the physical laboratories of the institutions of 
higher learning. Specifically, it should find ways of accelerating the 
installation of cutting edge machinery in the engineering, chemical and 
other physical laboratories of the universities, and the computerization 
of these institutions' facilities and processes. The government may 
extend to the universities the normal investment incentives in order to 
speed up their modernization. 
The government should give increased support to the training and 
education of high level manpower as called for in the programs of the 
Department of Science and Technology. (DOST).11 
Beyond providing these supportive and facilitative measures, the 
government must exert pressure on the private sector to revamp its 
production processes. The most powerful pressure that can be exerted on 
12. DOST (1990), p. 10. 
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Table 5-9 
Percentage Distribution of Capital Goods Imports 
1986-1990 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Total (US$ million) 872 1,220 1,717 2,543 3,269 
% of Total Imports 16.2 17.0 19.7 22.8 25.1 
1. Power generation and 
specialized machinery 43.5 43.0 39.3 41.1 41.4 
2. Office and EDP machines 3.8 3.9 4.3 4.3 4.0 
3. Telecom equipment and 
electronic machines 38.8 37.5 34.7 31.0 30.6 
4. Land transportation 4.2 6.7 9.0 10.8 10.0 
5. Aircraft, ships, boats 2.9 2.7 7.2 7.7 9.5 
6. Professional scientific 
photographic equipment 
and optical goods 6.9 6.2 5.5 5.2 4.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
SourcePhilippine Statistical Yearbook (various issues). 
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the private sector to upgrade its technology will come from liberaliza- 
tion, i.e., the need to be competitive in foreign markets. The govern- 
ment must speed up the liberalization process so that local industries 
will be exposed to international competition and be forced to adopt 
higher productivity technologies in order to survive. 
The role of the private sector. It is of course the private sector that must 
do the actual acquisition and application of improved technology in its 
production processes. The time for such move is now, when the sector 
faces a much wider market arising from the country's participation in 
AFTA. The sector should prepare itself not just in safeguarding its 
dominance in the domestic market but in winning a global clientele. In 
other words, it should develop international competitiveness. 
The best way to acquire international competitiveness is to raise 
productivity, and the most reliable means for achieving higher produc- 
tivity is to use more up-to-date technology. Only through it can the 
private sector take advantage of the opportunities and challenges that 
it now faces. 
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If the speed of technological improvement in industry is partly a 
function of the educational attainment, youth, and imagination of the 
enterprise's management, there is basis for suggesting that the manage- 
ment of Philippine industrial enterprises be overhauled to permit the 
introduction of more visionary and forward-looking leaders in these 
enterprises. Of course, only the private sector itself, on its own initia- 
tive, can carry out this important task. 
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ORGANIZING FOR RESULTS: 
THE PHILIPPINE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
Crietina C. Dave, E&eo R Ponce, 
and Ponciano S. Intal, Jr. 
Introduction 
PHILIPPINE AGRICULTURE PERFORMED POORLY IN THE 1980s. THE AVERAGE 
annual growth rate declined from 4.8 percent in the 1970s to 2.1 
percent, lower than the population growth rate. As a result, export 
surpluses dwindled and agricultural imports rose. Although depressed 
world commodity markets undoubtedly lowered agriculture's growth 
performance, other Asian countries managed to grow faster, and most of 
them at a rate even higher than in the 1970s (Table 6-1). The country's 
poor performance can be largely attributed to the slow growth of crop 
productivity, eroding Philippine competitive advantage (Fig. 6-1). 
Among the traditional commodities, only yields of rice and, to a lesser 
extent, corn grew significantly. As Philippine coconut and sugar yields 
stagnated, Malaysian oil palm and Thai sugar expanded their shares of 
world markets (Fig. 6-2). 
With the closing of the land frontier and continued high population 
growth, agricultural development will have to come from technological 
change and irrigation expansion that can increase productivity and effective 
crop area. Yet government interventions in agriculture over the past four 
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Table 6-1 
Average Annual Growth Rates of Agricultural Gross Value 
Added at Constant Prices for Selected Asian Countries 
1970-1980 1980-1990 
Bangladesh 1.8 2.9 
India 1.1 3.4 
Indonesia 1.3 5.3 
Malaysia 3.8 3.8 
Philippines 4.8 2.1 
Thailand 4.9 2.5 
decades have relied primarily on short-term price and trade regulations to 
lower food prices, raise farmers' income, and achieve food self-sufficiency; 
regulations are easier to implement, have short-term impact, and generate 
resources for the agency concerned. Market regulations, however, have 
often protected consumers at the expense of farmers, raised production costs, 
distorted incentives against commodities where our comparative advantage 
lies, and misallocated government resources from growth-enhancing invest- 
ments to unproductive bureaucratic costs without achieving their stated 
objectives. On the other hand, too few resources have been allocated to the 
more cost-effective, sustainable long-term policy instruments that raise 
agricultural productivity and lower unit cost of production, such as agricul- 
tural research and irrigation, to attain these conflicting objectives. 
This paper proposes a set of policy and institutional reforms to reverse 
the weak performance of agriculture in the 1980s. Our reform proposals 
focus on three aspects: 
O Completing the deregulation of the sector; 
Improving the allocation of public funds across policy 
instruments; and 
Restructuring the agricultural bureaucracy. 
These agricultural reforms will lay the foundation for an efficient incen- 
tive structure and institutional structure of support-service delivery, 
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Our reform proposals are intertwined and self-reinforcing. The further 
deregulation of the sector forces the agricuitural bureaucracy to focus its 
talents and energies on the provision and/or encouragement of 
productivity-enhancing services to agriculture, allows the organizational 
streamlining and institutional restructuring of the agricultural 
bureaucracy, and releases scarce resources for productive investments in 
agriculture. The end result is greater effectiveness of government 
expenditures and an agricultural bureaucracy better organized for "results" 
in the agricultural sector. 
Deregulation 
Many well-meaning government interventions in the agriculture 
sector use up scarce resources with almost no tangible positive impact; 
rather, they impose heavy and unnecessary transactions costs and 
uncertainty on farmers, and distort agricultural production and the 
marketing systems. For example, National Food Authority (NFA) has 
spent billions of pesos over the years in rice purchases without successfully 
stabilizing rice prices or raising farm prices to NFA support prices (Table 
6.2). Similarly, despite NFA's monopoly control of corn imports, the 
average implicit tariff rate on corn imports is below the 50-percent book 
tariff rate (Table 6-3). Had importation of com been open to any 
private trader without NFA control, domestic corn prices would have 
been 50 percent higher than imported com and the government would 
have earned corresponding customs duties rather than spend scarce 
public resources. The import regulations on seeds raises costs of 
production to farmers and prices to consumers, particularly for vegetables. 
Deregulation is an important means of improving the effectiveness of 
government agricultural administration by eliminating or streamlining 
unnecessary, distortionary, and unduly expensive administrative tasks. 
Deregulation can become a means of "people empowerment" and im- 
proving incentives for agricultural production and productivity. 
The Aquino administration started deregulation in agriculture by 
dismantling a number of counterproductive regulations and monopo- 
lies: export taxes on selected agricultural commodities; copra export 
ban; sugar and coconut monopolies, quantitative controls on fertilizer 
imports; and the NFA monopoly on imports of wheat and animal feeds. 
It is high time to complete deregulation by abolishing more counterpro- 
ductive interventions and by modifying regulations that should be 
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Table 6-2 
Comparison of Government Support to f=arm Price 








Support/ Ceiling/ Retail/ Ceilingt 
Farm Price Retail Price Farm Price Support Price 
0.94 0.74 2.04 1.59 
1.09 0.76 2.21 1.53 
0.94 0.81 2.04 1.78 
1.13 1.00 2.15 1.90 
1.22 1.02 2.15 1.81 
1.16 0.91 2.11 1.66 
1.23 - 2.18 - 
Table 6-3 
Trends in Nominal Protection Rate of Rice and Com, 1960-1991 
Rice Com 
1960-64 43 -43 
1965-69 11 3 
1970-74 4 9 
1975-79 -13 22 
1980-84 -13 11 
1985-89 16 48 
1990-91 16 - 
Note: Nominal protection rate is the % alfference between domestic and border price. 
Domestic price is wholesale price of rice and com (yellow). Border price is CIF import 
unit value for com and Thai 35% brokens plus 15% to arrive at landed cost for rice. 
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retained. Deregulation need not be undertaken as part of the bargaining 
process, and industry over the pace of trade liberalization; rather, it 
should be undertaken because it improves the efficiency and efficacy of 
government support to agriculture. 
To complete deregulation of agriculture, the following should be 
abolished: 
O NFA monopoly on international trade and domestic market 
operations in rice and corn; 
O Hectarage limits on banana production; 
Q Import bans on garlic, onions, potatoes, cabbage, coffee, and 
seeds; 
Q Import controls on sugar; 
Q Quantitative import controls on cattle feeder stock; 
O Export bans on buntal and ramie planting materials; 
C1 Slaughter ban on carabaos; 
0 Export restrictions on animal and animal products; 
C3 Licensing/registration of rice retail trade and warehousing, 
sugar trade, coconut-industry participants, fiber traders, proc- 
essors, manufacturers, livestock and poultry traders, livestock 
auction markets, feed establishments, fertilizer warehouses. 
The fear that abolishing the NFA trade monopoly and domestic market 
operations in rice and corn will remove government subsidies to farmers and 
consumers and leave the market vulnerable to price manipulation is un- 
founded. Allowing private imports will increase competition among rice 
traders. Because domestic prices can be influenced indirectly by tariff 
policies, budgetary allocations to NFA simply subsidize inherently ineffi- 
cient government market operations. In other words, subsidies to NFA 
largely benefit the bureaucracy rather than the target beneficiaries. Special 
targeted food-subsidy programs - in the case of calamities, for example - 
can be more economically accomplished by the Department of Social 
Welfare and Development (DSWD). 
High protection of corn means high input costs for the livestock 
industry, resulting in high prices of meat products and an internation- 
ally uncompetitive domestic livestock (and corn) industry. This implies 
that encouraging domestic corn production with high tariff protection 
is not a socially optimal strategy. The best strategy would be to raise farm 
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productivity, allowing higher farm profits, lower com and meat prices, 
and eventual corn and livestock export competitiveness. Yet, the recent 
budget for corn research averaged only P10 to P15 million, much lower 
than the P18 to P20 million research budget for tobacco which contrib- 
utes less value added to the economy than corn. 
In the long run, quantitative import controls must be replaced by 
tariffs equivalent to 20 to 30 percent. However, tax-free importations of 
agricultural commodities - such as possible for cooperatives that have 
tax-free privileges for importing raw materials and capital equipment - 
must not be allowed. In selected cases, these tariffs may initially be 
higher (40 to 50 percent) during a two- to three-year adjustment period. 
Higher tariffs, as with import bans, will only promote inefficient pro- 
duction. It should be emphasized that import controls or high tariffs on 
agricultural commodities do not generally help the poor, particularly in 
the case of the sugar sector, which is dominated by large landholdings 
and has historically benefited from the United States premium-sugar 
market. The poor are the landless, including the sugar workers, who 
have to pay for the policy-induced higher prices. 
For rice and other commodities that have widely fluctuating world 
prices, a variable tariff scheme may be adopted to protect the domestic 
market from secular world-price instabilities. Because the world market 
is less subject to seasonal price variation, international trading by the 
private sector, in addition to private storage, will help stabilize domestic 
supply and price seasonally, minimizing seasonal domestic price fluctua- 
tions in a more cost-effective manner than direct government market- 
ing operations. Varying tariffs seasonally is unnecessary and distortionary 
for products that are not highly perishable (e.g., corn). Administra- 
tively, a variable tariff scheme can be implemented by setting a reason- 
able tariff range per commodity (agreed upon with Congress) and a set 
of clear criteria and rules allowing automatic tariff adjustments within 
the tariff range. 
Hectarage limits, export restrictions, and slaughter bans on carabaos 
are clearly counter to the objective of higher agricultural growth. On 
the other hand, special licensing/registration requirements for certain 
agricultural products/inputs do raise cost of production and promote 
graft and corruption. In most cases, these requirements were instituted 
to collect information that could be obtained in a more cost- effective 
manner. If these were required to strengthen controls, revoking ordinary 
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business permits rather than special licences for violations of trade 
regulations would have been a more severe penalty. 
A number of regulatory functions that raise overall efficiency of the 
sector, extract monopoly rents for public gain, and protect human health 
and the environment should be continued with some modifications in 
procedures. 
CI Shares in export premium markets in sugar (US), fresh coconuts 
(Taiwan), and coffee, as well as permits to establish and operate 
fishponds, fishpens, and commercial fishing vessels, must be dis- 
tributed either through open bidding or by imposing fees that 
reflect their true long-term scarcity value. This is based on the 
principle that benefits from natural resources and external policies 
must be shared with the general public. Although fishing permits 
will have to be issued by the local government, the central 
government must continue to coordinate the setting of fees or 
bidding procedures to ensure correct and consistent pricing. Pro- 
ceeds should then be shared between local and central govem- 
ment to motivate local governments to manage their natural 
resources efficiently and share the benefits of abundant natural 
resources with the rest of the population. 
O Certification for quality standards of seeds, fiber, tobacco, 
feeds, coconuts, fertilizers, and others, is a public service that 
should continue to be provided for a fee that covers variable 
cost, but availed of on a voluntary basis. 
0 Export restrictions on endangered species or raw materials on 
which the country has some degree of monopoly control in the 
world market should be maintained. 
0 Quarantine service, meat inspection, pesticide regulations and 
monitoring, which have health, safety, and environmental 
benefits, must be strengthened. 
Strengthening Support Services 
Although the public sector should largely leave domestic and inter- 
national marketing of agricultural commodities to the private sector, 
the government should strengthen its support services. Support services 
are aimed at increasing productivity (agricultural research, extension, 
irrigation), enhancing market efficiency (market-promotion policy and 
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development, agricultural statistics), and efficient, sustainable manage- 
ment of natural resources and the environment (proper pricing and 
other regulations). 
Most support services cannot be devolved to the private sector be- 
cause of their public-good nature, pervasive externalities, and large 
investments. For example, the private sector will underinvest in the 
development of agricultural technologies; it will invest only in tech- 
nologies that can be embodied in purchased inputs and/or where own- 
ership of the new technology can be effectively protected by patents, 
such as hybrid seeds, farm machineries, pesticides, and fertilizers. It will 
not invest in a wide range of biological technologies - high-yielding 
cultivars, improved farm management, integrated pest management - 
where their use cannot be effectively limited to those who pay for them. 
Moreover, agricultural technologies are highly location-specific; rela- 
tively little can be directly borrowed from abroad without some measure 
of testing and adaptation. 
The public sector will also have to play a major role in irrigation 
investments because of their large size, long gestation period, and 
complementarities with power and road infrastructure. Forestry and 
fishery resources, which have pervasive externalities, must likewise be 
publicly managed to ensure long-term sustainability of their production 
and minimize negative intertemporal and interregional effects on agri- 
cultural productivity. 
Strengthening agricultural support services will require raising budg- 
etary support for agriculture, improving budgetary allocation within 
agriculture, and restructuring the agricultural bureaucracy. 
Raising and Improving Budgetary Allocation 
The agricultural sector bore the brunt of the contractionary policies in 
the early 1980s. Relative to gross value-added in agriculture and to total 
government expenditures, public expenditures for agriculture in the mid, 
1980s were only about equal to 1955 levels (Fig. 6-3). While expenditures 
for agriculture recovered by the late 1980s, the Philippines continued to 
have the lowest ratio of public expenditure for agriculture to total public 
expenditures and gross domestic product among ASEAN countries (David 
1991). 
It should also be noted that the increases in public expenditures in the 
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support, and other support services rather than to growth-enhancing invest- 
ments such as agricultural research and irrigation (Fig. 6-4). Although most 
of the agrarian-reform expenditures were for support services such as exten- 
sion, the linkage to land reform rather than to technological opportunities 
reduced cost-effectiveness of such expenditures. 
In the 1960s, the country's ratio of expenditure for agricultural 
research to gross value-added in agriculture was about average among 
developing countries; it is now the lowest among major Asian countries 
(Fig. 6-5). The relatively weak support to agricultural research explains 
the decline in the competitive advantage of Philippine agriculture, 
particularly for traditional crops. The generally high estimated rates of 
returns of agricultural research reported worldwide and in the Philip- 
pines clearly indicate that the country is underinvesting in the devel- 
opment of agricultural technologies (Table 6-4). Those rates of returns, 
even if discounted by half, are higher than estimates for infrastructure 
investments, which typically range from 15 to 25 percent. Therefore, 
raising public investments for agricultural research must receive equally 
high priority as public infrastructure. Limiting the regulatory functions 
in agriculture as recommended above will free significant resources for 
growth-enhancing investments, as the NFA budget alone is about three 
to four times the total public support for agricultural research. 
Table 6.4 
Summary of Rates of Returns Estimates of Public Agricultural Research 
Developing Countries (Evenson and David 1992) 
5 studies 0 
8 studies 0 - 20 
28 studies 30 - 50 
37 studies 50+ 
Philippines 
Rice (Flores, Evenson, & Hayami,1978) 75 
Corn (Librero and Perez, 1987) 29 - 48 
Sugar (Librero, Perez, and Emlano,1987) 51 - 71 
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Restructuring the Bureaucracy 
Efficient delivery of agricultural support services has been greatly 
slowed by weaknesses in the institutional structure of governance. 
Whereas the Department of Agriculture (DA) assumes the responsibil- 
ity for accelerating agricultural development, the mandates, authorities, 
and budgets for performing the various agriculture-related activities are 
spread over several different agencies belonging to at least four other 
departments. Further, the key instruments for raising agricultural pro- 
ductivity - technological change and irrigation investments - are 
largely outside the purview of the DA. 
The mandates for technology generation in agriculture, fisheries, and 
natural resources still officially belong to the Philippine Council for 
Agriculture, Forestry and Natural Resources Research Development 
(PCARRD) and Philippine Council for Agriculture and Marine Re- 
search and Development (PCAMRD) under the Department of Science 
and Technology (DOST). Irrigation development belongs to National 
Irrigation Authority (NIA) as an attached agency of the Department of 
Public Works and Highways (DPWH). The Department of Agrarian 
Reform (DAR) allocates nearly 90 percent of agrarian-reform funds and 
manpower, resources for provision of agricultural support services. The 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) also simi- 
larly delivers agricultural support services in the upland areas. 
The problem stems not only from the dispersion of responsibilities 
across several departments but, equally important, from the defects in 
the organizational structure of the DA. Although the Aquino adminis- 
tration brought most of the autonomous agriculture-related agencies - 
NFA, Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), Sugar Regulatory Admin- 
istration (SRA) - under the DA, they have remained largely intact as 
attached agencies. Thus, the organizational structure adopted after 1986 
is a mixture of attached commodity agencies and a set of bureaus, 
councils, and offices concerned with other commodity groups and func- 
tions outside the purview of attached agencies (Charts 6-1 and 6-2). 
Attached commodity agencies may have solely research functions 
(Philrice, Naphire, etc.), regulatory functions (NFA, Fertilizer and 
Pesticides Authority, etc.), or the whole range of research, extension, 
marketing, and regulatory functions (PCA, SRA, Fiber Industry Devel- 
opment Authority, National Tobacco Administration). Bureaus and 
other offices similarly perform a single or variety of functions. For 
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Chart 6-1 
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1. Agricultural Credit Poky Council 
2. Livestock Development Council (LDC) 
3. National Agricultural & Fishery Council (NAFC) 
4. National Pest Inspection Commission 
5. National Nutrition Council (NNC) 
6. Phil. Admin. & Technical Committee for 
SEAFDEC (Pate) 111 
Corporations/Agencies 
1. Fiber Industry DeVt. Authority (FIDA) 
2. Fertilizer & Pesticide Authority (FPA) 
3. National Food Authority (NFA) 
4. National Irrigation Administration (NIA) 
5. National Tobacco Administration (NTA) 
6. Philippine Cocont Authority (PCA) 
7. Philippine Cotton Corporation (PCC) 
8. Philippine Dairy Corporation (PDC) 
9. Phil.Fisheries Development Authority (PFDA) 
10. Philippine Rice Research Institute (PRRI) 
11.Ouedan Guarantee Fund Board (OGFB) 
12. Regional Coop. twit. Assistance Off. (RCDAO) 
13. Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) 
14. Sacovia Development Authority (SDA) 2/ 
Legal Bases 
E.O. 116 dated 1-30-87 per 
*As/approvsd Supplemental Pattern dated 13 April 1989 
1/ & 21 - Based on 1987-1989 DA Appropriations 
**As per S.O.904 S. '89 
3/ E.O. Muting A.O. of 1987 dated 7-25.87 
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Chart 6-2 
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regional operations, the attached agencies are separate and independent 
of the integrated operations of the regional offices of the DA. As a 
result, there is considerable overlapping of functions and activities, 
particularly in relation to extension. On the other hand, the essential 
interactions among the various support services throughout the whole 
process, from planning to delivery, such as between research and exten- 
sion, is largely missing. 
The commodity-based structure of the DA not only exacerbates the 
fragmentation of the bureaucracy and the overlapping of functions, it 
also makes the department prone to greater instability and inflexibility. 
Historically, the DA has been divided among more and more specific 
commodities, based mainly on political-economy factors rather than 
consistent, sound, and logical criteria. Why, for example, is there a 
commodity agency for fiber or cotton but not for corn? In the 1970s, 
several DA agencies became autonomous, severely weakening controls 
and accountability in their bureaucracies and constraining coordina- 
tion of research and extension within the DA. 
The commodity-based structure favors regulations against growth- 
enhancing activities - research, extension, irrigation - which have 
longer-term pay-off. Regulations are easy to implement, have short-term 
impacts, generate resources for the agency and rents for the employees 
allocating import/export permits, issuing licenses, and so forth. In con- 
trast, well- documented justifications and a record of performance are 
necessary to raise budgetary resources for productivity-enhancing activi- 
ties. Furthermore, heads of commodity agencies are typically nontech- 
nical persons who may not fully appreciate the potential contributions 
of technological change or the scientific skills and different type of 
management style required for productive research. The multifunc- 
tional commodity-based organizational structure has inadvertently low- 
ered the priority of productivity-enhancing activities. 
Research and Extension 
The weakness of the overall organizational structure for agricultural 
governance has adversely affected the support, efficiency, and effective- 
ness of the research and extension system, fragmenting it and leading to 
the following problems. 
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O Extremely weak linkage between research and extension arising 
from the separation of the mandates between the DOST and DA. 
The designation of the Secretary of Agriculture as Vice- 
Chairman of PCARRD and PCAMRD is not a sufficient 
mechanism of linkage, because the necessary interaction is not 
merely at a policy level, but at a working - scientific and 
grass-roots - level. Effective linkage requires that both research 
and extension be accountable to the same office. I Unbalanced allocations between research and extension, across 
commodity groups, and across agencies. 
While the Philippines has one of the lowest expenditures 
for research relative to gross value-added in agriculture in Asia, 
a Philippine Agricultural Extension Study (PAES) of the DA 
in 1991 indicated that the extension budget and manpower 
resources are among the biggest among developing countries. 
This suggests that the country's budget allocation for techno- 
logical development is biased against research in favor of 
extension. Such imbalance may be explained by the wide- 
spread belief that there are a substantial number of mature 
technologies on the shelf (developed locally or to be borrowed 
abroad) and it is the weak and underfunded extension system 
that is a constraint. Thus, budgets for extension activities 
continue to grow and wasteful duplication of efforts persist. 
The extension forces for sugar, coconut, tobacco, fiber, cotton, 
and other commodities are separately administered by the 
different units of the DA, not to mention the extension force 
of the DENR in the uplands, NIA in irrigated rice, DAR in 
agrarian reform areas, and DOST's efforts to coordinate the 
dissemination of "trichoderma." Yet within a single region, 
even within a single farm, a whole range of crops will be grown 
and intercropped or planted in rotation. This clearly indicates 
that consolidation of efforts could save resources, which is all 
the more imperative to efficiently carry out the decentraliza- 
tion of the delivery of basic support services under the Local 
Government Code. 
The scientific community itself promotes and reinforces the idea of 
having many available new appropriate or mature technologies and a 
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weak extension system, as research performance is evaluated in terms of 
studies completed or new varieties released, rather than rates of technol- 
ogy adoption. In fact, there are too many extension agents but too few 
appropriate technologies to extend. When a new technology is clearly 
profitable, as it is with modern rice varieties or chemical spraying of 
mangoes, it does not take too many resources to have it widely adopted. 
Studies completed and new varieties released do not constitute mature 
technologies unless proven to be adopted. It is only through a strong 
working linkage between research and extension that the pace of tech- 
nology generation and adoption can be greatly accelerated because it 
will bring scientists closer to farmers. 
Within the research system, imbalances in the allocation of research 
funds and manpower resources significantly lower the productivity of 
the research system. Limited research funds are allocated thinly to too 
many commodities. Moreover, as Table 6-5 indicates, the allocation 
across crops is incongruent with their economic importance: more 
resources are allocated to minor crops, and too few on major crops. The 
research-priority ranking of commodities according to degree of 
economic importance generally conforms to measures of rates of return 
to research, as the benefits to research are higher, the greater the value 
of production, while the cost of producing new technologies across 
Table 6-6 
Estimated Research Expenditures and Gross Value Added 
of Agriculture of Selected Crops 
1990 
Research GVA Research/GVA 
(P million) (P million) N 
Rice 50.28 36416 0.14 
Corn 15.01 16469 0.09 
Coconut 54.8° 12515 0.44 
Sugar 39.8' 6962 0.57 
Tobacco 18.0° 2646 0.68 
a/Based on GOP budgets of Philrice, PCA, SRA, and NTA. 
b/Estimated research budget for corn (including extenal grants) in USM, IPB, and Hagan 
Experiment Station. 
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commodities may not differ as widely as gross value added. 
The distribution of public funds and manpower resources between 
the DA and PCARRD/PCAMRD/SCUs is imbalanced, particularly in 
light of distribution of responsibilities in research implementation and 
overall accountability. The establishment of PCAR in 1972 "to estab- 
lish, support, and manage the operations of a national network of 
research centers/programs in agriculture and natural resources" also 
involved the policy decision to shift the major task of technology 
development to the state colleges and universities. While the DANR 
received 17 percent and the SCUs 23 percent of public resources for 
research in the early 1970s, the MAF had 23 percent and SCUs 49 
percent by 1985 (ISNAR 1988). In addition, most of the research 
investments funded by external sources (e.g., USAID and World Bank) 
during this period were made in the university sector. As a result, the 
research capability of the DA declined as reflected in its scientific 
manpower resources relative to the SCUs, which increased significantly 
(Table 6-6). 
The 1990 distribution of public research allocation indicates a higher 
research budget for the DA compared to PCARRD and the SCUs 
(Table 6-7) due mainly to the establishment of the Philippine Rice 
Research Institute (Philrice) and strengthening of the DA's research 
capabilities, as recommended by an ISNAR review mission (1988). 
Allocations of external grants to the SCUs/PCARRD/PCAMRD group, 
Table 6-6 
Number of PhD and MS Holders in the Agencies 
ConductingtCoordinating Agricultural Research 
PhD MS 
1970 1977 1886 1991 1970 1977 1986 1991 
DA 3 4 11 60 51 39 138 313 
SCU's/PCARRD/PCAMRD 143 195 588 292 428 990 
UPLB 252 190 
VISCA 69 124 
CMU 42 108 
UEP 5 5 
Source of data: 1970, 1977 - ISNAR; 1986 - PCARRD; 1991 - specific agencies. 
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Table 6-7 
Distribution of Research Budgets by Agency, 1990 
(in million pesos) 
Department of Agriculture DOST - SCU 
a b 
BAR 7.7 PCARRD 62.9 130.2° 
REG'L OFFICE 85.3 PCAMRD 9.4 9.4 
PHILRICE 50.2 UPLB 143.8 149.11 
PCA 54.8 VISCA 19.9 30.6b 
SRA 39.8 CLSU 6.9 6.9 
BPI 22.9 USM 5.7 10.2b 
NTA 18.0 MMSU 5.0 5.0 
BAI 8.5 CRDI 6.7 6.7 
BFAR 5.7 BSU 4.7 4.7 
BSWM 6.5 ISU 2.2 2.2 
NAPHIRE 5.0 CSU 2.2 2.2 
CSAC 2.0 2.0 
PAC 1.3 1.3 
CMU 1.3 1.3 
Total P 304.4 P 274.0 P 361.8 
a/ Includes only government funds. 
bt Includes government funds and external grantsfor selected institutions. 
Source of data: Bureau of Agricultural Research, Government Appropri ation Act, individual agencies. 
however, remain substantial, possibly still more than the total research 
budget of the DA. 
Despite the dramatic turnaround in the DA's agricultural research re- 
sources, the scientific manpower resources in agriculture are still over- 
whelmingly located in the universities. Assuming that only 30 percent of 
Ph.D. man-years in the SCUs were devoted to agricultural research, this 
would still be equivalent to three or four times that of the DA. 
PCARRD supposedly leads in planning, prioritizing, and coordinat- 
ing the agricultural research program of the country. However, not only 
was the planning process faulty, PCARRD does not have effective 
control over the research budgets of state colleges and universities or 
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DA research units. Although PCARRD's endorsement of agricultural 
research budget request is required for DBM's approval, it has become a 
mere pro forma process as SCUs and DA directly defend their research 
budgets to DBM. PCARRD does not have sufficient clout to argue for 
higher research budgets and its competitive research grant is too small 
to influence research thrusts significantly. The establishment of re- 
gional research consortia to strengthen PCARRD's coordination can- 
not make the research system more efficient because budgetary and 
management control are not unified, there is no economic framework 
in research prioritization, and the weak linkage between research and 
extension is not addressed. Moreover, DOST's move to undertake 
technology-transfer activities introduces further inefficiencies by dupli- 
cating the DA's function and by increasing transaction costs. 
0 The above problems persist because the overall organizational struc- 
ture obscures accountability. The Secretary of Agriculture is 
ultimately responsible for the performance of the sector, yet he 
does not control the key instruments for agricultural produc- 
tivity - agricultural research and irrigation development. The 
research community blames slow technological progress on the 
weakness of the extension system, not realizing that the weak- 
ness stems from the lack of profitable new technologies to 
extend and the consequent focus on delivering subsidized 
inputs and credit. Since neither the DOST nor the SCUs are 
held accountable for agricultural development and are inde- 
pendent of the DA, there is no effective pressure on the 
research system in general to improve its performance through 
more efficient allocation of resources. Even within the DA, 
the multi-functional commodity-based structure and autonomy 
of several major commodity agencies make it extremely diffi- 
cult to effectively manage and monitor performance of the 
research units under its umbrella. 
Reorganizing Agricultural Bureaucracy: A Proposal 
Because the underlying institutional problem is structural, restructur- 
ing the organizational framework for the delivery of agricultural support 
services is necessary to increase efficiency. It is time for change not only 
because there is a new administration, but because the implementation 
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of the Local Government Code makes restructuring imperative. The 
central government must reorganize to efficiently develop the services 
that provincial governments must deliver. 
Principles and Results 
In developing the proposed organizational structure, we followed a 
number of principles. 
0 Limit public involvement to the following: 
O Delivery of basic services that have public-good attributes 
and externalities such as research, extension, and irriga- 
tion; 
O Allocation of fishery resources, and export premium mar- 
kets (US sugar quota, coffee, etc.); 
O Market promotion, development, information collection, 
analysis, and dissemination; 
O Regulations necessary for the protection of human health 
and the environment to ensure long-term sustainability 
of agricultural production; 
O Devolve extension, irrigation management, and certain 
regulations to provincial government; 
O Integrate responsibility of all public functions related to 
agriculture under the DA, except for redistribution of 
land (DAR) and management of forestry and mineral 
resources (DENR); 
O Reorganize a consolidated, but greatly trimmed DA along 
a functional rather than a commodity-based structure. 
Greater overall efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability are ex- 
pected because such a structure will: 
O minimize duplication of functions, 
Q minimize need for outside coordination, 
0 simplify lines of responsibility, authority, and accountability, 
O clarify indices of performance, 
O remove unnecessary and counter productive regulations and 
minimize incentives to create new ones, 
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strengthen linkages among research, extension, irrigation, and 
other productivity-enhancing activities, and 
free resources available for efficient delivery of growth enhanc- 
ing support services. 
Proposed Institutional Structure 
Charts 6-3 to 6-7 present both the "ideal" organizational structure 
and the transitional organizational structure of the DA. The "ideal" 
structure assumes that the legal mandate on the ceilings on the number 
of undersecretaries and assistant secretaries are revised. The transition 
structure takes as given the current stipulation of three each at most for 
undersecretary and assistant secretary positions in the DA. In both 
"ideal" and transition structures, we attempt to hew the organizational 
structure according to functions broadly defined: production support 
services (research and development, irrigation, regional operations) and 
planning, policy, and other support services (planning, policy and 
external affairs, marketing and inspection service). 
The new structure proposes that irrigation, technology generation, 
and technology transfer to the provincial governments be the responsi- 
bility of the DA under the overall leadership of an assistant or even an 
undersecretary. This will involve the transfer of the mandate and the 
corresponding resources for irrigation from DPWH and applied agricul- 
tural research from the DOST to the DA, and the separation of research 
and extension from the marketing and regulatory functions in the 
attached agencies. Such a structure facilitates the crucial linkage among 
production-related support services, especially between research and 
extension, and eases the rationalization of both financial and manpower 
resources of the research system along economic importance of com- 
modities/problem areas. 
The SCUs will remain a major sector in applied agricultural research 
and extension, but the DA shall assume control over government 
appropriations and general direction and priorities for applied agricul- 
ture research and extension activities of SCUs. However, the general 
administration and supervision, including appointments, salaries, and 
business operations, must remain with the SCUs. A council-type of 
structure can manage the applied-research and development system, but 
must be under the DA. The mandate to promote basic research in 
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Chart 6-1 
Research and Development Proposed Organizational Chart 
Assistant Secretary 
for Research & 
Development 
Rice 
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Chart 6-6 
Integrated Agriculture Research Center Proposed Organizational Chart 
IARC Manager - - R & D Consortium 
Assistant Manager 
Scientific Lbrary Services 
Computer Services Administrative Office 
Expt. Station Development 
Services 
Crop Animal Fisheries sa ti Water Socb- 
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Such an organizational structure for agricultural research and exten- 
sion will be similar to that of other countries - such as Indonesia, 
Thailand, Japan, the European Community - where ministries of 
agriculture are directly responsible for and conduct most agricultural 
research. In the US, the land-grant universities are directly responsible 
for research and extension to the state legislature, but the US Depart- 
ment of Agriculture maintains substantial influence through a system of 
counterpart funding and its own administered research programs and 
institutions. The Indian research system is also university-based but 
managed by a semi-autonomous council (ICAR) responsible to the 
Ministry of Agriculture. PCARRD as originally conceived and estab- 
lished was attached to the DANR; it was transfered to DOST only 
because the DANR split into the DA and DNR in 1976. 
The International Service for National Agricultural Research review 
(ISNAR 1988) stated that "it would seem more logical that the univer- 
sities and the colleges of agriculture should be moving more and more 
into areas of strategic research, while a large part of applied research for 
technology generation would become the responsibility of the DA 
research service and commodity institutes." Given the concentration of 
scientific manpower in the SCUs at present, a major part of the applied 
agricultural research will have to be performed by SCUs in the short and 
medium term, but the general direction and priorities should be under 
the overall control of the DA. 
Interactions between basic and applied agricultural research can be 
fostered by professional organizations with financial support both from 
DA and DOST. On the other hand, the DA not only will have greater 
clout in raising public expenditures for agriculture, but will be able to 
reallocate existing resources in favor of agricultural research over exten- 
sion and other market and regulatory functions. Overall, therefore, such 
a restructuring will be expected not only to raise efficiency and effec- 
tiveness of the research and extension system through better 
prioritization, stronger linkage of research and extension, and greater 
accountability, but also to raise the public-expenditure budgets for 
agricultural research. 
In the proposed organizational structure, there will be greater synergy in 
the functions and activities of planning, policy, and other support services. 
Bringing both market development and regulatory functions under one 
assistant secretary will encourage more enlightened and market-friendly 
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regulations. Similarly, putting together planning, policy, and external affairs 
functions under one assistant secretary will strengthen the DA's public- 
advocacy functions and strategic planning. The DA will also step up the 
collection and analysis of relevant agricultural statistics in the regions, 
thereby supporting the regional operations group. 
Concluding Remarks 
The proposed policy and institutional reforms are bold and far- 
reaching. The details of restructuring the agricultural bureaucracy will 
have to be worked out, modifications made, and other issues, such as 
incentive structure, considered. New legislations must abolish many of 
the regulatory functions, recast semi-autonomous agencies, and redis- 
tribute functions and resources among departments. However, we are 
convinced of the validity of the underlying principles behind the pro- 
posed reforms. 
The previous administration took the first step toward organizational 
reform by bringing many agriculture-related agencies - NFA, PCA, 
etc. - under the DA. DPWH recently agreed to shift NIA to the DA. 
Steps have been taken to remove the autonomy of certain government 
agencies - such as the PCA - to allow the DA's reorganization along 
functional rather than commodity lines. Nevertheless, there will be 
great resistance to completing the process of restructuring because of the 
following: 
Q Political power of autonomous agencies such as PCA will be 
reduced; 
Independence of PCARRD and SCUs with respect to agricul- 
tural research and extension will be diminished; 
Budgets and manpower resources for regulatory functions will 
be trimmed; and 
Q Rent-seeking will be greatly minimized. 
The proposed changes, however, will not need additional resources 
for the sector. Indeed, the short-run savings can pay for the early 
retirement of redundant employees; long-run savings will meet the 
increased need for agricultural research and infrastructure. What is 
required is a strong political will and an active information campaign to 
muster the political support for the changes. 
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POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE PHILIPPINES 
Aurora Sancbez and Beta P. Batagot 
Introduction 
THE ECONOMIC GROWTH THE PHILIPPINES EXPERIENCED IN OVER TWO DECADES 
from 1971 to 1990 has been modest; but its toll on the environment has 
been heavy. Pollution in the Philippines is serious and widespread, the 
severity of which is expected to increase as the country accelerates its 
industrialization pace and takes its place among the newly industrialized 
countries (N1Cs) by 2000. 
This paper examines Philippine environmental policy relating to 
pollution and its control. 
Pollution Control 
According to thermodynamics, matter is neither created nor de- 
stroyed but merely transformed from one form to another. In production 
and consumption processes, resources are used up and returned to the 
environment in the form of waste from which pollution originates. 
Pollution, therefore, forms part and parcel of economic activity; it may 
be minimized by removing, reducing, and reusing wastes. 
A zero pollution scenario is unthinkable as society produces and 
consumes; society must therefore live with some pollution. What is then 
the acceptable level of pollution? Theoretically, the efficient level of 
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pollution is determined by balancing abatement and pollution cost. 
Abatement costs involve : 
O Costs pollutive firms incur in having to cut output, alter 
technology, change location, or install pollution abatement 
devices to minimize pollution; and 
Q The administrative costs for monitoring pollution levels and 
enforcing pollution control laws. Pollution costs, meanwhile, 
refer to the costs pollutive firms inflict on others by not 
abating pollution. They include: 
O the damage cost of pollution (direct cost); and 
O avoidance costs (indirect cost) that pollutees shoulder in 
their attempts to escape pollution. 
The efficient level of pollution is Q* in Fig. 1. To the left of Q*, 
greater control and less pollution take place. But the increase in control 
(abatement) cost exceeds the benefit from reducing pollution. This 
makes pollution levels to the left of Q* inefficient. Beyond Q*, less 
control and more pollution occur. But the increase in damage costs is 
greater than the benefit from lowering the control cost so that the total 
cost rises. It is only at Q* where total cost (abatement and pollution 
costs) is minimized. 
Fig. 7-1 






0 Q Quantity of pollution 
emitted (units) 
Efficiency Pollution Level 
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In pollution control, the argument for government intervention is 
strong because pollution acts as an externality whose costs have to be 
shouldered not by the polluter but by persons and firms outside the 
polluting activity. Because pollution cost does not enter into the pollut- 
er's decisionmaking calculus, although pollution control cost does (e.g., 
the installation of pollution control devices is a direct cost to the firm), 
a polluter has the incentive to pollute and ignore pollution control. 
This is because controlling pollution through such means as reducing 
output, altering production processes, or installing pollution abatement 
devices involves cost and places the polluter at a disadvantage to 
competitors that do not undertake such controls. Thus, government 
intervention is necessary to induce polluters to control pollution. 
A wide range of policy instruments can be used to control pollution. 
These instruments range from direct controls that employ regulation 
limiting permissible emissions, to methods that rely on market processes 
and methods that involve direct government expenditures for con- 
structing and operating facilities for environmental protection. 
The Philippines uses direct regulatory controls as the basic instru- 
ments to carry out environmental policy. Over the years, the govern- 
ment has tended to rely on direct controls, coupled with a system of 
monitoring and penalties for noncompliance. Direct regulations have 
the most apparent advantage of the government's complete authority 
over the private sector's compliance to pollution control laws; its effect 
on environmental quality is therefore perceived as more certain. An- 
other factor for government's reliance on direct regulatory controls is its 
familiarity and experience with this policy instrument, since this ap- 
proach is pervasive in most government sectors. 
The more important pollution control regulations are: 
C3 Air and water quality standards that define maximum allow- 
able limits of emissions from industrial activities; and 
O The environmental impact assessment requirement. 
The following sections examine these government pollution control 
measures. 
Air and Water (,duality Standards 
The National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission established 
the first set of standards in 1967. These standards were adopted from 
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relevant air and water quality laws in the United States. In 1978, the 
standards were revised. The 1978 rules included provisions on noise, heat, 
and odor pollution; it featured more stringent criteria for ambient air and 
water quality. In 1982, effluent standards were promulgated. These were 
based on a comparison with those prevailing in Europe, Japan, and the 
United States as well as on local surveys, research studies, and database 
generated on the nature, extent, and magnitude of pollution. 
Despite factoring in the results of local studies into the 1978 and 
1982 revised standards, difficulties arose on attaining permissible limits 
set for some parameters. For instance, the effluent color standard for 
Class C waters was considered too stringent and thus was seldom 
achieved. 
In 1988, the government began to revise the 1978 and 1982 stand- 
ards. Considering the manpower and facilities constraints faced by 
regulatory agencies in conducting their monitoring activities, the 1990 
revisions reduced to four the number of parameters to be monitored for 
purposes of water body classification, as compared with the 26-46 
parameters in the 1978 ambient water quality criteria. For regular 
monitoring of ambient quality, the revisions slashed the number of 
relevant parameters from 50 to 24. The revised standards also included 
a guide on the significant parameters to be monitored in 21 industries. 
In the mining industry, for example, three parameters were considered 
significant. suspended solids, heavy metals, and arsenic. 
The effluent standards on biological oxygen demand (BOD) also 
became more flexible and less stringent compared with the 1982 stand- 
ards. In the 1990 rules, existing industries would comply with less 
stringent interim standards not afforded to new industries for a period 
not to exceed ten years. BOD effluent standards for very strong wastes 
were relaxed for a period of four years to allow firms enough time to 
implement plans for meeting long-term standards. 
But the 1978 and 1982 standards for toxic substances such as heavy 
metals and intractable chemicals were retained as the risks to human 
health and life associated with these substances and the uncertainties 
surrounding their effects on the environment do not warrant the adop- 
tion of less stringent standards. 
Implementing air and water quality standards. 
How effectively are these air and water quality standards enforced to 
abate pollution can be assessed through the environmental quality goals 
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achieved and the efficiency of attaining these goals. But because of 
insufficient data to undertake a cost-benefit or cost-effective evaluation 
of enforcing standards, only the first criterion will be examined in this 
paper. 
For water pollution control, the environmental quality goal is ex- 
pressed in Section 68 of the 1978 Rules and Regulations on Water 
Quality Criteria which states, "the quality of Philippine waters shall be 
maintained in a safe and satisfactory manner according to their best 
usages." Thus, a body of water is classified according to its current best 
beneficial use that is expected to last for the next 10 to 20 years. 
How does the water pollution control regulatory effort fare based on 
this goal? The monitoring data for parameters of dissolved oxygen (DO) 
and BOD in the 1980s show that the quality of the rivers in Metro 
Manila never improved. The stated goal of maintaining these waters for 
fishery purposes and propagation of aquatic life was never attained. 
As to air quality, the avowed objectives are expressed in the National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards for a number of pollutants, including 
suspended particulate matter and sulfur dioxide. Due to the spotty data 
available on air quality, only conclusions on suspended particulate 
matters (TSP) can be made. The magnitude of the reported readings on 
the concentration of TSP indicates that this has been increasing over 
the years, with high values 2 to 4 times the standard being recorded 
during the period 1987-1990. 
Based on the above, the pollution control program pursued by the 
government fell quite short of its stated goals. However, it is instructive 
to look at the resources allocated for pollution control before any 
conclusion can be made regarding the gap between policy objectives and 
implementation. From 1980-1988, the budgetary allocation for envi- 
ronmental agencies reached a maximum of 0.005 percent of GNP. The 
environmental budget share in the national budget is 0.03-0.04 percent 
from 1979 to 1988. An unusual increase in 1989 occurred due to 
allocations for equipment in the regional offices of the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), but this share again 
dropped to 0.045 percent in 1990. 
Despite modest increases in resources allocated in 1989-1990, the 
allocations did not keep pace with the demands and expectations placed 
on environmental agencies. The presence of many pending environ- 
mental legislation may appear to provide support for achieving anti- 
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pollution and environmental goals, but environmental protection budg- 
ets are obviously more accurate indicators of true legislative and execu- 
tive branch intents. Budget data suggest that despite major policy 
pronouncements, environmental protection still occupies a low priority. 
In contrast, other countries exhibited stronger commitment to im- 
proving their environment, as evidenced by their level of expenditures 
made for pollution abatement, as percentages of their gross national 
product (GNP). The figures for the United States (US) and Japan in 
1971-1975 indicate that the US spent from 0.81 to 1.0 percent of GNP 
while Japan allocated 1.3-2.0 percent of GNP (Asian Development 
Bank 1990). For Asian countries, Table 7-1 shows a comparison of 
environmental expenditures in the early 1980s. The Philippines regis- 
tered the lowest allocation to environment relative to its GNP. 
Another factor in studying the gap between air and water quality 
goals and implementation is the nature of environmental problems in 
the Philippines. On water pollution, the country's very high population 
density, especially in urban areas such as Metro Manila, coupled with 
lack of sewerage facilities, makes pollution control regulation more 
complicated. About 70 percent of water pollution, in terms of degrada- 
ble organics, comes from domestic sewage. Hence, a 100 percent com- 
fable 7-1 
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pliance of industries to effluent standards. will not necessarily attain the 
water quality objectives. 
In reviewing the implementation of standards, the paper identified 
several areas of concern that need to be addressed in order to correct the 
weaknesses of the present regulatory regime for the environment and 
strengthen the overall efforts in environmental protection: 
O The effectiveness of the existing regulatory framework should 
be assessed, using benefit-cost analysis. This will determine 
whether the benefits derived from direct controls are greater 
than the costs incurred in administering such regulations. 
Q Economic approaches to regulation should be considered such 
as effluent charges which, price the use of common property 
environmental resources. Effluent charges can serve as an 
alternative to the present regulatory framework. However, 
specific and detailed studies should first determine how eco- 
nomic approaches can solve environmental problems more 
efficiently or at a lower cost than regulatory alternatives. 
0 Granting economic incentives such as tax incentives and 
subsidies is another strategy for environmental management. 
To be effective, tax incentives should be set at a level that can 
produce the desired action. 
Subsidies may be granted to local government uaiits, espe- 
cially in rapidly urbanizing areas, for constructing municipal 
waste treatment plants. If these plants serve industrial users, 
the grants would provide indirect subsidy for industrial waste 
treatment. 
0 To support the continuing process of developing appropriate 
environmental quality standards, research activities should be 
undertaken on the following areas: 
O Kind and extent of all identifiable effects of pollutants on 
health and welfare; 
O Concentration and dispersal of pollutants through biologi- 
cal, physical, and chemical processes; 
O Effects of pollutants on biological community diversity; and 
O Assimilative capacities of major bodies of water in the 
country. 
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0 The lack of a competent monitoring system in the environ- 
mental regulatory set-up acts as a major drawback in imple- 
menting pollution control regulations. This area needs 
strengthening via the acquisition of adequate facilities and 
skilled manpower in environmental agencies. 
Environmental Impact Assessment 
The Philippine EIA system. By introducing the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) as a tool in environmental management, the govern- 
ment hopes to address the emerging environmental problems other than 
pollution control. In the mid-1970s, experts recognized the need for a 
more comprehensive approach that will take into account the interre- 
lationships among population, economic growth, and the environment. 
Consequently, the EIA was introduced as a major reform in environ- 
mental protection in 1977. 
As currently implemented, the EIA system operates within a network 
of interagency and interdisciplinary groupings of experts. The main 
implementors of the EIA requirement consist of the Environmental 
Management Bureau (EMB), the DENR regional offices, EIA Review 
Committee, other government agencies referred to as lead agencies, and 
a Committee of Environmental Officers. 
The EIA Review Committee is composed of consultants of various 
expertise, who come from the academe and from other government 
agencies. This Committee evaluates and reviews the EIA Report, rec- 
ommends the issuance or non-issuance of an Environmental Clearance 
Certificate (ECC), and renders technical and professional advice on 
matters pertaining to the EIA. 
Lead agencies refer to government agencies that have the expertise 
on or direct responsibility for particular types of projects or undertak- 
ings. Lead agencies assist project proponents in determining whether a 
project is environmentally critical or will be located within an environ- 
mentally critical area. They also assist project proponents in complying 
with the requirements of the EIA system. Their assistance, however, is 
limited to explaining the EIA system and environmental assessment 
methodologies for preparing an EIA, data collection, and suggestions as 
to where a project proponent may get additional information or assist- 
ance. But lead agencies do not usually provide manpower for data 
collection nor prepare an EIA for a project proponent. 
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The Environmental Officers' Committee was created to implement 
the EIA system. It consists of representatives from government agencies 
whose mandates deal with environmental protection and management. 
This Committee has three primary responsibilities: 
0 To comment on proposed policies, programs, and projects 
concerning the EIA system; 
Q To serve as the central working committee to implement the 
EIA system; and 
O To provide technical assistance to member agencies on EIA 
related matters. Due to lack of budgetary support, however, 
this Committee has not been fully functioning. 
Proclamation No. 2146, promulgated in 1281, defines projects subject to 
the EIA requirement. These are the environmentally critical projects and 
projects located within environmentally- critical areas. Three major catego- 
ries of environmentally- critical projects are in place: heavy industries, 
resource extractive industries, and infrastructure projects. Twelve site cat- 
egories are considered as environmentally critical areas. 
An important component of the EIA review process is the conduct 
of public hearings where all interested parties are invited to express their 
views on a proposed project. Results of public hearings become integral 
components to the decisionmaking process in the eventual issuance or 
denial of an ECC. 
Evaluating the EIA implementation. The EIA was developed primarily as 
a tool in decisionmaking to factor in environmental considerations in 
decisions concerning developmental activities. The EIA functions at two 
levels: the project level and the program or regional level. To be an effective 
decisionmaking tool at the project level, the EIA should be undertaken at 
the feasibility stage of the project cycle. At the program or regional level, 
the EIA would entail defining environmental objectives or constraints prior 
to identifying specific programs to pursue. In the Philippines, the EIA is 
usually implemented at the project level. Recent developments in environ- 
mental policy formulation, however, indicate a move toward a program- 
matic or regional approach to the EIA. 
Legal provisions establishing the EIA (Presidential Decree or PD 
1586) clearly aim at implementing the EIA at the project level. From 
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1983 to 1991, a total of 2293 projects applied for clearance from the 
EMB. Of this number, only about 8.3 percent were required to under- 
take an EIA. 
Prior to 1986, a large proportion of projects complying with the EIA 
requirement came from the mining sector. More than 75 percent of 
project documents submitted came from this sector. This is due to the 
permit system in the mines regulatory agency which requires an EIA 
before giving a mining permit. From 1987 to the present, however, 
other sectors are increasingly submitting documents for an EIA clear- 
ance. In 1990, for instance, the mining sector accounted for only 16 
percent of documents submitted for evaluation; in 1991, it accounted 
for 22 percent of submitted projects. The other sectors such as industries 
and infrastructure accounted for the rest. 
This improvement in compliance by the other economic sectors can 
be attributed to the various efforts of the DENR to streamline EIA's 
enforcement. 
Under a new administration in 1986 with its concern for a more 
effective bureaucracy, the EMB enforced the EIA with more vigor. 
Closer coordination was forged with the National Economic Develop- 
ment Authority (NEDA) to ensure that developmental projects pro- 
grammed for implementation will undertake the EIA. Non-governmen- 
tal organizations (NGOs) and people's groups were also mobilized to 
monitor compliance. 
Despite these efforts, however, ETA's implementation still suffers from 
lack of financial and manpower resources. EMB's technical staff of 11 in the 
EIA section cannot cope with the increasing volume of PD/EIA submis- 
sions. To remedy this setback, DENR tries to strengthen the EIA system 
through a gradual process of decentralizing implementation from the EMB 
to its regional offices. It also conducts the corresponding training for its 
environmental personnel at the regional offices. 
Persistent misconceptions of the EIA function. In spite of the greater 
awareness on the EIA system, many still regard the system as a regulatory 
requirement. Its utility as a management tool has been completely 
overlooked. In most cases, the EIA is done as an add-on feature when 
the construction phase is about to start. This has often caused delays and 
added costs to the project. 
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The use of the EIA to resolve conflict has achieved some success. 
Public hearings conducted for an EIA forged some agreements and 
working relationships among conflicting groups involved in implement- 
ing certain mining, energy, and industrial projects. 
A shift is also taking place toward applying environmental assess- 
ment at the broader levels of sectoral or regional planning. As an 
example, environmental considerations will now be included in prepar- 
ing energy and transport sector plans. 
All the above underscore the fact that the full potential of the EIA 
as a means for balanced decisionmaking, has not been fully realized due 
to the following: first, misconception on the EIA by both the private 
and some government sectors; and second, inadequate mechanism for 
implementation. Project proponents see the EIA merely as another 
bureaucratic regulation, resulting in "reactive" EIAs. Under this percep- 
tion, a project is usually taken through all its engineering design and 
construction stages with no regard for the environmental impact that 
the project may generate. It is only at the project's operational stage that 
an environmental study is hastily conducted to comply with EIA regu- 
lations. The objective is clearly not to seek optimal choices since the 
relevant choices have already been made. Instead, the objective be- 
comes justifying the project. 
The weak institutional machinery of the EIA, in terms of inadequate 
manpower and financial resources, has also precluded the full use of the 
EIA as an integrated approach toward environmental management. 
Thus, certain changes have to be instituted in the present framework 
of the EIA in order to achieve a more meaningful application to our 
environmental management strategies. First, the present scope of the 
EIA system should be evaluated. In particular, the list of environmen- 
tally critical projects should include certain industries that have a large 
impact on the environment; these industries such as textiles, chemicals, 
and alcohol distilleries, are conspicuously absent in the list. 
Second, area-wide EIAs for certain activities should be conducted 
such as those for mining and quarrying within a river basin or for 
industrial estates and sectoral EIAs for certain government programs 
such as those in the energy and transportation sectors. In the light of 
this development, the existing institutional mechanisms to implement 
the EIA have to be supplemented and modified. For instance, area-wide 
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EIAs can only be undertaken by the relevant government agency and 
not by individual project proponents. 
Third, certain processes currently being pursued to strengthen the EIA 
implementation is taking place, but these need to be reinforced. Foremost 
among this is coordination with other organizations. At the national 
government level, coordination among the various sectors need to be 
strengthened to enhance the intersectoral linkages and interdependency in 
decisionmaking, especially at the policyrnaking level. This type of coordi- 
nation is particularly crucial between the environmental sector (DENR), 
on the one hand, and development and economic sectors, on the other 
(e.g., NEDA, the Department of Trade and Industry, and the Department 
of Public Works and Highways). 
Fourth, the coordination involved in the permit systems in various 
agencies also needs improvement. The EIA requirement should be inte- 
grated with mining permits, industrial permits, business permits, and other 
related permits, as well as with the location clearance of the land use agency. 
Fifth, stronger linkages should also be forged among the DENR, local 
government units, and NGOs in implementing an EIA. A major objec- 
tive of this linkage is to ensure that environmental considerations are 
incorporated in preparing regional development plans and land-use 
plans, as well as to prioritize projects for implementation at the regional, 
provincial, or municipal levels. 
Sixth, information dissemination on the EIA should be a continuing 
activity aimed at various target audiences such as policymakers, NGOs, 
media, and the private sector. 
Part of institutional strengthening is the need to develop an effective 
database and information system and to upgrade the technical expertise 
of the EIA personnel at the EMB and the regions through training. 
Taxes, Subsidies, and Effluent Charges 
One broad range of instruments that the government has failed to 
consider in environmental policy are the fiscal measures or, as they are 
more popularly referred to in the literature, economic instruments such 
as taxes, subsidies, and effluent charges designed to influence the 
behavior of individuals and firms toward improving environmental 
quality. The use of fiscal measures or economic instruments comes from 
the basic premise that our scarce and valuable environmental resources 
should be used at an appropriate price. Individuals and firms usually 
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assume a zero price tag on these resources because these can be used by 
anyone without payment for the privilege. For example, breathing clean 
air or disposing wastewater into an estero bears no charges. 
The use of economic instruments will change relative prices with the 
end of internalizing the externalities underlying environmental prob- 
lems. It will also change the behavior of individuals and firms, making 
them account fully the social costs and benefits of their activities. 
Among the various kinds of taxation, effluent charges have the most 
relevant application to environmental quality. A tax per unit of effluent 
discharge gives a positive price to the use of air and water as waste 
repositories, and thereby limits the unrestricted use of such "free" re- 
sources. Individuals and firms are then forced to regard the effluent 
charge as another cost of doing business. Profit-maximizing behavior on 
their part will compel them to look for least-cost solutions. This may 
entail paying the charge, installing pollution-control devices, reducing 
output, or a combination of these actions. 
An alternative to effluent charges is the use of subsidies per unit 
reduction in emissions. In principle, both instruments would also result 
in inducing firms and individuals to account fully the costs and benefits 
of their activities. However, differences exist in the distribution of costs 
and in the allocation of property rights between government and the 
private sector over the use of environmental resources. In a subsidy 
taxpayers bear the costs while in the case of charges, firms and individu- 
als shoulder the costs. In a subsidy scenario, property rights belong to the 
private sector. 
Undoubtedly, both economic instruments and direct regulatory con- 
trols have their advantages and disadvantages. The choice of the appro- 
priate policy instrument need not be a selection of one instrument over 
the other. It could be a combination of both. What needs to be 
answered is which policy instrument or mix of instruments stands as the 
most effective in improving environmental quality. 
Pollution Control in Mining 
The mining industry occupies an important place in the economy as 
a foreign exchange earner and employment generator. 
Although mineral product exports registered declining shares from 16 
percent in 1971-1980 to seven percent in 1981-1990, this export cat- 
egory continues to be significant, accounting for US$15 million or 1.2 
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percent of total exports in 1991. Among the mineral products, copper 
and gold account for the country's largest mineral exports. Because of 
copper, the Philippines ranks among the top 10 copper producing 
countries. As a gold producer, the country exported gold representing 
over one percent of total exports in 1991. 
In rural areas, mining operations represent one of the major eco- 
nomic activities in terms of earnings and employment. In 1990, a total 
of 54,022 persons were reported to be employed in mining. The figure 
excludes the 150,000 to 300,000 engaged in small-scale mining. 
Despite their economic significance, mining activities have contrib- 
uted to various environmental problems. One of the more serious 
threats to the environment comes from the generation of mine wastes 
and the disposal of tailings. Mine wastes and tailings from the Baguio 
mining district have contributed significantly to the siltation of irriga- 
tion canals and paddy fields in the northern provinces of Ilocos Sur, La 
Union, and Pangasinan. The catastrophic dam failures in Benguet and 
Negros Occidental, due to mine tailings, rendered thousands of square 
meters of land area unproductive while sediments destroyed various 
agricultural crops. The traditional small-scale miners of Northern Phil- 
ippines who extract gold-bearing ore from hillsides, mountain slopes, 
and riverbeds also contribute to the siltation problem by dumping 
"mullock" or mine wastes directly into streams or in areas adjacent to 
natural water systems (EMB 1991). 
. 
Mercury pollution from small-scale gold mining poses the most, en- 
vironmentally lethal problem associated with the mining industry. 
Small-scale gold miners make use of mercury to combine with gold to 
produce the amalgam. The tailings and effluents containing mercury 
from amalgamation during panning and milling activities are dumped in 
areas adjacent to rivers, thereby endangering the natural water systems. 
Monitoring of water bodies in affected areas reveal high concentrations 
of mercury of up to 62 parts per million in sediments and 0.0204 parts 
per million in water; these are way above the 0.002 parts per million 
standard set by the World Health Organization (WHO) as cited in EMB 
1991. Ambient air quality in Davao areas where "goldrush" small-scale 
mining proliferates is reported to exceed the permissible levels for 
mercury set by WHO. 
The mining industry is thus one activity that Philippine society 
benefits from and also suffers from. To control the environmental 
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damage wrought by mining activities, the government responded with 
a combination of regulations and imposed fees. The following section 
looks closely at the latter approach. 
Evaluation of Mine Wastes and Tailings Fee 
PD 1251, enacted in 1977, imposes a fee on the mine wastes and 
tailings generated by operating mining companies. The fees collected 
are to compensate affected parties for damages caused by the polluting 
activity on their land, crops, aquatic resources, and infrastructure. How 
efficient are these fees? 
While PD 1251 is primarily a revenue-generating measure, its poten- 
tial as a pollution-abating measure cannot be denied. The environmen- 
tal costs associated with mining activities are external costs that, in the 
absence of charges or fees, do not enter the mining firm's decision 
calculus. Because environmental resources (clean air, clean water, etc.) 
are regarded as "free goods," a cost-minimizing mining firm has every 
incentive to use up as much of the resource than may be socially 
warranted. The imposition of fees or charges internalizes the pollution 
cost of mining operations and, in so doing, leads polluters to lessen their 
polluting activities. 
Charges or fees become efficient if they induce firms to cut back 
pollution to the socially efficient level in the least costly way. They lead 
to efficient solutions if polluters pay fees according to the damage their 
activities inflict on pollutees. Since greater damage entails higher input 
of environmental resources in production, the greater the fees should be. 
This is the "polluter pays" principle. PD 1251 is to be assessed on how 
closely it adheres to this principle. 
PD 1251. The implementing rules and regulations of PD 1251 are 
contained in Ministry Order (MO) No. 1, Series of 1979. These imple- 
menting rules and regulations were revised by Department Administra- 
tive Order (DAO) No.85, Series of 1990. 
The mine wastes and tailings fees imposed under MO No.1 and DAO 
No.85 as well as those under HB 9185 are shown in Table 7-2. 
The discharge of mine wastes and tailings into the environment 
causes pollution. The amount of damage caused by pollution depends on 
such factors as the amount of discharge, the toxicity of the substance 
discharged, the disposal scheme used, the assimilative capacity of the 
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Table 7-2 
Mine Waste and Tailings Fee Under Ministry Order No.1, 
Department Administrative Order No.85 and House Bill No. 9185 
(P/metric ton) 
1. Metallic Mines 
A. Mine Waste 
B. Mine Tailings 
1) Those utilizing duly 
approved tailings 
disposaVimpoundment 




3) Those discharging 
to the sea by 
pipelines, launders 
and/or tunnels 
II. Non-metallic Mines 
A. With settling ponds 
B. Without settling ponds 
Ministry Dept. Adm. House Bill 
Order No.1 No. 85 No. 9185 
.05 .05 
.05-.110 .10 10.00 




receiving environment, and the population density of the surrounding 
area. 
MO No.1 makes a distinction between the various tailings disposal 
schemes. Three modes of disposing mine tailings are practiced: land, 
riverine, and marine disposal schemes. In the Philippines, land disposal 
using tailings impoundment has become the most common and feasible 
means of tailings disposal for most mining operations. Riverine disposal, 
practiced intensively in the past, is no longer permitted; but in some 
areas, riverine disposal still occurs although on a small scale. Marine 
disposal is feasible for mines located near the coast. 
Under MO No.l, higher fees are levied on mining companies that 
dispose off their mine tailings into dams or impoundments meeting 
approved standards; lower fees are imposed on companies discharging to 
the sea. DAO No.85 removes the fee distinction between land and sea 
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disposal of tailings. Whether disposing tailings into dams or impound- 
ments or into the sea, mining companies pay a uniform tailings fee of 
P0.10 per metric ton. 
Discharging tailings into the marine environment offers advantages 
over land disposal: 
O Agricultural or forestry lands do not suffer damage and, thus, 
need not be converted to non-productive uses; 
0 Risk of surface water or groundwater being contaminated by 
heavy metals, change in pH, or suspended solids is reduced; 
C] Dust is eliminated, thus, abating the concern of local residents; 
0 Risk of dam failure is removed (Dames and Moore 1991, p.33). 
These advantages justify the lower fees on tailings discharged into the 
sea. When improperly undertaken, however, marine disposal can de- 
grade coastal habitats. 
Sea discharge of tailings is utilized by only two mining companies in 
the Philippines: Atlas Mines in Toledo, Cebu and Marcopper Mines in 
Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. Both operations are relatively close to the sea. 
Reports indicate that: 
0 the wastes of Atlas have halted the reproduction of plankton 
and other organisms on which fishes feed; 
O in Calancan Bay in Marinduque, 12,000 fishermen lost their 
livelihood because of the dumping of mine tailings into the 
bay by Marcopper (Porter and Ganapin 1988). 
This adverse experience appears to remove any justification for lower 
fees for the marine disposal of tailings. 
Most mines in the Philippines are located some distance from the sea; 
for these mines, land disposal is the only feasible and practical means of 
tailings disposal. 
Tailings discharged into dams or impoundments cause adverse environ- 
mental effects when dams or impoundments fail and seepages occur that 
pollute the receiving waters, the marine life utilizing these waters, and 
adversely affect the people who use these marine species for food. Proper 
selection of disposal site as well as proper design and construction of dams 
or impoundment prevent these harmful environmental consequences. 
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For mine wastes and tailings disposed into dams or impoundments, 
MO No.1 imposes a fee determined on the basis of a formula given in 
Table 7-3. As shown, the fees under MO No.1 provide incentives for 
abatement, and they consider the area specificity of the environmental 
damage arising from mining operations. Areas differ in their assimilative 
capacities (i.e., their capacity to degrade materials they receive and to 
convert them into harmless, even useful forms), making the environ- 
mental impact of mine tailings area-specific, i.e., differing from location 
to location. 
For reasons of administrative expediency, DAO No. 85 did away with 
this more complicated process of determining mine tailings fees for 
tailings disposed into dams or impoundments. In the process, the area 
Table 7-3 
Fee for Tailings Disposed Into Dams/Ponds 
Under M0. NO 
For mining companies which are disposing their tailings by 
utilizing damstponds, the tailings fee shall be from P0.05 to P0.10 
per metric ton with the following formula to be used in determining 
the amount of tailings fee per metric ton: 
Tailings fee/ton = P0.05 + [.05(TWMF) - .05(TWPF)) 
where 
TWMF = total weighted minus factor 
TWPF = total weighted plus factor 
Weight (%) 
Minus Factor 
a) areas affected by tailings 80 
b) toxicity of tailings 20 
Plus Factor 
a) pollution abatement measures 
- investment 40 
- annualexpenses 20 
b) assets 15 
c) annual sales 25 
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specificity, substance specificity, and abatement incentive features of 
tailings fees were removed. 
An advantage land disposal schemes have over marine disposal is the 
possibility of reworking the tailings for additional mineral extraction; 
tailings discharged into the sea do not allow further extraction. PD 1251 
(MO No. 1 and DAO No. 85) exempts from fees, mine wastes and 
tailings put to beneficial use (see Table 7-4). This exemption encour- 
ages the recycling of mine wastes and tailings, and diminishes the 
damage that mining operations can possibly inflict on the environment. 
Land disposal of tailings, however, raises the problem of maintaining 
tailings facilities even after mining operations have ceased. It is ex- 
pected that tailings impoundments will be maintained by the mining 
Table 7-4 
Exemptions From Payment of Mine Waste and Tailings Fee 
1. Under Ministry Order No.1 Series of 1979 
Mine waste exempted from payment of mine waste fee: 
1. Mine waste used for underground fill. 
2. Mine waste used for rehabilitation and restoration of mined-out and tailings- 
covered areas. 
3. Mine waste used for infrastructure such as roads and building construction and for 
fill material for sites of buildings and playgrounds. 
4. Mine waste impounded for future use in the restoration and rehabilitation program 
of the mining company when the impoundment area is such that no waste will be 
carried into drainage systems or into properties other than the company's or those 
contracted by the company. 
II. Under Department Administrative Order No.85 Series of 1990 
Mine waste and tailings utilized for the following purposes shall be exempted from 
payment of fees: 
1. Filling materials for underground mine openings. 
2. Filling materials for surface mine openings provided that such materials shall not 
affect natural drainage systems. 
3. Filling materials for civil structures such as engineered tailings dams, roads, 
housing areas, and similar structures, provided that such areas shall not affect 
natural drainage systems. 
4. Concreting and manufacture of concrete products. 
5. Mine waste impounded for future use provided, however, that said materials shall 
be utilized for its beneficial use within a period of two (2) years. Mine wastes which 
are not utilized within the two-year period shall be charged the corresponding fee. 
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company during the operating lives of the mines. The problem of who 
and how tailings impoundments will be maintained and financed arises 
when mines are abandoned. The fees currently imposed take no account 
of the need to maintain the long-term integrity of impoundments. 
PD 1251 intends that pollutees be compensated for damages (to 
crops, land, infrastructure, marine as well as aquatic and inland re- 
sources) caused by mine wastes and tailings; the mine wastes and tailings 
fees collected from mining companies in operation are to finance the 
compensation scheme. 
Damage compensation is not a requirement of efficiency; it is a 
requirement of justice. Including compensation schemes in pollution 
control policies makes possible the attainment of both efficiency and 
justice objectives. 
From 1981 to 1990 (except 1985), the mine wastes and tailings fees 
collected reached levels that were more than sufficient to pay for 
damage compensation (see Table 7-5). Total damage compensation as 
a proportion of the total mine wastes and tailings fees collected averaged 
Table 7-5 
Damage Compensation Paid Out and Mine Waste 
and Tailings Fee Collected, 1981 -1990 
Year Total Amount of Mine Waste 8 Tailings (A)/(B) 
Compensation (In Pesos) Fee Collected (In Pesos) 
(A) (B) 
1981 211,173.67 1,924,447.68 .11 
1982 208,352.77 1,656,159.86 .13 
1983 - 1,563,000.52 - 
1984 213,682.56 1,091,668.60 .20 
1985 2,026,245.60 832,636.01 2.43 
1986 109,625.64 1,182,664.8 .09 
1987 333,563.00 1,224,186.20 .27 
1988 925,705.91 1,495,250.14 .62 
1989 1,333,027.44 1,344,255.17 .99 
1990 246,509.96 1,526,342.10 .16 
Average .56 
Source: PD 1251 Progress Reports. 
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56 percent over the years under study. On an area basis, the ratio of 
damage compensation to mine wastes and tailings fees collected fell 
below one (see Table 7-6). Because the transfer of resources involved 
has been from polluters to pollutees, the compensation arrangement, 
thus far, did not overburden taxpayers. 
The recent guidelines ruled that compensation for damage claims be 
drawn from the reserve fund (representing the accrued mine wastes and 
tailings fees collected from operating mining companies) without preju- 
Table 7.6 
Damage Compensation Paid Out and Mine Waste 
and Tailings Fee Collected, By Area 1988-1990 
Year Total Amount of Mine Waste & Tailings (Au(B) 
Compensation (In Pesos) Fee Collected (In Pesos) 
(A) (B) 
1988 
Benguet, Ilocos 259,636.74 552,041.00 .47 
Sur, Pangasinan 
Masbate 49,080.83 155,269.00 .32 
Negros Occ. 444,761.91 473,467.00 .94 
Cebu 145,548.90 230,758.00 .63 
Surigao del Norte 26,677.53 59,951.00 .44 
1989 
Benguet, Ilocos - 508,396.00 
Sur, Pangasinan 
Masbate 16,616.20 99,228.00 .17 
Negros Occ. 1,253,476.52 1,966,274.00 .64 
Cebu 62,934.72 230,974.00 .27 
Surigao del Norte - 25,735.00 
1990 
Benguet, Ilocos 40,286.00 476,057.00 .08 
Sur, Pangasinan 
Masbate - 73,716.00 
Negros Occ. 81,241.05 308,634.00 .26 
Cebu 124,982.91 218,583.00 .57 
Surigao del Norte - 38,208.00 
Source: PD 1251 Progress Reports. 
256 Aurora Sanchez and Beta P. Balagot 
dice as to which company caused the damage. This system has the 
taintings of a cross subsidy wherein mining companies with less damage- 
inflicting operations subsidize those whose operations cause greater 
damage. Such a cross subsidy veers away from the principle that pollut- 
ers bear the cost of pollution. Allocative inefficiencies result since the 
activities of more polluting firms are not curtailed while those of the less 
polluting ones are discouraged. 
PD 1251 provides the mechanism for damage compensation. The 
Mine Wastes and Tailings Damages Evaluation Committee awards the 
compensation to a claimant. The Committee is assisted by a Technical 
Working Group and a Regional Investigation and Assessment Team. 
The Regional Investigation and Assessment Team receives applications 
for damage compensation and conducts field investigations and assess- 
ments of claims for damages. The Team is a recent innovation and its 
incorporation into the organizational structure to manage the compen- 
sation scheme represents a move toward a more decentralized approach 
to PD 1251's implementation. This decentralized approach facilitates 
claims application and processing, and lowers the affected parties' cost 
of making damage claims. However, the decentralization move remains 
partial as the decision to award compensation is made at the central 
office. Thus, there is still room for further decentralization of the 
compensation scheme's management. 
Those qualified to apply for compensation are private owners of 
damaged infrastructure, forest products, and marine or aquatic as well as 
inland resources; owners of private land; agricultural lessors or lessees; 
and share tenants. Excluded from the list are parties affected by pollu- 
tion damage to common property. This exclusion does not make for 
justice. There is, therefore, a need to review and expand the list of 
qualified applicants and install a mechanism to facilitate the claims of 
victims for damage to common property. 
HB 9185. HB 9185 underscores the damage to the environment 
caused by the discharge of mine wastes and tailings; it exacts contribu- 
tions from mining companies to compensate for the environmental 
damage caused. HB 1985 raises substantially the mine wastes and tail- 
ings fees imposed on operating mining companies from P0.05 to P5.00 
per metric ton for non-metallic and from P.10 to P10.00 per metric ton 
for metallic wastes and tailings. The proposed raise in fees presupposes 
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that pollution costs far exceed abatement cost and that existing fees 
have failed to close this perceived gap. 
No existing study on the abatement cost of mining firms exists and 
the dearth of information precludes a judicious assessment of abatement 
cost. Based on the mining companies' protest against the proposed 
increase in mine wastes and tailings fees, these abatement costs may be 
quite substantial. Reinforcing this view is the endorsement by PD 
1251's Executive Committee for the Chamber of Mines' position paper 
decrying HB 9185's proposed fee increases on the grounds that, among 
others, the fee increases will place operating mining companies in 
financial difficulties. Table 7-7 indicates the impact of HB 9185 on 
mining companies' operating expenses. The increase in fees by as much 
as 9900 percent constitutes, for most companies, a sizeable chunk of 
their operating expenses. For the eight selected mining companies 
where data were available, the fee increases resulting from HB 9185 
would make up an average of 4.2 percent of their operating expenses. 
Aside from paying the mine wastes and tailings fees, mining compa- 
nies spend 0.5 percent of their annual operating budget for environmen- 
Table 7-7 
Impact of HB 9185 
Company Volume of Fees (P000) Operating (DY(E) 
Tailings MO HB Increase Expenses 
(000 mt) No.1 9185 (POOO) 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Atlas Consolidated 8680.03 868.00 86800.31 85932.31 3266492 .026 
Mining and Dev. Corp. 
Marcopper Mining Corp. 8272.05 827.20 82720.47 81893.27 881201 .093 
Philex Mining Corp. 9176.73 458.84 91767.34 91308.50 1322031 .069 
Apex Mining Co., Inc. 233.62 11.68 2336.18 2324.50 25756 .090 
Manila Mining Corp. 290.34 14.52 2903.38 2888.86 71645 .040 
Lepanto Consolidated 207.24 10.36 2072.39 2062.03 890083 .002 
Mining Corp. 
Benguet Exploration, Inc. 29.95 1.50 299.54 298.04 123068 .002 
Benguet Corp.- 113.93 5.70 1139.26 1133.56 99758 .011 
Itogon Suyoc 
Average .042 
Source: Bureau of Mines and Geosciences. 
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tat protection. They also spend substantial sums to construct and main- 
tain tailings ponds or dams. For its Dizon copper operation, Benguet 
Corporation spent P665 million for the proper recycling and contain- 
ment of mine wastes and tailings, as of December 1989. For its gold 
operation, Benguet Corporation shelled out P100 million in environ- 
mental expenses as of 1987. Abatement cost thus appears to be large. 
Because they focus on the damage cost of pollution and do not 
account for avoidance costs, and because they consider mainly the 
damage to private property and not the damage to public property, 
existing estimates of pollution cost underestimate the true pollution 
cost. More reliable estimates of pollution costs are needed to arrive at 
correct policy decisions. Existing estimates, although still underesti- 
mates, do not indicate that pollution cost has been enormous to warrant 
mining companies to cease production. 
Small-Scale Mining 
The mining industry consists of an organized and an unorganized 
sector; the small-scale miners make up the latter. Government has 
encouraged small-scale mining operations as a strategy to alleviate 
poverty and achieve a more equitable distribution of benefits from 
mineral resources. 
The small-scale miners are numerous. 1990 estimates place their 
number between 150,000 and 300,000. They are found mostly in the 
traditional small-scale mining area of the Cordilleras and the gold rush 
areas of Bicol and the Mindanao regions. Their large number makes it 
difficult to monitor and regulate their polluting activity. Thus, small- 
scale miners do not easily fall within the ambit of PD 1251. 
The environmental issue related to small-scale mining focuses on the 
use of mercury in extracting gold from ores. Not all small-scale miners 
use mercury in gold recovery. Traditional small-scale miners in the 
Benguet Province employ milling, gravitation, and panning methods 
for gold recovery without the use of mercury; they have also increased 
gold recovery efficiency through better tools and techniques and the 
adoption of commercial mining technology at a smaller scale. Small- 
scale miners in gold rush areas use blowtorches to separate mercury from 
the gold or silver amalgam. This technique of gold recovery exposes 
those involved in the activity to mercury vapor, a serious health hazard. 
Lead deposits also contaminate the soil and water which will likely 
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cause environmental problems in the years to come. The existing 
regulation prohibits the use of blowtorching to recover gold; its contin- 
ued use, however, suggests the ineffectiveness of enforcement. 
Because small-scale miners are mostly poor who venture into this 
activity for economic survival, a subsidy-cum-regulatory approach may 
be more appropriate rather than a charge-cum-regulatory alternative. 
Encouraging the establishment of processing plants that accept tail- 
ings from small-scale miners, including the process of recovering mer- 
cury has been recommended as a means of mitigating pollution arising 
from small-scale mining operations (Dames and Moore 1991, p.60). Tax 
incentives or interest rate subsidies to investors (private persons, firms, 
people's cooperatives, NGOs) provide concrete ways by which this 
objective may be achieved. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The Philippine industrial sector is forecast to increase its share of 
GNP from 32.3 percent in 1990 to 42.6 percent in 2000. An increased 
rate of industrialization means that, unless checked by appropriate 
action, the pollution situation is likely to worsen as new pollution 
sources emerge and as existing sources expand their activity. 
To control pollution, the Philippines relies heavily on legal and 
regulatory instruments. The Philippines has in place an extensive body 
of laws and regulations addressing environmental management. Air and 
water quality standards and the EIA system form an important compo- 
nent of the regulatory framework. This paper tried to evaluate the 
implementation of these standards as well as the EIA system. 
Based on the analysis, the government's pollution control program 
fell short of its stated goals. Implementation of air and water quality 
standards was poor. One reason for the poor implementation is the 
present inadequacy of resources devoted to environmental protection. 
Budget data suggest that despite major policy pronouncements, environ- 
mental protection still occupies a low priority. 
The study also identified several areas of concern that need to be 
addressed in order to correct the weaknesses of the present regulatory 
regime in environment. 
The EIA system was introduced to lend a comprehensive approach to 
environmental management. However, the full potential of the EIA to 
facilitate a balanced decisionmaking has not been fully realized due 
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primarily to misconceptions on the EIA and inadequate mechanisms 
and support, particularly financial and manpower, for its implementa- 
tion. Certain changes have to be instituted in the present EIA frame- 
work to achieve a more meaningful application of the EIA in our 
environmental management strategies. There is a need: 
to review the present scope of the EIA; 
0 to conduct area-wide EIAs for certain activities such as mining 
and quarrying; and 
0 to reinforce processes that are currently being pursued to 
strengthen the EIA implementation such as coordination with 
other organizations. 
The government hardly relied on market-oriented approaches to 
environmental management. The use of charges to regulate pollution 
offers a means to generate revenue to support enforcement costs and to 
compensate pollutees for damage suffered. This paper looked closely at 
the mining industry whose pollution control has been approached by 
the government through a combination of regulations and the imposi- 
tion of fees. 
Government policy toward the mining industry has been to promote 
its development, provide for environmental protection, and ensure 
equitable access to mining resources by promoting small-scale mining. 
This policy recognizes the industry's value to foreign exchange and 
employment generation and the adverse impact of mining activities on 
the quality of the environment. 
The government's approach to protect the environment from the 
pollution caused by mining operations has been mainly regulatory. Fees 
are imposed on mine wastes and tailings produced by mining companies, 
but these primarily compensate those harmed by mining pollution. 
Nonetheless, the fees, as designed, contain pollution mitigating fea- 
tures: recycled mine wastes and tailings are exempted from payment of 
fees, higher fees are imposed on metallic as opposed to non-metallic 
mine wastes and tailings, etc. The original design of fees incorporates 
features that give incentives to abatement measures and that take into 
account the area specificity of mining pollution effects. These are 
beneficial features that have been scrapped in the quest for administra- 
tive expediency. But with the passage of the new Local Government 
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Code which devolves to local government units the function of enforc- 
ing the rules and regulations relating to pollution and the environment, 
the administrative burden associated with area-specific fees would be 
eased. 
The compensation provision for damage caused by mining pollution 
lies more in the interest of justice than of efficiency. Statistics indicate 
that mine wastes and tailings fee collections were sufficient to compen- 
sate damage claimants. As such, the compensation arrangement did not 
drain vital and limited government resources. The fees imposed, how- 
ever, made no provision for maintaining tailings impoundments long 
after they would be abandoned when mining operations cease, nor did 
they provide for the damage caused by abandoned impoundments. In 
this respect, a raise in fees appears justified, but the raise as proposed by 
HB 9185 is quite large for mining companies to shoulder, thus eliciting 
some resistance. By how much fees need to be raised requires careful 
study. Such an assessment requires that estimates of pollution and 
abatement costs come as close as possible to the true estimates. 
The small-scale mining industry has been the depository of marginal 
rural workers who enter the industry for their economic survival. Small- 
scale mining in gold-rush areas have also been the focal points in the 
growth of communities. But small-scale mining, particularly in gold- 
rush areas, has been the source of much environmental deterioration 
caused principally by mercury pollution. The government's approach to 
the problem has been regulatory, but enforcement of regulations has run 
into difficulties. For the small-scale mining sector, a subsidy-cum-regu- 
latory approach is proposed in contrast to a charge-cum-regulatory 
approach for the large mining sector of the industry. The subsidy 
approach is justified on the grounds that small-scale mining polluters are 
predominantly poor and have little to show in terms of earnings. 
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8 
POLICY OPTIONS RELATING 
TO INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT AND ENERGY 
Florian A. Alburo 
Introduction 
THE PHILIPPINES REMAINS A PREDOMINANTLY AGRICULTURAL COUNTRY, WITH 
income derived from agriculture, fisheries, and forestry contributing 
about 30 percent to the country's Gross National Product (GNP), and 
at least one-third to its total export revenue. Roughly 70 percent of the 
population reside in rural areas and depend directly or indirectly on 
agriculture as their major source of livelihood. 
The scant attention given to agricultural development, however, 
belies its importance in the national economy. Thus, despite technology 
advances and some government effort to provide agricultural extension 
services, agricultural productivity remains low and has even stagnated 
since the 1980s. Consequently, many farm households are marginalized 
and sink deeper into poverty. 
The concomitant increase in poverty incidence heightens the already 
serious problem of unemployment and underemployment in rural areas, a 
situation largely due to the huge increase in the number of labor dependent 
on agriculture which, in turn, results from high population growth, currently 
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at 2.7 percent per annum.' In the early 1970s, national poverty incidence 
reached about 50 percent of all families. In the following decade, it moved 
closer to 60 percent, with nearly 75 percent of the total poor living in rural 
areas. In 1988, despite the decline in poverty incidence from 1985 as shown 
in Table 8-1, the rural poor, comprising about 70 percent of the total poor 
population, totaled about 3.6 million families or about one-third of the 
entire Philippine population.' 
National figures for unemployment and underemployment are just as 
worrisome. From a low seven percent in the 1950s, unemployment 
jumped to 11 percent in the 1980s and now stands at 15 percent. 
Underemployment hovers at a high 34 percent beginning the mid- 
1980s. From 1983 to 1990, employment in the agricultural sector re- 
mained roughly constant. The contribution to overall employment 
averaged about 10 million workers for the eight-year period. On a year- 
to-year basis, employment rose nominally and the figure for 1990 reached 
only 2.2 percent higher than that of 1983. The current state of the 
agricultural sector did not enable it to absorb much of the yearly increase 
in the labor force. Tables 8-1 and 8-2 give the correlation between 
unemployment and underemployment, on the one hand, and poverty 
incidence, on the other. Table 8-2 places the highest underemployment 
(and a relatively high unemployment) rate in Western Visayas; in Table 
8-1, the same region posted one of the highest poverty incidence 
(second only to the Bicol region). The massive poverty in many regions, 
particularly in rural areas, have created an "urban poor" problem, com- 
prised of individuals who seek employment opportunities in the cities, 
specifically Metro Manila. 
The neglect of agriculture and the rural sector manifests the relatively 
limited government spending on infrastructure and support services 
needed to attract private investments in rural areas, to boost agriculture 
and related industries. In the last 10 years, government support to 
infrastructure in agriculture, compared to its contribution to national 
1. See "Selected Statistics on Agriculture," Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, Depart- 
ment of Agriculture, May 1991. 
2. Intal and Power (1987) as well as Balisacan (1991) provides some discussion on 
poverty incidence and the rural poor. 
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Table 8-1 
Poverty Incidence Estimates by Region 
1985 and 1988 <. 
Poverty 
Incidence Threshold 
1985 1988 1985 1988 
Philippines 59.0 49.5 2,381 2,709 
Region 
NCR 43.9 31.8 3,282 4,037 
Ilocos 51.6 47.5 2,389 2,597 
Cagayan Valley 55.7 48.9 2,201 2,576 
Central Luzon 43.5 39.6 2,552 2,881 
Southern Tagalog 55.2 49.3 2,471 2,832 
Bicol Region 73.5 65.3 2,143 2,443 
Western Visayas 73.4 61.8 2,453 2,654 
Central Visayas 69.9 54.6 1,987 2,173 
Eastern Visayas 70.2 60.5 2,015 2,263 
Western Mindanao 63.0 52.0 2,119 2,289 
Northern Mindanao 65.6 51.5 2,249 2,439 
Southern Mindanao 60.2 52.2 2,389 2,763 
Central Mindanao 63.6 47.1 2,212 2,468 
*Preliminary results. 
Source: Family Income and Expenditures Survey, 1985 and 1988, National Statistics Office. 
income and employment, has not only been low but has also remained 
at levels prevailing in the 1950s and early 1960s.3 
This is due in part to the import substitution industrialization policy 
that has influenced allocation priorities in favor of the urban sector. 
Balisacan (1989) notes that for decades, capital- and skill-intensive 
industries having major input links with overseas suppliers (rather than 
the domestic agrarian economy), were encouraged. This policy made 
3. From 1980-1986, the average rural growth rate of public sector expenditures on 
agriculture in real terms was -13.9 percent from a +14.4 percent a decade earlier, 
1970-1980. See Balisacan (1989). 
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Table 8-2 
Unemployment and Underemployment Rates 
Regional Average, 1588 
Unemployment Underemployment 
Region Rate Rate 
1 7.5 13.6 
CAR 6.2 3.6 
{{ 6.8 10.1 
III 9.9 6.4 
IV 6.9 12.6 
V 5.5 16.6 
VI 6.4 18.4 
VII 4.5 7.0 
VIII 7.0 12.8 
IX 4.5 8.2 
X 6.5 11.0 
XI 6.7 13.8 
XII 3.3 14.4 
Source: National Economic and Development Authority, 1988. 
the outright purchase of raw materials and equipment from abroad more 
attractive in lieu of developing and sourcing them domestically. Infras- 
tructure linkages with the rural sector, therefore, did not receive priority 
since much of the economic activity was concentrated in and around 
Metro Manila. 
The 1991-1995 Philippine Agricultural Development Plan acknowl- 
edged the crucial role of government to enable the agricultural sector to 
realize productivity gains by way of providing the required public.invest- 
ments to complement and support small farmers, fishermen, and agribusiness 
entrepreneurs. Thus, the Department of Agriculture (DA) advocates the 
provision of adequate, fully functioning, and cost-effective infrastructure 
and related services to raise the incomes of rural families.' 
4. See "The Philippine Agricultural Development Plan, 1991-1995." 
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Infrastructure and Poverty 
Of late, attention has been given to labor-intensive rural infrastruc- 
ture programs undertaken to provide supplementary (if not the sole) 
income-earning opportunity, as well as to improve the general infra- 
structure base. On the former, many food-for-work projects in develop- 
ing countries such as the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme 
in India emphasized the construction of infrastructure that enlarges the 
productive capacity of the rural economy. In times of disaster or natural 
calamities, such schemes can make a substantial contribution to reduce 
unemployment and underemployment.' 
Direct Employment Effects 
The employment-generating potential of infrastructure projects in 
many poor developing countries basically hinges on utilizing labor- 
intensive methods. In Kenya, for example, De Veen (1979) noted that 
labor-intensive methods used in constructing rural roads are economical 
and can be technically viable. In recent years, the significance of labor- 
intensive techniques in generating greater employment and efficiency 
has been emphasized, given the relatively low wages prevailing in 
developing countries. However, organizational and management tech- 
niques should be modified to replace the inherent capital-intensive bias 
of many equipment used in infrastructure building. 
Rural electrification also has a potential to expand employment 
opportunities although the extent of labor-intensive construction meth- 
ods, and thus direct employment, are quite limited. The indirect effects 
appear to be more significant as they enhance the growth of job oppor- 
tunities in rural-based light industries. The same applies to irrigation 
and water control facilities which permit a considerable expansion of 
opportunities for productive employment in agriculture. The extent to 
which these opportunities can significantly and positively address rural 
poverty, however, will depend on the growth rate of effective demand 
in rural areas as well as on existing macroeconomic policies. 
Enhancing Productivity through Infrastructure 
A major argument supporting public investment expansion in rural 
infrastructure is enhanced productivity, since access to markets for final 
5. See the discussion on rural infrastructure projects in Mukhoti (1984). 
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goods and services, and sources of production inputs are facilitated. 
Among others, the improved facility makes the input/output ratio price 
relationship more advantageous.6 In an environment where access is 
limited or restricted, farmers often face low and unstable farmgate prices 
which threaten to reduce further the viability of small- and medium- 
sized farms; this is because the state of infrastructure largely determines 
the relative mobility of factors of production and final goods to and from 
farms. 
Improving the transport system such as farm-to-market roads, bridges 
and highways, as well as air and sea ports including upgrading transport 
facilities particularly during peak harvest/production months lend sup- 
port to rural industries as these also enhance mobility and proximity to 
supply and demand markets. 
Other infrastructure facilities such as irrigation and drainage systems, 
and adequate power and communication facilities also buttress the 
productive pursuits of rural households. This support inevitably leads to 
better prices for farmers for both produce and inputs, and reduces post- 
harvest losses. In turn, better sales provide incentives for affiliated 
industries in agriculture such as food processing, trading, and other 
agribusiness enterprises to set up and expand business activities in the 
rural areas. A survey of the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID 1978) noted that electrification bore very posi- 
tive effects on industry; 100 small- and medium-scale enterprises (e.g., 
welding shops, rice mills, ice plants, and bakeries) were established 
within a year of energy provision.? 
Strengthening the rural infrastructure base is a core concept in 
Thailand's Poverty Alleviation Program. In the 1960s and 1970s, the 
improvement of the country's road network aimed to link important 
food producing areas to the capital, with particular focus on the north 
and northeastern parts of the country. By the middle of the 1970s, the 
completed road network system proved instrumental in reducing farm 
transport cost and, more importantly, in creating non-farm job 
opportunities. As a result, the off-farm component of rural incomes 
6. See Evenson (1986), pp. 62-63. 
7. See USAID (1981). 
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increased by at least 12 percent per year, or roughly the same level 
achieved by other regions.8 
In enhancing its investment in infrastructure and improving incomes 
by increasing resource endowments, the Thai government made avail- 
able basic and low-cost technologies and other government services to 
rural residents. For the two plan periods, 1982-1986 and 1986-1990, two 
percent and seven percent of the national budget, respectively, were 
allotted for the expansion and improvement of infrastructure facilities 
to support agriculture and rural industries. Tong (1991) validated the 
effectiveness of anti-poverty policies when combined with good infra- 
structure support in a study of poverty in rural China.9 
Transport infrastructure. Constraints to efficient transport of agricul- 
tural products translate to high transport costs which, in turn, results in 
low farmgate prices or high consumer prices, or both.10 In the Philip- 
pines, producing regions are often far from consuming regions. Rice 
supply in Metro Manila, for instance, comes mainly from Northern 
Luzon, Western Visayas, and, to some extent, even Mindanao. The 
same is true for other agricultural products such as com, fruits, and 
vegetables. At the same time, many consumer and manufactured prod- 
ucts sold in the regions are sourced from Manila. Thus, transport 
facilities are imperative to link markets and enhance dualistic ex- 
changes between and within regions. Consequently, the more devel- 
oped these facilities are, the more efficient it is to move products and 
services. 
In 1982, the country had a total of 155,000 kilometers (km) of roads. 
Six years later, an additional 3,000 km, mostly national roads, increased 
the road network system. Over the years, roads construction appeared 
highly concentrated in the National Capital Region (NCR). Table 8- 
3 shows that the NCR received the highest nominal increase in appro- 
priation for road repairs and maintenance from 1983 to 1988, more than 
8. Suphachalasai and Patmasiriwat (1991) detail the success of Thailand in poverty 
alleviation through an increase in non-farm job opportunities. 
9. See Tong (1991) on China's experience with anti-poverty policies in rural 
districts. 
10. Cabanilla (1991), p. 19. 
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twice the national average. In real terms, the NCR's share declined the 
least, i.e., 21 percent, while the share of the rest of the regions declined 
from 30 percent to 46 percent. 
By mode, road transport accounts for the majority of total freight 
movements, i.e., 60 percent, while interisland and coastal shipping 
account for 40 percent. For regions utilizing mainly road transport, 
procurement is limited to those covered by better roads and relatively 
peaceful towns; otherwise circuitous routes are resorted to, thus increas- 
ing travel time and transport cost. To the extent that road condition 
influences the choice of routes, transport costs (and hence price spreads) 
become variable. Moreover, road condition also bears heavily on the 
vehicle operating cost (VOC). The National Transport Planning Project 
(1987) cites that VOCs are at least 50 percent and 95 percent higher on 
bad and very bad roads, respectively, than on good ones. By the same 
token, travel time for cargo vehicles increases by at least 60 percent on 
bad roads and 110 percent on very bad roads. Because of this, hauling 
rates within regions are also reportedly higher when applied to gravel- 
surfaced (as against cemented or asphalted) roads. For example, short 
distance rates along gravel-surfaced roads (Region VI) can be as high as 
P16.00 per ton/km compared to P1.73 on cement or asphalt roads. Post- 
harvest losses also tend to be higher on routes marked by poor roads. 
Table 8-4 indicates that even in relatively short distances, the loss can 
be as high as one percent of total cargo." 
Apart from bad road conditions, the underdevelopment of road links 
between towns and cities makes the movement in and out of important 
production sites difficult. In Region IV, for instance, bad roads dominate 
the towns of Calintaan, Sablayan, and Magsaysay (major sources of rice 
and com); except in town approaches where about a kilometer of 
cemented road exists, the connection to San Jose, the major trading 
center, has very poor minor roads.12 Garcia (1984) confirmed the 
importance of good minor roads to agricultural productivity: Good roads 
increased direct farmer marketing activities, thus reducing farmers' 
dependence on traders. Visits by agricultural extension agents and 
public health officials to remote towns also became more frequent, and 
11. Both (high) hauling rates and post-harvest losses are a function of the (poor) 
state of infrastructure facilities in many rural areas. 
12. Cabanilla (1991), p. 54. 
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Table 8-3 
Regional Expenditures for Road Repairs and Maintenance, 1983-1988 
(in thousand pesos) 
Repairs & Maintenance 1988 
Expenditure % Change 
1983 1988 in Real 
Region Current Constant* Current Constant* Terms 
NCR 21,689 9,011 41,119 7,104 -21 
1 53,884 22,370 80,509 13,910 -38 
II 63,405 26,342 82,316 14,222 -46 
III 43,303 17,990 59,906 10,350 -42 
IV 96,128 39,937 128,346 22,175 -44 
V 36,037 14,972 50,359 8,701 -42 
VI 61,215 25,432 102,894 17,777 -30 
VII 44,334 18,419 60,476 10,448 -43 
VIII 52,632 21,866 75,440 13,034 -40 
IX 26,407 10,971 39,751 6,868 -37 
X 57,083 23,715 77,196 13,337 -44 
XI 56,679 23,548 75,076 12,971 -45 
XII 33,244 13,811 47,008 8,122 -41 
Total 646,600 268,633 920,396 159,018 -41 
*Computed using the yearly average construction index, 1978--100, 
National Statistical Coordination Board. 
Source : General Appropriations Act, 1983 and 1988. 
marketing activities, some totally unrelated to agriculture, increased 
substantially.'' 
Port development and maintenance, though an important aspect of 
the general transport system, has not also received due attention in 
many years. The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), the government 
corporation mandated to develop and maintain all ports in the country, 
concentrates its efforts only on financially viable ports. This means that 
out of the 606 ports nationwide, only about 149 are recommended for 
13. Garcia (1984) distinguishes between different types of rural roads that link farm 
to markets. 
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Table 8-4 
Reported Post-Harvest Los ses During Transportation 
of Rice and Corn in Selected Routes 
(% of total cargo) 
Commodity/Route Vehicle Used Distance Road Surface % Loss 
(km) 
Rice 
Tuguegarao-Manila 10-wheeler 484 Cement/Asphalt .005 
Kabacan-Davao City 6-wheeler 140 Cement/Asphalt .5 
Tacurong-General Santos 10-wheeler 95 Gravel/Earth 1.0 
Com 
Maramag-Cagayan de Oro 6- & 10-wheeler 143 Cement/Asphalt 0.25 
Pangantukan-Cagayan de Oro 10-wheeler 169 Cement/Asphalt/ 1.0 
Gravel 
Source: Cabanilla (1991). 
inclusion in the PPA's port system. Of this, only 100 are presently under 
the system. Yet, even among the top 10 ports critical to the movement 
of agricultural goods, inefficiency still persists. The General Santos port, 
for example, has an average service of 56 hours and an average waiting 
time of five hours. This is high when compared to the national average 
of 39 hours of service and two hours of waiting.14 
Energy/power and telecommunications infrastructure. Equally critical in 
promoting productivity in the agricultural, industrial, and commercial 
sectors is power and telecommunications infrastructure. The current 
power crisis which has been worsening since 1989, has severely strained 
an economy already plagued with various natural calamities. The crisis 
hit hardest on Luzon and Mindanao, with unofficial estimated defi- 
ciency of 800-1000 megawatts or about a third of total energy demand. 
In certain days, this translated to 10-12 hours of power outages. Moreo- 
ver, officials of the National Power Corporation (NPC) openly admit 
that the energy crisis will be resolved only by 1995. As an unfortunate 
consequence, foreign investments expected in 1993 may be diverted to 
14. Cabanilla (1991), p. 37. 
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competitor countries as power schedules, much less power reliability and 
sufficiency, cannot be assured. 
The Joint Govemment-Business Task Force on Power estimates the 
production cutdown in industries to be at least 30 percent, many of 
them exporters of garments, electronics, and food manufacturing. Initial 
estimates of the commercial industry losses reached about P20 billion 
from March-May 1992 alone: Businessmen complain that opportunities 
are lost due to the failure of communication facilities to operate, i.e., fax 
machines, trunk lines, etc., during the power outages, as well as the 
inability of small firms to process orders due to the exorbitant cost of 
even small-scale generators. Many industries have resorted to revising 
their work schedules (to include Sundays), to coincide with the avail- 
ability of power, usually during the "graveyard shift." In a desperate 
attempt to meet production schedules, many firms who originally signed 
up for the voluntary load curtailment program (VLCP) ended up vio- 
lating their assigned shutdown days." 
With industries in Luzon, particularly Metro Manila, being held 
hostage to the power crisis, several power projects are being "fast- 
tracked." Many of these, in the form of gas turbines and power barges, 
constitute short-term solutions that are not only expensive in terms of 
operating cost vis-a-vis the magnitude of power generated, but may, in 
the near future, be incompatible with the direction of the country's 
energy and environmental policy. The proposed reactivation of the 
mothballed Rockwell oilfired power plant and, more recently, the 
suggestion to revive the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) are a clear 
admission that the country is running out of long-term options to bring 
the country, as it were, "out of the darkness." Already, pressure has given 
way to exempt proposed power projects, financed through the build- 
operate-transfer scheme (BOT), from the environmental impact state- 
ment requirement of the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (DENR). For the time being and perhaps even longer, the 
acquisition of stop-gap power units, though a palliative and expensive 
measure, will provide additional sources of power with shorter gestation 
periods than large-scale energy development projects that usually re- 
15. The non-compliance of many firms in the VLCP has disturbed the distribution 
of brownouts among industrial and residential consumers, resulting in longer brown 
outs during the day. 
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quire no less than five years. The danger of plant breakdowns, however, 
remains even if the new power barges are in place by 1994. 
It is unfortunate that the Aquino government, during its early years 
in power, was unable to lay the groundwork for strengthening the power 
and communications infrastructure of the country while prematurely 
eyeing the country's place among the newly industrialized countries 
(NICs) by the year 2000. The apparent unpreparedness for the worse 
scenario, wherein power plants break down simultaneously, explain why 
maintenance and rehabilitation, much less building new power plants 
or developing alternative energy sources, did not get the priority it 
deserves. Several thermal plants are over 20 years old and are generally 
unreliable. This is the major reason why the Manila Electric Company 
(Meralco) cannot even submit a firm brownout schedule for use by 
industry since the plants can break down (and indeed do) any time. 
Also, rehabiliation and maintenance work on power plants are often 
done beyond schedule since older, more dilapidated plants get first 
priority, especially when precipitated by a complete breakdown. Al- 
though such a priority cannot be questioned, delaying the maintenance 
work on newer power plants also threatens their long-term viability. In 
the end, unless replacements are put up to relieve the ailing plants that 
need rehabilitation, the power outlook appears dim with the possibility 
of simultaneous plant breakdowns. That would result in longer power 
outages than is currently experienced. 
During the last five years, the acquisition of 14 gas turbines, with a 
combined capacity of 560 megawatts, served as the country's only 
complementary program to energy development. This suggests that the 
energy crisis lies not only in the poor maintenance of the power plants 
and in the overall operation and management of the NPC, but also in 
the substance of the country's energy policy. Part of this policy, as 
approved by President Aquino in early June 1992, is to "relieve the 
government of financial and operational burdens" by allowing the 
private sector to lease some of the power plants, including its operation 
and maintenance. 16 It is sad to note that officials console the public by 
16. The government's invitation for greater private sector involvement in infrastruc- 
ture projects is long overdue. However, the full privatization of NPC, though urged 
by the business sector, is not deemed feasible by the government at this time. Private 
sector participation is thus limited to leasing arrangements and participation in BOT 
schemes. 
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granting the liberalization of generators, discussing schemes on how to 
distribute the blackouts among sectors "more equitably," and vowing to 
shorten brownouts to the "target" two to three hours a day. Such 
marked deficiency in planning, developing, financing, and constructing 
new power projects may eventually prove to be more debilitating to the 
country's economic recovery. 
Tables 8-5 and 8-6 detail the level of government expenditures on 
various infrastructure items. From 1980 to 1990, the power sector 
received the highest nominal allocation, except for 1988. However, 
only about nine percent of the total allocation for power and electrifi- 
cation went into rural electrification projects. The decline of the share 
for rural electrification is most pronounced in the crisis years of the mid- 
1980s when its share dropped to a low three percent in 1985. The same 
occurred in the communications sector, the most neglected among the 
sectors. For the period under study, the sector received an average of 0.7 
percent; only in 1989 did the sector receive an allocation greater than 
one percent of the total budget for infrastructure. The low level of funds 
allocated to communications may be explained by the dominant role of 
a private sector firm, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Com- 
pany (PLDT) in the field. 
Funds spent for energy development during the Marcos administra- 
tion are not indicated for 1980 to 1985, although it may have been 
listed under "Other/Special Projects." From 1986 onward, the alloca- 
tion for this sector did not go beyond 15 percent. 
The Rise of Non-Farm Economic Activities 
As previously cited, the initial impact of infrastructure expenditures 
in rural areas is job creation. The longer-term impact, however, lies in 
enhancing productivity and alternative employment opportunities in 
both farm and off-farm, regardless of the season. Improved productivity 
results initially in higher farm yields and, when coupled with better 
prices obtained at the farmgate and reasonable transport cost, in encour- 
aging farmers to diversify or make productive other plots of land previ- 
ously lying idle. Thus, higher productivity, both farm and off-farm, will 
bring about higher rural incomes. 
Balisacan (1989) notes that higher farm incomes allow households to 
save more, which can then be used for industry or to improve the farm, 
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sustained productivity, the entry of labor into non-farm activities will 
eventually give way to the release of labor from the farm without sharp 
increases in food prices or the need to import large quantities of agricul- 
tural products formerly produced domestically in sufficient quantities." 
As discussed briefly in an earlier section, adequate and reliable rural 
infrastructure bring about many linkage effects. In his study, Fabella 
(1986) noted the positive effects on non-agricultural employment levels 
as a consequence of improved roads and power infrastructure. The ratio 
of installed electricity capacity in neighboring countries such as Taiwan 
as early as the 1950s, had five times the capacity of the Philippines. Two 
decades later, only about one-fourth of all Philippine households had 
electricity, compared to Taiwan's 99 percent (1979). Given the present 
poor state of the country's power infrastructure and the fact that not all 
Philippine households have electricity, one wonders whether the Philip- 
pines will ever be able to generate sufficient energy supply to provide 24- 
hour electricity to all households and industries, both rural and urban, 
in the near future. The response to this challenge is critical if economic 
recovery efforts are to succeed. The success of NICs like Taiwan can be 
attributed in part to the extensive rural electrification and expanded 
communication facilities that have spurred the rapid growth of decen- 
tralized rural industry within regions, including firms that cater to urban 
and export markets. 
Irrigation projects spur rural economic activity with very strong direct 
employment effects as well as consumption linkages. However, many 
agricultural lands have not yet received the benefits of modern-day 
irrigation systems. As of mid-1990, about 1.6 million hectares, or only 
47 percent of potentially irrigable land, are irrigated; those that are 
covered have to contend with inefficient existing systems caused by lack 
of proper maintenance. This happens despite the amounts allocated for 
water resources, the bulk of which went to irrigation projects, except for 
certain years, as shown in Table 8-5. 
The magnitude of the linkage effects due to improved transport, 
power, and communication facilities is also demonstrated in its "mod- 
emizing" influence on attitudes of rural households. The increased 
contact brought on by access to modern activities, consumer goods, and 
17. Balisacan (1989) discusses fully the promotion of industrialization through 
agricultural development. 
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new technologies and inputs may serve to increase the incentive to 
accumulate, in agriculture to finance non-agricultural activities. Conse- 
quently, family members will expectedly have greater opportunities to 
participate in non-farm activities for certain periods of the year. 
Non-farm activities in rural areas such as food processing, handicrafts 
and cottage industries, and small retail shops are significant in the face 
of an increasing labor force. By providing sustained employment for 
farm workers during slack periods, these activities alleviate poverty and 
promote equality. Moreover, as Ranis et al. (1990) observed, regions 
that were able to sustain expanded rural non-agricultural activities over 
time, as incomes per head rose, were also able to transform the nature 
of rural industries from cottage to more "modem" industries, including 
extensive processing of agricultural commodities for consumption within 
and outside the regions. This transformation facilitates the association 
of the non-farm sector with rising capital accumulation, productivity, 
and incomes. Higher demand for ancillary services also follow this 
transformation."' Such development is necessary if rural industrializa- 
tion and agriculture are to form the basis of sustained productivity in 
rural areas. This type of interaction provided the economic push for 
NICs like Taiwan, South Korea, and, recently, Thailand. Traditional 
activities were expanded into modem, yet small-scale, labor-intensive, 
rural, and non-agricultural activities. Underlying this transition, how- 
ever, is the existence of decentralized infrastructure and related support 
services. 
The nature of rural industries that evolve out of traditional ones is 
just as important in terms of the linkage effects on agriculture and in 
raising rural incomes in real terms. As observed in the experience of the 
N1Cs, upgraded "traditional" technologies or "new," small-scale rural 
industries embodying modem technologies are likely to have greater 
effects than merely expanding traditional, non-agricultural activities.19 
18. Oshima (1985) devotes considerable attention to the significance of non- 
agricultural activity in rural Asia. 
19. See Ranis et al. (1989) and Oshima (1985). 
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Policy Issues and Problems 
Location of Infrastructure 
As discussed in the previous section, the NCR has captured the bulk 
of the total budget for infrastructure construction and maintenance, be 
it roads, bridges, power, and communication facilities. Meanwhile, 
irrigation projects have figured quite prominently in the infrastructure 
investment portfolio in certain regions. The budget allocation for infra- 
structure has contributed to the growth imbalances between and even 
within regions. The deficiency of infrastructure linkages among regions 
has also encouraged firms to locate in Metro Manila and nearby areas. 
The unevenness of infrastructure prioritization and development in the 
Philippines is depicted in the distribution of infrastructure expenditures 
(Table 8-7) between Luzon, Metro Manila, Visayas, and Mindanao from 
1971-1981. Metro Manila's share of 28.3 percent, appears roughly propor- 
tional to its population of 23.7 percent. Luzon received the lion's share at 
73.8 percent for a population ratio of 54 percent. In contrast, Visayas, with 
a population ratio of 24.1 percent, received only 13.5 percent; Mindanao, 
with a population ratio of 21.9 percent, received only 12.7 percent of total 
infrastructure funds. Luzon and Metro Manila also received a relatively 
higher percentage as a proportion of their gross value added (GVA) in 
agriculture in 1974. On the other hand, Visayas and Mindanao, with 
relatively higher GVAs in agriculture for the same year, received consider- 
ably less. From all indications, the very high GVA in industry and utilities 
from the Luzon and Metro Manila areas served to influence the percentage 
of infrastructure allotment to these regions from 1971 to 1981. The high 
level of infrastructure amounts given to the Luzon area enabled it to have 
the greatest power capacity per 1,000 population (1975), compared to 
Visayas and Mindanao.20 
A policy measure to increase and sustain productivity in rural areas 
promotes the regional dispersal of industries. Although this has been 
articulated in development plans since the early 1960s, efforts in indus- 
trial dispersal have been mostly limited to the grant of incentives and 
the promise of lower labor costs. Pante and Medalla (1990) confirmed 
the bias of the national government in favor of the NCR, Central 
20. In 1975, the estimated power capacity per 1,000 people in kw was placed at 74. 
Luzon had the greatest capacity at 98, while Visayas had only 40 and Mindanao had 50. 
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Table 8-7 
Regional Diabibution of I nfrastructpre Expendit+f ms 
Indicator Philippines Luzon Metro Visayas Mindanao 
Manila 
Population (%) 100 54.0 23.7 24.1 21.9 
Infrastructure expenditure, 
1971-1981 (%) 100 73.8 28.3 13.5 12.7 
GVA in utilities, 1974 (%) 100 84.3 71.9 11.8 3.9 
Power Capacity 
per 1000 people, 1975 (kw) 74 98 - 40 5o 
GVA in agriculture, 1974 (%) 100 46.9 17.8 30.5 22.6 
GVA in industry, 1974 (%) 100 74.1 45.4 17.2 8.7 
Source: National Economic Development Authority (1981). 
Luzon, and Southern Tagalog, with these areas receiving roughly 30 
percent of total region-specific public investments, while the shares of 
other regions ranged only from two percent to four percent." 
Though it is uncertain whether this bias will be reduced in the future 
as greater funds are allocated for regional development, the govern- 
ment's regional industrial centers (RICs) concept attempts to redress 
the imbalance in infrastructure development as well as promote indus- 
trial dispersal. The RICs are target sites for such developmental activi- 
ties as the improvement of infrastructure, utilities, and credit delivery 
facilities; they will serve as alternative industrial locations outside Metro 
Manila. However, the prioritization of the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) in choosing and developing RICs focuses on cities that 
have strong industrial potential and equipped with a fairly developed 
infrastructure and utilities base. Given the poor infrastructure in many 
cities and towns, such a criteria leaves out many areas that have vast 
potentials as future growth centers. 
There appears to be strong support for locating many small-scale 
infrastructure projects in areas where poverty incidence is relatively 
high. Rural public works that enable farmers to diversify into 
21. See "Medium-Term Public Investment Program, 1989.1992." 
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multicropping can generate work for construction of rural roads and 
bridges, irrigation, and drainage facilities, among others, particularly 
during the dry months.when many of these farmers are underemployed. 
Organization for Infrastructure Investment 
Institutionally, the responsibility to administer and implement local 
infrastructure projects has been delineated among three agencies in line 
with the government's decentralization policy. Local government units 
(LGUs) handle implementation while the Department of Public Works 
and Highways (DPWH) takes care of the overall administration and 
technical supervision. The Department of Interior and Local Govern- 
ments (DILG) concerns itself with institution-building. For the trans- 
port sector such as the port sub-sector, the implementation, operation, 
and maintenance of municipal/tertiary/ feeder ports was devolved to the 
LGUs, although the Department of Transportation and Communica- 
tions (ROTC) maintains responsibility for coordination, programming, 
and implementation of future projects. 
There is a proposal to elevate the Office of Energy Affairs into a 
regular department that will be responsible primarily for overseeing 
power infrastructure investments. Ideally, some form of coordination is 
necessary between the various infrastructure-oriented departments such 
as the proposed Department of Energy, the DPWH, the ROTC, the 
National Electrification Administration (NEA), and the National Irri- 
gation Administration (NIA) to ensure a degree of consistency with 
respect to the overall infrastructure target and design. 
Interaction between Government Programs 
Many agricultural programs have links with other government pro- 
grams, particularly those with a strong infrastructure component. The 
synergy effect between these programs is well established, with the 
positive effect of infrastructure spending on agricultural development 
and, hence, regional incomes. Moreover, many agricultural programs 
that aim to increase productivity through better inputs and technology, 
also inevitably depend on a strong infrastructure base. In extension 
programs, for example, agricultural technicians require field contact 
with farmers to disseminate new farming techniques and processes, and 
introduce modern equipment. Such activities can be initiated and 
sustained only if basic infrastructure is present -- roads, bridges, ports, 
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electricity, and irrigation facilities. Moreover, in areas where these 
facilities are present, private industry tends to thrive. 
Lamberte's (1990) study on regional development utilized the level, 
adequacy, and quality of government infrastructure expenditures to 
explain the variation in regional economic performance. To evaluate 
the impact of government spending on the decision of private industry 
to invest in a certain region, the study regressed government construc- 
tion data with total private investment in various regions from 1975- 
1987. Though not all regions responded uniformly, the findings indi- 
cated a significant relationship and a positive response of private indus- 
try to government infrastructure spending for the NCR, Regions 1, 1V, 
and VI (albeit small in Region IV). In general, though, the effectiveness 
of government's infrastructure expenditure policy in encouraging pri- 
vate investment helped explain the regional variation in economic 
performance. 
The Medium-Term Public Investment Program (MTPIP) of 1987- 
1992 details the thrust to allocate more funds to the regions, through 
the distribution of physical infrastructure and the regional dispersal of 
industries. Both programs can be highly synergistic if attention is given 
to appropriate industries that can locate in specific regions, preferably 
those that are labor intensive, and then supporting them with the 
required infrastructure. 
Programs that aim to raise rural productivity are supported by policies 
and programs that affect industrial location, as in decentralized indus- 
trialization or the regional dispersal of industries. Herrin and Pemia 
(1986) noted that infrastructure, i.e., access to transport and power and 
communication facilities, appears to be a decisive criteria for both 
foreign and local firms in their location choice. Also, many foreign 
manufacturing firms expressed preference to locate in areas where there 
is existing "infrastructure specially designed for industry." Such a criteria 
suggests that direct government policies to influence locational behavior 
in favor of areas distant from Metro Manila can only work if infrastruc- 
ture requirements are met sufficiently. 
A related program is the thrust toward the development of small- and 
medium-scale industries (SMSIs). As in many rural infrastructure 
projects, SMSIs also generate job opportunities since it is presumed that 
they are relatively labor intensive than large industries. SMSIs also play 
a role in the thrust to disperse industries in the countryside as most 
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small-scale enterprises are based in rural areas, and labor skills, rather 
than capital or technology, is deemed more significant. Being located in 
rural areas, SMSIs can fully and quickly develop if infrastructure links 
that facilitate marketing activities are established. 
Budget Itemization 
During the balance-of-payments (BOP) crisis in the early 1980s, the 
infrastructure/utilities sector received the largest cuts in government ex- 
penditure. Manasan (1988) cited that the cost-cutting measures carried over 
from the crisis years (and also because of the heavy debt burden) also 
reduced capital outlays drastically and, in fact, contracted significantly in 
real terms since 1983. As a proportion of GNP, spending on infrastructure 
in 1989 fell to three percent from an average of five percent while capital 
outlays dropped to 2.1 percent from an average of 5.3 percent. 
In the sectoral allocation of infrastructure spending, the priorities 
went to power/electrification, transport, and water resources, in that 
order, as indicated in Tables 8-5 and 8-6. The latter two sectors alter- 
nately shared second and third place in various years, although from 
1986 onwards, transport clearly led over water resources except in 1988. 
The decline in the share of power and transport infrastructure gave way 
to huge increases in social infrastructure spending from 1986 onwards. 
Previously, the trend from 1980 to 1985, in 1978 constant prices, was 
declining: from P328 million in 1980 to P119 million in 1985. In 1988, 
however, social/related expenditures moved closer to the level of the 
transport sector. 
A serious handicap in implementing infrastructure projects was the 
inability of agencies (and recipient regions) tasked to undertake such 
activities to absorb the huge budget for capital outlays. Among others, 
this includes raising counterpart funds, budget release delays, and other 
minor bottlenecks that resulted in low utilization of investment funds. 
Out of the total scheduled disbursement of US$1.937 billion for 1991, 
for example, only about US$1.002 billion were actually disbursed. 
Moreover, in the recently proposed Private Sector Development Invest- 
ment Fund (PSDIF) administered by the Coordinating Council of the 
Philippine Assistance Program (CCPAP), about 70 percent of the 
US$1 billion in new infrastructure funds is expected to be raised by the 
private sector. The large private sector proportion will cover the govern- 
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ment's shortfall in counterpart funding, which was estimated at about 
P7 billion for 1992 alone.22 
Proposed Solutions 
Infrastructure Location 
Locating infrastructure in areas where it complements other produc- 
tion programs enhances the synergy of investments in both infra- 
structure and agriculture. One of the apparent benefits of doing this is 
reducing the cost and the time lag associated with production and 
marketing activities. As cited in a preceding section, the inadequacy or 
the poor condition of the road network leading to and from major 
production areas has hindered the access of farmers to better inputs and 
prices, particularly if the areas are quite distant from urban centers. 
Nonetheless, even in nearby areas, poor transport facilities and bad 
roads can deter the greater exchange of goods and services between farm 
and cities, and may even lead to the use of circuitous routes to get to 
major trading centers. 
The same argument holds for infrastructure meant to enhance pro- 
ductivity in non-agricultural economic activities, since industrial growth 
is facilitated by efficient infrastructure facilities that lends economy in 
production costs. Subsequently, as increased contact with suppliers and 
customers contribute to higher production activity, the demand for 
more "accessible" infrastructure obtained at lower cost becomes a pri- 
mary concern. 
Decentralization 
For decades, many have recognized that decentralizing government 
authority in identifying, designing, and implementing infrastructure 
projects would greatly facilitate the approval and completion of projects 
in regions that are geographically distant from Metro Manila. Moreover, 
the devolution of authority to local governments to identify and admin- 
ister regional infrastructure projects provides a "better fit" with actual 
local needs and conditions. The 1991 Local Government Code empow- 
ers local government units to exercise, discharge, and maintain within 
22. The fund will make loans available up to 30 percent of total project cost to 
eligible infrastructure project contractors in selected sectors. 
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their jurisdiction agricultural support services, roads, bridges, water 
supply systems (including communal irrigation systems), drainage and 
sewerage, and reclamation projects. Provincial and city administrators 
also have authority to oversee the development and maintenance of 
telecommunications and transportation services subject to national 
policy guidelines. Moreover, city governments can act as the imple- 
menting agency for certain public works and infrastructure projects 
funded by the national government. All these have greatly facilitated 
the design and implementation of infrastructure projects. However, the 
more tangible expression of the decentralization process is the removal 
of many regional offices of national agencies whose functions are now 
devolved to LGUs.23 
Scale of Infrastructure 
Infrastructure projects may need to be scaled down toward small, imme- 
diate, and high-impact infrastructure as against large projects with long 
gestation periods. Experience with the latter has been frustrating for many 
local officials since funds often run out before the project is completed or, 
as what commonly occurs, the government's attention (and resources) are 
diverted to other regions or another "high profile" project. Also, large 
projects that extend beyond the term of the incumbent administration may 
no longer interest the incoming administration. 
As a poverty alleviation measure, small-scale infrastructure projects 
also have more direct benefits to the rural poor than large-scale ones. 
This is because the former accommodate more labor-intensive methods 
than the latter if the object is to pump-prime the economy. However, 
this does not discount the importance of large-scale infrastructure 
projects in selected sites such as those for energy, telecommunications, 
and transportation. 
Small-scale infrastructure projects like minor roads, communal irriga- 
tion, and water systems can be (and tend to be) located in areas where 
these are most needed and where the incidence of poverty is greater as, 
for example, in remote farm areas. By design, small projects are also 
more flexible and maneuverable than large-scale ones. Ideally, the 
former should have linkages, though this may not be initially apparent, 
with the latter. For instance, minor rural roads can serve as intercon- 
nections to major roads, highways, and bridges. 
23. See Local Government Code (1991) on General Powers and Attributes of LGUs. 
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A recent study on rural roads point to the huge increase in production 
arising from the construction of barangay roads where each additional 
kilometer of road generated an average of about P750,000 per year in 
additional regional production. To achieve the national productivity 
level, the DA estimates an additional 14,000 km. of roads, majority of 
which are to be constructed in the Visayas and Mindanao regions, and 
only about 10 percent in Southern Tagalog. With such road links, farm 
household incomes may increase from six percent to 55 percent.24 
On the whole, the required infrastructure expenditures in real terms 
should at least be equal to, if not more than, the forecast real economic 
growth for 1993, i.e., four percent. This level is required to develop and 
maintain critical infrastructure to boost regional incomes. 
In allocating infrastructure funds, the emphasis on "equal share" for 
all regions also often results in the non-completion of projects. Theo- 
retically, if all regions were to be allocated the same amount of funds for 
infrastructure investment, even funds for small-scale projects (much 
less, large-scale ones) will be hard to come by, as other contingency 
items will also have to be provided for over and above overhead and 
maintenance costs. 
Finally, infrastructure policy should go beyond the piecemeal approach 
wherein each agency concerns itself with the implementation of its own 
projects without consulting other public or private sector agencies that 
undertake (related) infrastructure building, or derive benefits from shared 
infrastructure projects. 
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